State ex rel. Neguse v. CrawfordState ex rel. Neguse v. Crawford
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Benjamin D. Humphrey, for respondent.
IN PROHIBITION ON RESPONDENT‘S MOTION TO DISMISS
D E C I S I O N
NELSON, J.
{¶ 1} “Mekria Neguse,” whose name seems to appear on various other court documents as “Mekuria Neguse” and “Mekuira Neguse,” filed with this court a “Cоmplaint for Writ of Prohibition” relating to a trial court Nunc Pro Tunc Entry from February 3, 1995 that had denied Mr. Neguse‘s petition for postconviction relief. That entry, as attached by Mr. Neguse to his complaint here, recited that “[a]fter hearing testimony of witnesses and arguments from the plaintiff and defendant, the Court finds the defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.”
{¶ 2} Pursuant to
{¶ 3} With Mr. Neguse not having timely filed any objections to the magistrate‘s decision, the matter was submitted to this panel on October 8, 2019. Under
{¶ 4} We have reviewed the decision in the context of the record of this case and find no such error of law or other evident defect. Nonetheless, a brief recap may be appropriate.
{¶ 5} This matter does not appear to relate directly to the murder for which Mr. Neguse was convicted in 1990. See App‘x at ¶ 12; see also State v. Neguse, 71 Ohio App.3d 596 (10th Dist.1991). Rather, it relates to his 1989 conviction by plea for drug abuse and assault. See App‘x at ¶ 19; State ex rel. Neguse v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (”SER Neguse“), 10th Dist. No. 17AP-755, 2019-Ohio-564, ¶ 3.
{¶ 6} Earlier this year, this court dismissed Mr. Neguse‘s request for a writ of mandamus seeking “written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Post-Conviction Transcript of Proceeding of Evidentiary Hearing relative to the dismissal of his Petition for Relief after Judgment filed in Respondent‘s Court rendered on June 29, 1994.” SER Neguse, 2019-Ohio-564, at ¶ 5. That decision quoted from another Neguse matter, reciting that “[a] hearing on the postconviction motion was held June 29, 1984, and the trial court overruled [relator‘s] motion. [Relator] appealed the denial of his postconviction motion, and on April 12, 1995, this court sua sponte dismissed the appeal [as untimely]. * * * On September 7, 1999, [relator] filed a motion for delayed appeal regarding the trial court‘s denial of his 1993 postconviction motion. This court denied the motion in December 1999. On January 5, 2000, [relator] again filed a notice of appeal of the trial court‘s denial of his
{¶ 7} We observed that “for nearly 30 years” and in a variety of fashions, Mr. Neguse has challеnged his 1989 drug abuse and assault convictions on the ground that the trial court there lacked jurisdiction because he had been a juvenile; that “relator had the opportunity to file an appeal of this court‘s decision” denying a motion on those grounds as contrary to the evidence, and that he had not done so; and that “this question has been raised and answered by both the trial court and this court and relator is not entitlеd to a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to provide him with additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.” SER Neguse, 2019-Ohio-564, at ¶ 23 (adding that Mr. Neguse had not shown that he was entitled to a second copy of the trial court hearing transcript at state expense). Mr. Neguse did not appeal from this earlier 2019 decision, either.
{¶ 8} In this latest action, Mr. Neguse again seeks a writ, now characterized as a “Writ of Prohibition,” to compel the trial court “to make findings of fact and conclusions of law * * *.” Complaint at Prayer for Relief. (He does attach an “Affidavit of Prior Civil Actions” that refers to his 2017 mandamus attempt but neglects to provide information relating, for example, to appeal efforts in 17AP-449, 17AP-450, and 17AP-755, or a Supreme Court appeal designated as case number 2018-0714, omissions that would constitute grounds for dismissal pursuant to
{¶ 9} With no timely objection to the magistrate‘s decision having been filed, and because no error of law or other defect is evident on its face, we adopt the findings of fact
Motion to dismiss granted; action dismissed.
SADLER and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.
M A G I S T R A T E ’ S D E C I S I O N
Mekria Neguse, pro se.
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Benjamin D. Humphrey, for respondent.
IN PROHIBITION ON RESPONDENT‘S MOTION TO DISMISS
{¶ 10} Relator, Mekria Neguse, has filed this original action requesting this court issue a writ of prohibition ordering respondent the Honorable Dale A. Crawford, a judge of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, to explain the reasons for the February 3, 1995 nunc pro tunc entry issued without findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordering respondent to make findings of fact and conсlusions of law.
Findings of Fact:
{¶ 11} 1. Relator is an inmate currently incarcerated at Warren Correctional Institution.
{¶ 13} 3. This court affirmed relator‘s conviction in State v. Neguse, 71 Ohio App.3d 596 (10th Dist.1991).
{¶ 14} 4. Thereafter, relator filed numerous motions, postconviction petitions, and requests for writs in this court.
{¶ 15} 5. On June 29, 2018, relator filed this complaint regarding the trial court‘s denial of his petition for postconviction relief filed June 29, 1994.
{¶ 16} 6. Respondent hаs filed a motion to dismiss and relator has filed a brief.
Conclusions of Law:
{¶ 17} For the reasons that follow, it is this magistrate‘s decision that this court grant respondent‘s motion to dismiss.
{¶ 18} Relator filed a similar mandamus action in this court last year. In addressing rеlator‘s arguments concerning this same motion and denial by the trial court, the magistrate set out a brief history of the case.
{¶ 19} In the 28 years following his conviction, appellant has filed and was denied several рostconviction motions pertaining to his drug abuse and assault convictions. Pertinent to this appeal, in 1993, appellant filed a motion to vacate or set aside judgment asserting his conviction and sentences are void because he was a juvenile (16 years old) at the time of the offenses depriving the common pleas court of jurisdiction, no jurisdictional hearing was conducted, reliance on the bone test was erroneous as he was never examined or a patient of Children‘s Hospital, and his counsel provided ineffective assistance. Appellee filed a memorandum contra asserting appellant failed to appeal, and the issues raised by appellant were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. A hearing on the postconviction motion was held June 29, 1994, and the trial court overrulеd appellant‘s motion. Appellant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion, and on April 12, 1995, this court sua sponte dismissed the appeal due to the lack of a timely notice оf appeal.
{¶ 20} On September 7, 1999, appellant filed a motion for delayed appeal regarding the trial court‘s denial of his 1993 postconviction motion. This court denied the motion in December 1999. On January 5, 2000, appellant again filed a notice of appeal of the trial court‘s denial of postconviction relief. This court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of a timely filed notice of appeal.
{¶ 22} In 1990, relator was convicted of murder with a gun specification, and having a weapon while under disability, and he was sentenced to serve 15 years to life plus an additional 3 years incarceration for the gun specification. Counsel for relator filed a motion to dismiss in the drug abuse case asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction because relator had been a juvenile on the date thе offense was committed. This was an issue which was originally raised in 1984 when it was ultimately determined that relator was not a juvenile on the date of the offense. The trial court held a hearing, revoked relator‘s prоbation on the drug abuse case, and re-imposed the one and one-half year sentence.
{¶ 23} In affirming, this court addressed the issue of the trial court‘s denial of relator‘s motion to dismiss ultimately finding that the evidencе was sufficient to establish that relator was not a juvenile. See State v. Neguse, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-449, 2018-Ohio-1163.
{¶ 24} Relator continues to take an issue, which was resolved against him, looking for new ways to challenge the original conviction. Relator cоntinues to challenge the court‘s disposition of his June 29, 1994 motion. The magistrate finds this question has been raised and answered by both the trial court and this court, and relator is not entitled to a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court‘s determination.
{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, it is this magistrate‘s decision that relator has not demonstrated he is entitled to a writ of prohibition, and this court should grant respondent‘s motion and dismiss relator‘s complaint.
/S/ MAGISTRATE
STEPHANIE BISCA