State ex rel. Montrie Nursing Home, Inc. v. CreasyState ex rel. Montrie Nursing Home, Inc. v. Creasy
Rеspondents initially raise the question of whether the court of appeals properly used the interest on the amount deposited by respondents to рay attorney’s fees to relators’ attorneys. Respondents argue that any prejudgment interest belongs to the state, while relators maintain that the state аdmitted liability when it deposited the sum with the court and the interest which subsequently accrues inures to the relators, the prevailing party. We find respondents’ argument well-taken and reverse the decision of the court of appeals to distribute the interest as attorney’s fees.
This court faced nearly the same issue in State, ex rel. Home Care Pharmacy, Inc., v. Creasy (1981),
i<* * * < <<pjn ^ absence of a statute requiring it * * * interest cannot be
While R.C. 2743.18(A)
“* * * This statute [R.C. 2743.18(A)] is part of the Court of Claims Act and is applicable only to actions brought in the Court of Clаims.” Id.
As a result, relators’ argument that the state is not entitled to retain the prejudgment interest is without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of apрeals awarding the prejudgment interest to relators’ attorneys as attorney’s fees is reversed.
The next issue is whether the award of attorney’s fees was proper in this case. In Smith v. Kroeger (1941),
“In such case [class action], a court exercising equitable jurisdiction may allow, in addition to costs between party and party, reasonable attorney fees, technically known as costs between solicitor and client, to be paid out of the fund under the control of the court.”
The court in Smith v. Kroeger, supra, at 515, furthеr stated that the attorney who is eligible for attorney’s fees is one “ ‘who, at his own expense, has maintained a successful suit for the preservation, protеction, and increase of a common fund or common property, or who has created at his own expense, or brought into court a fund in which others mаy share with him.’ ”
In other words, where a fund has been created or preserved for the benefit of a class at the expense of one class member or а few class members, all members of the class may be required to share proportionately in the counsel fees incurred thereby. Thus, the court below had discretion whether to grant attorney’s fees. However, any attorney’s fees must come from the fund itself and may not be assessed against respondents in the absence of some exceptional conduct on respondents’ part which would justify the imposition of attorney’s fees as costs or damages.
The facts оf the case at bar mandate a remand to the court of appeals for a consideration of the propriety of awarding attorney’s feеs from the fund
Several questions must be аnswered by the court of appeals. The court below shall first consider the effect of the fact that the costs of this litigation were advanced to rеlators’ counsel by the Ohio Health Care Association. Specifically, it must be determined whether the members of the class have in fact already financed this litigation through membership fees or dues in this organization.
If the court below ultimately finds that attorney’s fees are proper under these circumstances, the сourt will consider the following factors in arriving at the amount of allowable fees: (1) the time and labor involved in maintaining this litigation, (2) the novelty, complexity, and difficulty оf the questions involved, (3) the professional skill required to perform the necessary legal services, (4) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, and (5) the miscellaneous expenses of this litigation.
Finally, we address the court of appeal’s construction of Am. Sub. H.B. Nos. 155 and 1546,111th General Assembly. That bill provided the method to compute the reasonable costs incurred by nursing homes in providing Medicaid services. The nursing homes were then reimbursed for these costs by the ODPW-administered Medicaid program. In part, the bill stated:
“(B) * * * Reimbursement for a cost of property and equipment * * * shall be on a reasonable cost basis, as follows: Facilities * * * constructed prior to and subsequently originally licensed prior to 1958 — $2.50 per available bed per day. Facilities * * * constructed and subsequently originally licensed after 1957 but prior to 1968 — $3.50 per available bed per day. Facilities * * * constructed and subsequently originally licensed January 1, 1968 and. after, $4.50 per аvailable bed per day.”
The court below interpreted the phrase “per available bed per day” to refer to those beds occupied by Medicaid patients only. Additionally, the court construed the phrase “constructed and subsequently originally licensed” to refer to the date of original licensure, not the licensure to a subsequent purchaser of the facility. We agree with both these interpretations.
We find no merit to relators’ assertion that the phrase “per available bed per day” means the number of beds, regardless of their occupancy by a Medicaid patient. If that were true, the state would be required to reimburse nursing homes with Medicaid money even if no services were rendered to a Medicaid patient. Contrary to relators’ position, we find that the General Assembly intended that Am. Sub. H.B. Nos. 155 and 1546 only apply to beds used to render services to Medicaid patients. Accordingly, the court of ap
Relators also contend that the phrase “constructed and subsequently originally licensed” should be construed to refer to the date a subsequent purchaser of the nursing home acquires a license to operаte the facility. To the contrary, the bill specifically refers to original licensure, not any subsequent licensure. Thus it is clear that the General Assembly intended that the datе of original licensure control for purposes of computing reimbursement under the Medicaid program. Ergo, the court of appeals properly construеd Am. Sub. H.B. Nos. 155 and 1546 to be limited to the original licensure and not to extend to a subsequent licensure of the nursing home.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in this opiniоn, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this oрinion.
Judgment accordingly.
Notes
R.C. 2743.18(A) states:
“Prejudgment interest shall be allowed with respect to any civil action on which a judgment or determination is rendered against the state for the same period of time and at the same rate as allowed between private рarties to a suit.
“The court of claims, in its discretion, may deny prejudgment interest for any period of undue delay between the commencement of the civil аction and the rendition of a judgment or determination against the state, for which it finds the claimant to have been responsible.”
See, e.g., State, ex rel. Crockett, v. Robinson (1981),
See, generally, Annotation, Attorney’s Pees in Class Actions (1971),