State Ex Rel. Pflanz v. County Court of Dane CountyState Ex Rel. Pflanz v. County Court of Dane County
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hallows
The sole question is whether under sec. 954.02 (2), Stats., it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe Otto E. Pflanz, Jr., filed fraudulent tax returns. A complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and must be made upon oath before a magistrate or other person empowered to issue warrants of arrest; but the complaint besides alleging the offense must set forth facts showing probable cause before a warrant of an arrest may issue. 1
Prior to 1949 when the provisions of the present sec. 954.02, Stats., were enacted the practice was for the magistrate to examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath and to reduce the charge to writing in the complaint if he thought there was probable cause. Much of the basis for the making of the complaint and which established probable cause was not included in the complaint and did not appear in the record because magistrates normally kept no record of such testimony and were not required to do so. This practice of taking oral testimony to satisfy the magistrate that probable cause existed is fully set forth and was held to meet constitutional standards in State v. Davie (1885), 62 Wis. 305, 22 N. W. 411, Murphy v. State (1905), 124 Wis. 635, 102 N. W. 1087.
Thus the practice of issuing a warrant for an arrest based upon a complaint has been the source of some misunderstanding because of the dual nature served by the complaint. For instance in the instant case the crime charged is a misdemeanor, State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 609, 143 N. W. 2d 437, and the complaint serves not only a charging function upon which the accused may be tried (sec. 954.036, Stats.) but also serves as a basis for his arrest. The practice in Wisconsin up to the time of State ex rel. White v. Simpson (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N. W. 2d 391, emphasized the charging aspect of the complaint because of the major role played by the district attorney in deciding whether a person should be charged at all. Overlooked in importance was the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Under the present practice of issuing warrants for arrest on complaints, two essentials are necessary: (1)
The requirement of an independent and neutral magistrate to pass upon a complaint for the arrest of a citizen is found in the constitutional mandate that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” U. S. Const., fourth amendment;
Since sec. 954.02, Stats., is taken from the
In
Giordenello
the complaint charged a crime of illegally purchasing narcotics. In holding the complaint did not measure up to the standards of
The Jaben Case is directly in point. There, the complaint charged the filing of fraudulent income tax returns by the accused in violation of the federal law and the question was the sufficiency of the complaint to show probable cause. In concluding the basis stated in the complaint was adequate, the court pointed out that the complaint included the following: (1) The complainant was identified as a special agent of the internal revenue service, (2) that he investigated Jaben’s tax liability for the year in question in the performance of his duties imposed upon him by law and that an examination was made of the tax returns for that year and other years, that the complainant identified and interviewed third parties with whom the taxpayer did business, consulted private and public records reflecting taxpayer’s income and interviewed third parties having knowledge of the taxpayer’s financial condition; and the complainant swore he had personal knowledge of the taxpayer’s actual income because of his investigation.
The complaint in the instant case
3
admittedly does not contain all the source information of
Jaben.
It fails to
The
Jaben Case
did not lay down the maximum or ideal standards but merely the minimum. It requires a sufficient disclosure of the source of the complainant’s information and knowledge and his identity and qualifications .to enable the magistrate to satisfy himself that the conclusion or judgment of an expert in tax matters is probably correct. In
Jaben
three other justices of the supreme court would have required more foundation information in the complaint before a magistrate could accept the judgment of the complainant, but the majority opinion stated that information relating to a crime generally falls into two categories: “(1) that information
This case is essentially different from State ex rel. White v. Simpson, a paternity case wherein the complainant from her own knowledge and experience knew she had had intercourse, with whom and was pregnant. The crime charged in the instant case does not rest upon the personal experience or observable evidence of the complainant but upon his opinion based upon facts discovered by his investigation of Pflanz’s records. We think the complaint is wholly insufficient under our statute in its statement of the facts upon which an independent magistrate could find probable cause.
It is important that the magistrate who issues the warrant of arrest not only be neutral and indépendent but he must act in a neutral and a detached manner. The authorities are unanimous on this point. Jaben v. United States, supra; United States v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U. S. 102, 85 Sup. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684; Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108, 84 Sup. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723; Giordenello v. United States, supra; Johnson v. United States (1948), 333 U. S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436; Nathanson v. United States (1933), 290 U. S. 41, 54 Sup. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159.
“It follows that a search warrant cannot be issued upon a statement under oath based entirely upon information and belief, unless competent evidence of the facts which are the basis of the belief are stated, and unless those facts are sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. If the complaint contains a bare statement on information and belief, without giving the basis for the same, it permits the complainant to determine probable cause, rather than the magistrate, whose duty it is to perform this judicial function. ‘The immunity guaranteed by the constitution should not be lightly set aside by a mere general declaration of a non-judicial officer that he has reason to believe and does believe, etc. The undisclosed reason may fall far short of probable cause.’ ”
The complaint does not give sufficient facts to allow a magistrate to reasonably infer probable cause. The identity and ability of DeYoung, his duty to investigate the tax status of Pflanz and the sufficiency of the investigation to disclose a crime cannot be reasonably inferred from the complaint even though judicial notice was taken of sec. 71.11 (44) (c), Stats. This section, used by the circuit court to find a sufficiency of the complaint, provides for secrecy of income tax returns but allows others besides agents and employees of the tax department to have access thereto. The section provides the following persons may also examine tax returns : Public officers of the state or political subdivision or their agents, members of any legislative committee or their agents, public officers of the federal government or their agents, and persons by virtue of a court order. It is not reasonable to infer that because one
It is noted that the present complaint is in an old form which was used prior to the change of the statute in 1949 and is to the effect that the complainant was examined by the magistrate under oath. This is no longer the practice and the present practice requires a complaint to state the facts evidencing probable cause. This may be done either directly in the complaint or indirectly by an affidavit setting forth the basis for the probable cause and made a part of the complaint by incorporation. In either event, the facts will be in the complaint and available on review if their sufficiency is challenged. This statutory requirement creates no burden but it does require more attention to be given to drafting complaints for arrest than was used in this case.
By the Court. — Judgment is reversed, with direction to make the writ of prohibition absolute.
Notes
“954.02 Complaint and warrant or summons; service; return. (1) A complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and may be upon information and belief. It shall be made upon oath before a magistrate or other person empowered to issue warrants of arrest.
“(2) If it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused committed it, the magistrate shall issue a warrant or summons.”
These instances are listed in Dahl & Boyle, Procedure and the Law of Arrest, Search and Seizure 40, n. 5, as follows:
“As to warrants issued without complaint see: Sec. 962.21 Wis. Stats. (by magistrate where he has knowledge that a battery is about to be committed or that a fight is about to occur); Sec. 966.12 Wis. Stats. (by coroner where person charged by inquest is not in custody); Sec. 253.22 (by county court where orders not performed); Sec. 954.20 (by court where material witness beyond subpoena); Sec. 955.02 Wis. Stats, (where indictment or information); Sec. 954.46 Wis. Stats, (where perjury).”
(omitting formal parts) “Jack E. DeYoung, being duly sworn and examined on oath, complains to the undersigned Magistrate (Judge) (Court Commissioner) of the County of Dane, Wisconsin, that Otto E. Pflanz, Jr. AGE: 48 430 West Wisconsin Avenue Portage, Wisconsin on the 17th day of February, 1960, at the city of Madison, in said County of Dane, State of Wisconsin, did feloniously render a false and fraudulent Wisconsin Return of Income for the calendar year 1959, to-wit: the said defendant did report a net taxable income of $3,074.44, whereas in fact he had a net taxable income of $9,372.00;
“For a second and separate offense . . .
“For a third and separate offense . . .
“For a fourth and separate offense . . .
“For a fifth and separate offense . . .
“** 2) and that this complaint is based on: personal knowledge of the complainant who made investigations of the defendant’s records
“all of the above offenses
“against the peace, and contrary to the statute 71.11 (42) in such cases made and provided, as said deponent verily believes, and prays that the said defendant(s) above named may be arrested and dealt with according to law. Made pursuant to Section 954.02, Wisconsin Statutes.
“/&/ Jack E. DeYoung
“Subscribed and sworn to before me,
this 9th day of February, 1966
/s/ William C. Sachtjen
Magistrate (Judge) (Court Commissioner)”