287 N.W. 297 | Minn. | 1939
Before the service of these orders, relator applied to this court for a writ of prohibition, and on his verified petition attacking the constitutionality of the act under which the proceedings were instituted we issued a temporary writ prohibiting the probate court from proceeding with the hearing until the further order of this court. The matter is now here on relator's application to make the writ permanent.
Because of a recognized need for legislation to deal with sex offenders and a belief, shared in by medical authorities and others, that sex crimes are committed because of a weakness of the will as well as of the intellect, the 1939 legislature enacted c. 369, entitled: "A bill for an act relating to persons having a psychopathic personality." Section I of the act reads:
"The term 'psychopathic personality' as used in this act means the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons."
Section 2, in part, reads:
"Except as otherwise herein or hereafter provided, all laws now in force or hereafter enacted relating to insane persons, to persons alleged to be insane, and to persons found to be insane, shall apply *547 with like force and effect to persons having a psychopathic personality, to persons alleged to have such personality, and to persons found to have such personality, respectively."
The act also provides that the facts be submitted to the county attorney and his approval be procured before a petition be filed with the probate court; that the probate judge may at his discretion exclude the public from the hearing; that the patient may be represented by counsel, and if the court determines that the patient is financially unable to obtain counsel it is empowered, but is not required to appoint, counsel for him; and that the patient shall be entitled to have subpoenas issued to compel the attendance of witnesses. From a finding that a "patient" is a "psychopathic personality," he may appeal to the district court upon compliance with the provisions of 3 Mason Minn. St. 1938 Supp. §§ 8992-166, 8992-167, 8992-169, and 8992-170.
Section 3 of the act reads:
"The existence in any person of a condition of psychopathic personality shall not in any case constitute a defense to a charge of crime, nor relieve such person from liability to be tried upon a criminal charge, unless such person is in a condition of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, or lunacy within the meaning of the laws relating to crimes and criminal procedure."
Relator challenges the constitutionality of L. 1939, c. 369, on three grounds. He contends (1) that it violates Minn. Const. art.
1. We deal first with the question of the power of the legislature under our constitution to confer upon the probate court jurisdiction over persons having what is termed a "psychopathic personality."
Minn. Const. 6, § 1, reads: *548
"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, courts of probate, justices of the peace, and such other courts, inferior to the supreme court, as the legislature may from time to time establish by a two-thirds vote."
Section 7 of the same article, in part, reads:
"A probate court shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianship, but no other jurisdiction, except as prescribed by this Constitution."
It will be noted that the constitution specifically limits the jurisdiction of the probate court to "estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianship." If persons having "psychopathic personalities" are to be included among those over whom the probate court has jurisdiction, it must be because they are persons subject to guardianship. The constitution does not specifically state what class of persons are subject to guardianship but leaves the regulation of that question to the legislature. It was so decided in State ex rel. Chesley v. Wilcox,
"The manner in which jurisdiction conferred by the constitution on any court or officer shall be exercised when not prescribed by the constitution itself, or the power to regulate it vested elsewhere, may be regulated by the legislature."
It was there held that the putting under guardianship of all persons who are proper subjects for it — insane persons, incorrigible drunkards, idiots, spendthrifts, as well as minors — comes within the jurisdiction of the probate court.
While this court in State ex rel. Chesley v. Wilcox,supra, referred only to insane persons, incorrigible drunkards, idiots, spendthrifts, and minors as included in the class subject to guardianship within the jurisdiction of the probate court, we do not think it was intended for all time to limit the classification to those named or to deprive the probate court of jurisdiction over other types of "unnaturals" such as the class involved herein.
Leavitt v. City of Morris,
The constitutionality of L. 1917, c. 397, known as "The Juvenile Court Act," was determined in Peterson v. McAuliffe,
L. 1939, c. 369, § 1, defines the term "psychopathic personality" to mean "the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons." Dorland, American Illustrated Medical Dictionary (15 ed.) defines "psychopathic" as "pertaining to mental disease." It naturally follows that a "psychopathic personality" is one characterized by a mental disorder. It is well recognized that there are many types and degrees of mental disorders. An article appearing in2 American Journal of Medical Jurisprudence, March-April, 1939, No. 3, on "Mental Abnormality in Relation to Crime" (Draper), pp. 161, 163, refers to "psychopathic personalities" thus:
"These are individuals who show a lifelong and constitutional tendency not to conform to the customs of the group. They habitually misbehave. They have no sense of responsibility to their fellow-men or to society as a whole. Due to their inherent inability to follow any one occupation, they succumb readily to the temptation of getting easy money through a life of crime. There is usually a history of delinquency in early life. These individuals fail to learn by experience. They are inadequate, incompatible, and inefficient. *550 This class is sometimes designated as 'Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.' Before making this diagnosis, every other diagnostic possibility must be considered and excluded. In this group we see pathological lying, prostitution, vagrancy, illegitimacy, alcoholism and drug addiction. The term 'moral deficiency' is sometimes used to characterize this group. These patients may have psychotic episodes superimposed upon the trends just mentioned. Many of these individuals come into contact with the courts on account of threats, assaults, quarrels and vagrancy."
It is to be noted that the definition given above includes not only the sexually irresponsible but also others of immoral tendencies. The fact that the legislature has chosen to limit the class to the former does not make the act more or less objectionable from a jurisdictional standpoint. Whether the limitation constitutes a basis for objection on the ground that the title fails to express the subject of the act will be later considered.
While the abnormalities of the group placed under the jurisdiction of the probate court by this act differ in form from those which characterize inebriates, idiots, and insane persons, the need for observation and supervision is the same, and the considerations which led this court in State ex rel. Chesley v. Wilcox, supra, to recognize the latter as being proper subjects for guardianship apply with equal force to the former. In the interest of humanity and for the protection of the public, persons so afflicted should be given treatment and confined for that purpose rather than for the purpose of punishment. This we believe to be true even though their mental deficiencies might not be such as to require absolving them from the effects of the criminal statutes. We find no difficulty in holding that the legislature may give to the probate court jurisdiction over such personalities.
2. It is urged by relator that L. 1939, c. 369, is void because in violation of Minn. Const. art.
The objects of the constitutional provision have been often expressed in the decisions of this court. They are, first, to prevent "logrolling legislation" or "omnibus bills," by which a large number of different and disconnected subjects are united in one bill and then carried through by a combination of interests; and, secondly, to prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the legislature by including provisions in a bill whose title gives no intimation of the proposed legislation, or of the interests affected. 6 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. 1932 Supp.) § 8906, and cases cited.
While the provision of the constitution is mandatory, it is to be given a liberal and not a strict construction. Johnson v. Harrison,
"The term 'subject,' as used in the constitution, is to be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow the legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. * * * All that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject. The large number of related or cognate matters often treated of under some comprehensive title, such as 'Criminal Code,' 'Penal Code,' 'Code of Civil Procedure,' 'Private Corporations,' 'Railroad Corporations,' and the like, are familiar illustrations of what may be legitimately included in one act. * * * The subject may be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses to make it, provided it constitutes, in the constitutional sense, a single *552 subject, and not several. The connection or relationship of several matters, such as will render them germane to one subject and to each other, can be of various kinds, as, for example, of means to ends, of different subdivisions of the same subject, or that all are designed for the same purpose, or that both are designated by the same term. Neither is it necessary that the connection or relationship should be logical; it is enough that the matters are connected with and related to a single subject in popular signification. The generality of the title of an act is no objection, provided only it is sufficient to give notice of the general subject of the proposed legislation and of the interests likely to be affected. The title was never intended to be an index of the law."
These rules and tests have been applied in a great many later cases. City of Crookston v. Board of Co. Commrs.
A title broader than the statute, if it is fairly indicative of what is included in it, does not offend the constitution. State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co.
Applying these principles to the statute before us, it can be said: (1) If the term "psychopathic personality" gives sufficient notice *553 that the act relates to sexually irresponsible persons, the class embraced by the terms of the statute is adequately named in the title; and (2) if the act affects such persons in a manner and by a mode reasonably to be associated with laws of this type, the fact that the title fails to mention such provisions does not render it too general from a constitutional viewpoint.
It is true that the term "psychopathic" is not a part of the working vocabulary of most people. Yet the reasonably well informed recognize it as having reference to mental disorders. (See Dorland, American Illustrated Medical Dictionary [15 ed.]supra. To those concerned with mental cases, it connotes a condition of the mind causing the person afflicted to be hopelessly immoral. In either case, the fact that the law deals with the sexually irresponsible would not come as a surprise to legislators or members of the public who might have occasion to read its title.
Since the title indicates that the act deals with persons of abnormal minds, the manner in and the mode by which the law is to operate are clearly germane to the subject expressed. That the statute is essentially the same in these respects as are the laws of this state which apply to insane, idiots, and inebriates appear sufficiently to indicate this fact.
Examination of titles held not to be violative of the constitutional provision fortifies the conclusion which we have reached. In Johnson v. Harrison, supra, the title in question was "An act to establish a probate code." The body of the entitled act includes provisions which cast the descent and determine in whom property left by an intestate shall vest and which allow this title to be asserted by the heir in courts other than probate wholly independent of any action of or administration in the latter, as well as provisions fixing the jurisdiction of and procedure in the probate court.
In State v. McDow,
Turning to recent decisions from other states having similar constitutional provisions, we find that the following titles have been considered not too general in a constitutional sense: "An act relating to marriage and divorce" (Titus v. Titus,
We conclude, therefore, that the constitutional mandate is not violated by the title here in question. Its defects may offend the principles of legislative draftsmanship but not those of constitutional law.
3. Is the act so indefinite and uncertain as to make it void? Conceding that it is imperfectly drawn, the statute is nevertheless valid if it contains a competent and official expression of the legislative will. State v. Partlow,
Statutes must be so construed as to give effect to every section and part, and when any doubts arise as to the constitutionality thereof such doubts must be resolved in favor of the law. Hurst v. Town of Martinsburg,
Applying these principles to the case before us, it can reasonably be said that the language of § 1 of the act is intended to include those persons who by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who as a result are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire. It would not be reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to every person guilty of sexual misconduct nor even to persons having strong sexual propensities. Such a definition would not only make the act impracticable of enforcement and perhaps unconstitutional in its application, but would also be an unwarranted departure from the accepted meaning of the words defined. See Draper, "Mental Abnormality *556 in Relation to Crime," 2 Am. Jour. Med. Jur. No. 3, p. 163.
Section 2 of the act incorporates by reference all laws now in force or hereafter enacted relating to insane persons, to persons alleged to be insane, and to persons found to be insane. Such practice has been held proper. Hassett v. Welch,
Section 3 of the act provides that the existence in any person of a condition of psychopathic personality shall not constitute a defense to a charge of crime. On its surface this section would appear to imply that persons with psychopathic personalities are sane. The confusion which is thus caused is obviated when we consider the limited scope of the term "insanity" when used to indicate a defense to crime. In this state an uncontrollable and insane impulse to commit crime, in the mind of one who is conscious of the nature and quality of the act, is not allowed to relieve a person of criminal liability. State v. Scott,
The final argument of the relator is that the act denies a "patient" a jury trial and fails to secure certain other rights of defendants in criminal proceedings. Since the proceedings here in question are not of a criminal character, we will confine ourselves to consideration of relator's right to a jury trial. While persons cannot be *557
adjudged insane and committed without notice and an opportunity to be heard (State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings,
If relator has a right to a jury trial, it is because such was provided at common law when our constitution was adopted. While no one has contended that "psychopathic personalities" were confined and treated at common law, the claim has been made that the issue of idiocy was, in early times, decided by a jury. The other view is that if such ever was the case the practice had been abandoned before our constitution was adopted. That we are committed to the latter belief appears quite unequivocally from the language of this court in Vinstad v. State Board of Control,
We conclude that the act is constitutional both in form and in application.
The restraining order is vacated and the writ quashed.
MR. JUSTICE HILTON, being incapacitated by illness, took no part. *558