State Ex Rel. Nelson v. Quigg

May 24, 1940

Versions:196 So. 417

143 Fla. 227

Thomas, J.

An ordinance of the City of Miami, No. 1352, regulating the inspection' of motor vehicles and establishing standards of equipment for them also provides in Section 7 that no one shall operate a car on the “streets, highways or other public ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍places” of the сity without having procured a driver’s license.

Chapter 19551 of the Laws of Florida, Acts of 1939, prohibits any person' from driving an automobile on the highways of the State unless he has a license to do so. There are certain exceptions which do not apply to the facts here.'

C. W. Nelson was arrested for operating a car on a street in Miami, being at the timе licensed by the State but not by the city. ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍By writ of habeas corpus, he sought release upon' the theory that the ordinance was impliedly repealed by thе State law.

The Circuit Judge overruled his contention аnd remanded him, whereupon writ of error was issued.

Therе can be no doubt that the city under its charter had thе right to license and ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍control cars and to licеnse and register drivers within its boundaries, State, ex rel. Stephenson v. Dillon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 South. Rep. 558, 22 A. L. R. 227, so the questiоn involved is whether subsequent enactment by the Legislaturе of the law we have cited repealed thе ordinance with which it conflicted in some of its details.

We have recognized that a motor vehiclе upon the highway is a “dangerous instrumentality” and have declared that regulation of the use thereof is а part of the police power ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍of the Stаte. There seems little need to extend the doctrine to the end that such control as is exercisеd under the Act shall supersede the power therеtofore exerted by *229 the municipality toward prоtection of its citizens from the ravages of the in'еpt or inexperienced driver.

We can reаdily perceive, as was pointed ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍out in State v. Moseley, 174 S. C. 187, 177 S. E. Rep. 156, that because a State law providеs a method of licensing drivers it would not follow that an ordinance on the subject would necessarily be rеndered nugatory. Congestion of traffic, relative рositions of streets, and of streets and public gathering places would all influence the legislative bоdy of the city in fixing rules controlling the operation of these so-called “dangerous instrumentalities,” and the qualifications, therefore, of those persоns who drive them. What is more important, the conditions, hence the regulations, would vary greatly in the many populous municipal areas of the State.

We think thе reasoning in the case we have cited is sound and hold that the licensee was not entitled to his discharge, so the judgment of the circuit court is—

Affirmed.

Terrell, C. J., and Chapman, J., concur. Whitfield, P. J., concurs in opinion and judgment. Justices Buford and Brown not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.