282 S.W. 367 | Ark. | 1926
On October 11, 1924, the county court of Prairie County entered into a written contract with an accountant to audit the books of all county officers. The contract specified the amount and terms of payments to be made by the county as compensation for the services rendered. A citizen and taxpayer of Prairie County instituted an action in the chancery court to restrain the county officers from performing the contract, on the ground that the contract was void because, at the time it was entered into, there was no unexpended appropriation *1005
for the payment of general county expenses. That cause was heard on an agreed statement of facts, in which it was stated that there was no specific appropriation made by the quorum court for the purpose of paying for the audit of the books of county officers, and that the appropriation for general county purposes for the current fiscal year had been entirely expended. The trial court dismissed the complaint for want of equity, and on appeal to this court an additional record was lodged here, showing that the quorum court of Prairie County at its regular session had made an appropriation for general county purposes, which appropriation was unexpended, and that the county court, on October 30, 1924, the same being a day of the regular term of that court, entered an order ratifying and approving the original contract of October 11, 1924. This court, in passing upon the above facts, said: "Conceding, without deciding, that the contract was void and unenforceable at the time of its execution because of the fact that there was no unexpended appropriation of funds, the county court had full power, after the appropriation had been made by the quorum court, to enter into a contract with the accountant to audit the books of the several county officers, and the ratification, of the original contract was valid for the reason that it was tantamount to making a new contract." Craig v. Grady,
The defendants, in their answer, denied the material allegations of the complaint, and pleaded the former decree of the Prairie Chancery Court and of this court, on appeal above mentioned, as res judicata of the present action. The undisputed facts in the record are to the effect that the quorum court of Prairie County had duly appropriated the sum of $5,000 on October 22, 1924, for general county purposes. This was the amount of the appropriation for general county purposes when the county court, on October 30, 1924, entered an order ratifying the contract of October 11, 1924. Warrants have been issued under the contract as ratified amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $7,134.99. It was shown that warrants in the sum of $2,551.20 were ordered issued by the county court to Leathem Company after the general appropriation had been wholly expended.
The view we have reached makes it unnecessary to set forth any of the testimony except that bearing upon the issue of whether or not the warrants issued under the contract to the extent of the excess over the appropriation made to defray county general purposes are void. The trial court found that the contract and warrants issued thereunder were valid, except certain warrants *1007 for which the county received credit, and not in dispute here, and rendered a judgment dismissing the complaint for want of equity, from which is this appeal.
1. The case of Craig v. Grady,
In Craig v. Grady, supra, it appears that, at the time the contract was ratified, there was an unexpended appropriation for general county purposes, and there is nothing in this record to show that at that time the warrants in controversy had been issued. To be sure, if the warrants now in controversy had not been issued at the time of the ratification of the contract then the contract was not subject to challenge on that ground. So the issue here as to the validity of these warrants was not raised in Craig v. Grady, supra, and could not have been *1008 raised, and the judgments in that case are not res judicatae of the issue here raised as to the validity of the warrants issued in excess of the appropriation for county, general purposes.
2. Section 1976 of C. M. Digest provides that: "No county court or agent of any county shall hereafter make any contract on behalf of the county unless an appropriation has been previously made therefor and is wholly or in part unexpended, and in no event shall any county court or agent of any county make any contract in excess of any such appropriation made, and the amount of such contract or contracts shall be limited to the amount of the appropriation made by the quorum court." This section is an amendment of 5 of the act of March 18, 1879, which provides as follows: "No county court or agent of any county shall hereafter make any contract on behalf of the county unless an appropriation, has been previously made therefor and is wholly or in part unexpended."
In Durrett v. Buxton,
In Scott County v. Advance-Rumley Thresher Co., 288 F. 739, at page 747, the Circuit Court of Appeals, passing on an Arkansas contract made by the county court for the purchase of a tractor for road work, when there was no appropriation by the quorum court for road work, and when the amount exceeded the sum appropriated for other expenses of county government, referring to 1976, C. M. Digest, supra, said: "Before the amendment to the act referred to it had been held by the courts of Arkansas and by the Federal courts that, where a contract had been made, if there was any appropriation, the contract could exceed the appropriation, but the amendment of 1917 to the original act seems to have been for the particular purpose of preventing that in the future." The court held that the action of the court in making the contract under these circumstances was void.
We have held in quite recent cases that it is within the jurisdiction of the county court to enter into contracts to have the books of the county and the accounts of its officers audited. Leathem Co. v. Jackson County,
As we have seen, the case of Craig v. Grady, supra, is res judicata as to the validity of the contract and warrants issued thereunder in all particulars to the extent of the appropriation made for general county purposes when the contract was ratified. But it follows from what we have said that the contract for an amount exceeding this appropriation and the warrants issued and directed to be paid in excess of such appropriation are null and void. The learned trial court erred in, not so holding. The decree is therefore reversed, and the cause *1011 will be remanded with directions to cancel the outstanding warrants in favor of the appellees in the sum of $2,551.20, and to perpetually enjoin the collector from receiving, and also the treasurer from receiving and paying, such warrants.