37 S.W. 1126
Mo.
1896
Burgess, J.

Rеlator indicted in the circuit court of Bollinger county for murder of the first degree was committed to the jail of Madison county for safe keeping. Afterward at the August term, 1896 (and on the fifth day of sаid month), of the county court of the county last named he sued out of said court a writ of habeas corpus, direсted to the sheriff and jailer of that county, returnable forthwith, requiring said sheriff to produce his body in court, and show cause, if any he could, for his detention, and why he should not be admitted to bail. To this writ the sheriff made return according to the facts heretofore stated.

The county court, on hearing, refused to discharge *325the relator or to admit him to bail, and remanded him to the custody and keeping of said sheriff.

Thereafter on the twеntieth day of August, 1896, relator ‍‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍made application to this court for a writ of certiorari directed to the county court aforesaid for the purpose of compelling said court to certify to this court a copy of the proceedings with respect to said writ of habeas corpus in order that the same might be reviewed.

In obedience to this writ the county court has caused to be certified to this court all the evidencе introduced at the hearing of the habeas corpus by that body, which we are now asked to review, and, if is found that error was committed by that court, to remand the cause to said court with directions as to whаt course to pursue, or disposition to make of the proceedings.

By section 3, article 6, of the state constitution, the supreme court is given ‍‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍superintending control over all infеrior courts, and power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same; so there can be no question as to its power to issue the writ of certiorari in this casе, and to review the action of the county court in so far as such action was judicial, if at all, in refusing to admit the relator to bail. The writ lies to review the action of an inferior tribunal, аnd to correct errors of law in case where no appeal lies from the ruling of such a tribunal, as in the case at hand, but not to review matters purely ministerial or discretionary.

By section 24, article 2, state constitution it is provided ‘‘that all persons shall be bailable by sufficiеnt sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the prеsumption great.”

I'n People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. at p. 543, in passing upon the question of ‍‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍the right of defendant who was *326under indictment for murder оf the. first degree to b© admitted to bail, it., was said: “It [the indictment] creates a presumption of guilt for all purposes except the trial before a petit jury. Indeed, if it did not create suсh presumption, the defendant held under it, or-by virtue of the warrant based upon it, without other evidеnce of his guilt, would be entitled to his discharge absolutely. If it furnished no such presumption it would not justify the еxaction of bail or the detention of the defendant.”

So, in State v. Mills, 2 Dev. (L.) 421, it was said by the supreme court оf North Carolina: “After bill found, a defendant is presumed to be guilty to most, if not to all purposes, еxcept that of a fair and impartial trial before a petit jury. This presumption is so strong, thаt in the case of a capitol felony, the party can not be let to bail.” To the sаme effect are In re Alexander, 59 Mo. 598; Hight v. United States, 1 Morris (Iowa), 410; Ex parte Vaughan, 44 Ala. 417.

It must, therefore, be presumed from thé indictment that “the proof is evident or the presumption great” (Ex parte Dusenberry, 97 Mo. 504), and there is nothing before us, of which we ‍‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍can take cognizanсe to rebut that presumption.

But even if there was, the granting or refusing bail was a matter resting in the sоund discretion of the court (Lester v. State, 33 Ga. 192), and under no> circumstances would this court interfere unless it be made to aрpear that such discretion has been abused.

. “The writ of certiorari only brings up the record; and only such matters аs appear from the face thereof, and which go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to which the writ is sued out, can be reviewed by such writ.” Ward v. Board of Equalization, 135 Mo. 309.

The county court is of statutory origin, having neither ‍‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‍commоn law nor equitable jurisdiction. No *327provision has been made for preserving evidence taken before it, and making it a part of its record. Therefore, the evidence adduced before that court on the hearing of the writ of habeas corpus, even, if reviewable at all, is no part оf the record proper, nor could it be made so in the absence of statutory enаctment providing some means for so doing by bill of exception or otherwise, hence nоt the subject of review here, so that there is nothing before us to pass upon save the record proper, that is, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the return of the sheriff thereto, and the оrder of court refusing to admit the relator to bail, and nothing appears from them which entitles relator to the writ.

But even if the evidence had been properly preserved we express no opinion as to whether or not it could be reviewed by this court under this proceeding. 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 62, and authorities cited. The writ will be quashed.

Gantt, P. J., and Sherwood,'J., concur.