Aрpeal from an order of the district court, Hennepin county, quashing a writ of certiorari issued by that court to the probate court of Hennepin county. Appellant was attorney for the respondent Smith while she ivas administratrix оf the estate of Josephine E. Erman, deceased. In her final account respondent, as administratrix, asked the probate court to allow her a certain sum as attorney’s fees for appellant for services rendered by him as her attorney as administratrix. One of the heirs filed objections to the allowanсe of the account, particularly to the amount of attorney’s fees, and to an item of $139 claimеd by appellant to have been advanced by him to the administratrix for estate purposes. The disputе over the attorney’s fees and claimed advancement ivas referred to a referee, who found and reported to the probate court that the reasonable value of appellant’s services as attorney was $500; that the sum of $139 had been paid to appellant to pay to one Denvеr, a creditor of the estate, but that appellant had not given the estate credit for this sum and that therеfore the estate ivas entitled to a credit against the attorney’s fees in the amount of $139. The probаte court adopted the findings of the referee and on November 25, 1935, made its order allowing the final account. No appeal was taken from that order. On January 13, 1936, appellant petitioned the district сourt for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the probate court, claiming that the order Avas not apрealable and that the probate court had no authority to make the $139 deduction from the allOAvanсe for fees. The writ was *169 issued on that date. On April 4, 1936, the district court entered its order quashing the writ of certiorari on the ground that the order of the prohate court was appealable.
The writ of
certiorari
under our practice is a writ of reviеw in the nature of a writ of error or an appeal. 1 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed.) § 1391; Grinager v. Town of Norway,
The proceedings in the probate court were between the administratrix on the one hand and the objectors on the other. Appellant admits that he was not a рarty to these proceedings. The petition of the administratrix was that an allowance be made tо her, not to appellant, of a sum for attorney’s fees. The sum allowed was to her, and not to appellant. These proceedings were pursuant to the terms of the statute which authorizes such allowance to the administratrix as such, and not to the attorney. 3 Mason Minn. St. 1936 Supp. § 8992-118. Under similar statutes it has been held that, inasmuch as the attorney is not a party and the allowance is made to the representative and not tо the attorney, the representative only and not the attorney has a right of review. Briggs v. Breen,
We do not рass upon the question whether the probate court has jurisdiction in any case to determine the amount of attorney’s fees as between the representative and the attorney, nor the effect of thе order made in this case allowing the final account, upon the rights and remedies which the appellant may have against the representative to recover any attorney’s fees which he may claim in excess of the amount allowed to the representative for his services. These questions are not before us because the appellant is not entitled to have the order in question reviewed in these proceedings.
Affirmed.
