State ex rel. Peirce v. MerrittState ex rel. Peirce v. Merritt
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Henry
*283
Judge Gantt, delivering the opinion of the court of appeals, said: It is claimed by the appellants that the jurisdiction of the State court on the.subject matter of this suit was determined by the proceedings in bankruptcy. In this connection the facts are these : Brock, Rogers & Co. being insolvent, made a sale of a large part of their stock, perhaps the whole of it, to Peirce on the 7th day. of October, 1874. A creditor of Brock, Rogers & Co. sued them by attachment on the 9th day of October, 1874, charging this‘sale to have been fraudulent; the attachment was levied on the stock sold. Peirce claimed *287the stock as purchased. The creditor gave the sheriff an indemnifying bond arid directed him to’ hold the property as belonging, when attached, to Brock, Rogers & Co. Thereupon Peirce sued the creditor on the bond, and before the end of the month proceedings’ were commenced in the United States district court under which Brock, Rogers & Co. were adjudicated bankrupts on the 14th day of November, 1874, and their assignee, on the 31st day of December, 1874, claimed the property from the sheriff. That official delivered it to the assignee without a contest; and it is claimed by the creditor who is appellant here, that these circumstances defeated the action of Peirce against him. We cannot perceive the reasonableness of this claim, and think that the creditor has no more ground for making it than he would have had if, after seizing the goods by attachment and removing them to a warehouse of his own selection, they had been consumed by fire. By this action he estopped himself to say when the goods were demanded by the assignee that they were not the property of Brock, Rogers & Co. The sheriff, of course,’ was in the same position, and it was, therefore, the necessary consequence of the action of the creditor that if proceedings in-bankruptcy were commenced and prosecuted to judgment within a given period after the attachment, these goods must without a possibility of dispute, pass into the hands of the assignee in bankruptcy of Brock, Rogers &.Co. If the same proceedings having been commenced in bankruptcy, no attachment had intervened and the assignee of Brock, Rogers & Co. had shed Peirce as the fraudulent purchaser of these goods, the latter might have‘had difficulty in vindicating his right to them under the sale shown by this record; but at any rate he would have been at liberty to aver and prove that sale, and if he could, to uphold its fairness. But no such questions as would- then have been legitimately discussed between Peirce and the- assignee were, possible between that assignee find the attaching creditor. Undoubtedly the attaching creditor,-in such a *288case occupies a position of peculiar embarrassment. By his action he has so narrowed the issues that he must either maintain-, in a controversy with the purchaser, the invalidity of the sale by which that purchaser claims the goods, or he must respond to him for their full value. If he succeed in maintaining this invalidity he gains only a trifling advantage when the goods have been seized by the assignee in bankruptcy. All which victory yields to him in that event, beyond immunity from the claim of the pretended purchaser, will be a slightly increased dividend from the estate of the bankrupt, which, by his exertions, he has augmented. This seems hard, but the law is clear. The hardship is due to his own misdirected enterprise, and not to the operation of the statute. If instead of attaching and seeking to gain a priority over the other creditors, he had invoked the aid of the bankrupt law to enforce an equal division of the property of the insolvent, and to sot aside fraudulent conveyances of it, he would probably’ have been more successful in impeaching the transfer, which is alleged to be fraudulent and certainly would have run no risk of the disastrous consequences which may possibly flow from the adoption of the more direct and energetic course of attachment. Moreover, he would have had in the courts of the United States the benefit of some rules of evidence which, as we conceive, have no place in the State courts.
What we mean by this is, that whereas the bankrupt act declares that certain facts shall be taken as establishing a certain prima facie legal presumption, thus assuring to the assignee in bankruptcy seeking to collect the assets of the bankrupt, the benefit of a rule, which, unless positively encountered and overthrown by countervailing evidence, will be conclusive, no such artificial effect can be claimed for the same facts by either party to a contest not looking to enforcement of the bankrupt act. If a party being insolvent, or in contemplation of bankruptcy, makes a transfer or conveyance of any part of his property to a *289person having reasonable cause to believe him to be insolvent, &c., the transfer, &c., if assailed under the provision of the bankrupt law, will be void, and the fact that such transfer, &c., is not made in the ordinary course of business of the debtor ¡mail be prima facie evidence that it is fraudulent. (§ 85 of the bankrupt act as amended in 1874.) The circumstances here instanced by the statute as constituting fraud prima facie are of a nature to induce suspicion without reference to the statute, and between A and B conducting- a controversy respecting the property transferred, either party desiring to show the fraudulent nature of the transfer, will be at liberty to adduce the fact that the transfer was not made in the usual and ordinary course of business of the debtor. Such evidence will he admissable for that purpose as evidence of any other relevant fact will be admissible. Yet in administering justice in the State courts between two parties, neither of whom is attempting to enforce the bankrupt act, it would, we conceive, be erroneous for the courts to single out this circumstance and tell the jury what it, unconnected with other circumstances, would establish, and perhaps, also, if this and nothing more was the evidence on the charge of fraud, it would be error for the court to tell the jury that it, without more and unexplained, would amount to proof of fraud. At most it would be a circumstance from which the jury would he at liberty to reach a different conclusion. The State courts do not sit to administer the bankrupt law. So far as Congress in the exercise of its unquestionable power to pass a general bankrupt law forbids, and, therefore, renders unlawful any particular act of any individual, it will he unlawful everywhere in the United States. But when in carrying into effect the provisions of such a system it prescribes a mode of procedure and artificial rules of evidence, the operation of these must be confined, (if not to the forums especially charged with the execution of the bankrupt law,) to cases in which the enforcement of that law is sought.
Notes
See infra, page 286.