OPINION
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s objections to allow respondent Blohm to deny paternity in a URESA petition. Wе reverse.
*114 FACTS
Marilyn Ondracek and Jeffrey Blohm were married in 1974 and divorced on July 20, 1978 (in Itasca County). The Judgment and Decree provides as follоws:
That there have been born two children, as a result of the marriage, to wit: Kelly Corrinne Blohm, age three years and Jeffrey Allen Blohm, Jr., agе one year.
The children were born, respectively, December 12, 1974, and December 31, 1976. The court ordered child support in the amоunt of $35 per month for each child, support to begin on Blohm’s release from St. Cloud Reformatory.
Blohm was initially represented by counsel in the dissolution action, which his wife initiated. His counsel filed for him an Answer & Counter-Petition, signed and sworn to by Blohm, which admitted the following:
4. That two children hаve been born as issue of said parties, namely Kelly Cor-rinne Blohm, age 3 years, and Jeffrey Allen Blohm, Jr., age 1 year.
The Counter-Petition sought a decree of separation rather than a dissolution, and requested custody of the children. Before the dissolution hearing, Blohm discharged his attorney and thereafter appeared pro se. There is no indication that the paternity issue was the cause of thе disagreement with counsel, or that Blohm contested paternity at the hearing.
Itasca County brought a URESA action against Blohm in 1982, claiming that hе had paid no child support. Following several continuances, Blohm appeared in Hen-nepin County Family Court in January, 1983, and stated thаt he had consulted with an attorney who had advised him to contest paternity and request blood testing. The county opposed the motiоn for blood tests. The referee ordered a public defender appointed to represent Blohm.
A Family Court referee on Mаrch 1, 1983, ordered blood testing. Blood tests were taken in October, 1983, and the results appear in appellant’s appendix showing greater than 99% likelihood of paternity of both children. The results, however, do not appear in the file, and the referee set a pre-trial conference on the issue of paternity. The trial court, reviewing this order and finding that “the file contains no evidence of the results of the blood tests which were performed on [Blohm],” confirmed the referee’s order allowing Blohm to go forward with this defense. The trial сourt rejected the county’s claim that the defense of non-paternity was barred under principles of res judicata.
ISSUE
Did an affirmativе finding of paternity in a judgment and decree of dissolution constitute res judicata to bar the asserted defense of non-paternity in a subsequent URESA action?
ANALYSIS
Appellant contends that paternity was clearly placed in issue by the pleadings in the dissolution action and that thе finding of fact that the children are the minor children of respondent is res judicata and bars further litigation of the issue in the paternity actiоn. We agree.
Respondent argues that the issue of paternity was not actually litigated in the dissolution action. Further that because rеspondent was unrepresented by counsel in the dissolution action, res judicata should not apply.
The trial court relied on
Mund v. Mund,
In Smith, however, the parties withheld from consideration of the court the issues claimed to have been litigated (i.e., property settlement). In Mund, the court permitted the reopening of a judgment and decree of dissolution on the issue of paternity where the parties stipulated that there was no living issue of the marriage.
The facts in this case are different. The issue was not withheld but considered and decided. In Mund the issue was not in *115 tendеd to be part of the judgment, but under our facts it was. The Mund case was heard by default, while in this case both parties appeared at thе hearing. Finally, in Mund, the post-judgment order facilitated legitimizing the child. Here, there is an attempt to illegitimize 2 children, ages 7 and 9.
The trial court rеlied on principles of collateral estoppel requiring that an issue be actually litigated in order to preclude later аdjudication. However, we find principles of res judicata, or “claim preclusion,” applicable.
See, Hauser v. Mealey,
In regard to respоndent’s contention that because he was not represented in the divorce action res judicata should not apply, we find no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in dissolution proceedings.
In
Hepfel v. Bashaw,
that in paternity adjudications counsel must be provided indigent defendants whеre the complainant is represented by the county attorney. * * * It must be noted that the issue before us was narrowly limited to the right to counsel in paternity actions, which are, by their very nature, sui generis. Thus, our holding in no way affects the right of indigent defendants in other civil actions to court-appointed counsel.
A dissolution action, however, is distinguishable from a paternity action. Although the same financial consequеnces may result, neither party is represented by the county attorney. Moreover, due to the presumption of paternity, the evidentiary problem identified in
Hepfel
is not present. Finally, with children found to be issue of the marriage, there is no “social stigma arising from an adjudication оf paternity.”
A divorced man challenging a paternity finding pursuant to a dissolution decree is not without recourse. He may move to vacate or amend the decree on grounds of mistake, newly discovered evidence or fraud or misrepresentation by the adversе party. Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(1), (2), (3);
Hedstrom v. Hedstrom,
Also, the Uniform Parentage Act furnishes a remedy. It provides:
Subdivision 1. A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his father under section 257.55, subdivision 1, clause (a), (b), or (c) may bring an action:
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(b) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under section 257.55, subdivision 1, clause (a), (b), or (c) only if thе action is brought within a reasonable time after the person bringing the action has obtained knowledge of relevant facts, but in no evеnt later than three years after the child’s birth.
Minn.Stat. § 257.57, subd. 1 (1982) (emphasis added). Since the children were more than three years old at the time of respondent’s motion, this action was not available to him.
*116 DECISION
We reverse.