42 Ohio St. 2d 471 | Ohio | 1975
Appellant, Director of Highways, argues that there was not such an interference with appellees’ right of access to a public highway as to be a compensable taking, and that the alteration and improvement of existing Boute 422 on property which is subject to a perpetual easement for highway purposes is not an added burden on that property for which compensation must be awarded.
In this case, the easement continues to be used for the same purposes for which the state acquired it in 1947. Progress and the increased use of motor vehicles have made it necessary that Boute 422 be improved for the convenience and safety of the travelling public. The improvement was made entirely within the right of way originally acquired by the state and there was no substantial interference with, or added burden on, appellees’ property.
The property owners contend that the elimination of their direct access to Boute 422 “has created a substantial impairment of ingress and egress which constitutes a compensable talcing.”
State, ex rel. Merritt, v. Linzell (1955), 163 Ohio St.
See, also, Richley v. Jones (1974), 38 Ohio St. 2d 64.
In denying appellees a writ of mandamus, the Court of Common Pleas correctly held that there was no taking of appellees’ property.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, is reversed.
Judgment reversed.