This is аn original proceeding in certiorari to review for conflict the respondents’ decision in the case of Mary Gasperino, Appellant, v. The Prudential Insurance Company of America, a Corporation, Respondent,
The plaintiff is the beneficiary in an insurance policy which contains a provision for “double indemnity” in case the insured’s death was the result of an accident. The insured died of typhoid fever. Plaintiff hаs sued for the additional indemnity claiming the death was the result of accidental means and therefore covered by the policy. The facts are undisputed and judgment on the pleadings was rendered for the defеndant.' On appeal, the Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court.
During the hot weather in July the insured found the tap water, which was piped to his home from the city waterworks in Lexington, warm and unpаlatable so he drank the cool and refreshing water from an old, unused well in his backyard. Unknown to him there were typhoid germs in the well water. Pie soon took to his bed with typhoid fever. He suffered the usual effects of the disease such as diarrhea, passing blood, swollen mouth, lips and tongue, cracked and blackened lips, swelling in his abdomen and finally delirium. He died. The parties admit that he died solely of typhoid fever and that it is a specific, infectious disease and cannot be,contracted through a bruise or wound, but can only be contracted by being taken into the alimentary canal with food or drink containing typhoid germs.
Plaintiff claims under the follоwing provisions of, the policy:
‘ ‘ The, amount of Accidental Death Benefit specified . . . shall be payable . . . immediately upon receipt of due proof that the death .of the Insured occurred .. . ,. as a result, directly and independently .of all other causes, of bodily injuries, effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, of which . . . there, is a yisible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, . . . provided, however, that no Accidental Death Benefit shall be payable if the death of the Insured- resulted . , . . directly or indirectly from . . . disease in any form. ’ ’
In sustaining her claim under such provisions the respondents held that the taking of the germs wаs accidental,, the germs were an external means producing violent injury resulting in death; the *627 cracked lips constituted the visible contusion or, wound on the exterior of the body; and that the provision excluding death from disease must be construed not to apply in this .ease because the disease followed or was incidental to accidental bodily injuries caused by the germs. Relator contends.in so construing the policy the respondents gave to plain and unambiguous language an unusual and unnatural meaning.
On certiorari the- question whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is correсt on the merits is, of course, no proper concern of this Court. This Court has not previously considered the particular question decided by respondents. Therefore, the sole issue in this proceeding is whether, in construing the language of the policy, the Court of Appeals’, opinion conflicts with the controlling decisions of .this Court which hold that unambiguous language in an insurance policy is not open to construction, but must be given its plain meaning and be enforced as written. In deciding this issue we have' the right to, and we must, determine whether the language of the policy is ambiguous. [State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Allen,
In deciding if the “double indemnity” provision of the policy coverеd this case, the respondents had two questions to determine. The first: Was the death of the insured from typhoid fever contracted by drinking water, which ■ contained without his knowledge typhoid germs, the result, directly and independently .of .all other causes, of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means of which there Was a visible contusion- or wpund on the exterior of the body? It would be impossible to recоncile all the cases which have considered whether death was. the result of-external, violent and accidental means. Taking each word separately, so many interpretations and so varied aрplications of them can be found in our various state jurisdictions and in England that one may piece together an interpretation of the whole so as to present almost any desired result. As applied to tyрhoid fever, where policies did not expressly exclude death from disease, we find cases holding that death from such cause
*628
was covered under a policy indemnifying for accidental death. One of them, strоngly relied on by respondents, is Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company,
The seсond question presented to the respondents was: Does death from typhoid fever result directly or indirectly from disease in any form? This question does concern us because it calls for determination whether the clause excluding death from disease is ambiguous. If it is ambiguous, then the respondents -had the right which they have exercised to construe it, and under their construction to determine whether it applied to the facts in this case. Such provision has been considered chiefly in only one class of cases. Those are eases where disease followed a violent external injury to the body. They have, declared the rule where death results from disease which follows as a natural, though not as a necessary, consequence of an accidental physical injury (for illustration, from blood-poisoning infecting a break in the skin), then the death is- within the tеrms of an accident policy because the death is the proximate result of the injury, and not of the disease as an independent cause. The disease is a mere link in the chain of causation betweеn the accident and the death. Under such' conditions an exclusion clause has been construed not to apply. [See 6 Cooley Briefs on Insurance (2 Ed.), 5346; 5 Couch on Insurance, sec. 1141.] Although the case of Cameron v. Massachusetts Protective Assn.,
In giving the exclusion clause, such a construction as to hold death from ■ typhoid' fever was without its terms, the respondents caused conflict with our decisions that unambiguous language must be given its plain meaning and enforced as written. Respondents’ opinion should be quashed. It is so ordered.