108 N.W. 36 | N.D. | 1905
This is a proceeding by mandamus, brought in the name of the state, by the relator, as treasurer of the city of Fargo, to compel -the defendant, as treasurer of Cass county, to pay over to the relator the amount of interest and penalties on the city and city school taxes, collected for said city by the defendant. The relator bases his right to the relief demanded upon section 124 of chapter 62, p. 122, Laws of 1905. That section reads as fol
We shall take up the defendant’s propositions in the order above stated. The appellant’s argument is that chapter 62 is wholly a new law for the organization and government of cities; that is, to take effect only when the inhabitants of a previously organized Milage or city shall see fit to organize under it. They con
Fargo is a city organized under the general law, and hence the revision of that law is operative on the city without any action by the municipality. The relator is entitled to the relief prayed for, unless the provisions of section 124 contravene some constitutional limitation. Under the laws of this state, the collection of all taxes, including special assessments for local improvements in cities, is committed to the officers of the county in which the property taxed is situated. The taxes levied by the several cities, vil-' lages, townships and school districts are reported to the county
The powers of the legislature in this respect must be exercised, however, in conformity with, and subject to the limitations imposed by, the constitution. When the act of 1905, now in question, was passed, the disposition of the interest and penalties on taxes was controlled by section 1260, Rev. Codes 1899, which reads as follows: “All penalty and interest collected on taxes shall belong to the county and become a part of the general fund, or such other fund as the county commissioners may direct; except the penalty and interest collected on special assessments due to cities, and all such penalties and interest shall be paid to the city thereunto entitled.” This provision was adopted in 1899 (chapter 4, p. 8, Laws 1899), as an amendment of section 75 of the 1897 revenue law (Laws 1897, p. 285, c. 126), and restores substan
There is no doubt that for many purposes cities, or the inhabitants thereof, or the property therein, may be properly placed in a distinct class for the purpose of legislation with respect to such class, without infringing the constitutional prohibitions against “class legislation.” But the fact that such a classification would be eminently proper for some purpose is no reason for upholding it in this case. Chief Justice Corliss, speaking for the court on this subject, in Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N. D. 270, 274, 50 N. W. 970, 14 L. R. A. 725, said: “The classification must be natural, not artificial. It must stand uppn some reason, having regard to the character of the legislation.” See, also, Vermont Loan & Trust Co. v. Whithed, 2 N. D. 82, 49 N. W. 318; Angell v. Cass Co., 11 N. D. 265, 91 N. W. 72; Beleal v. Railroad Co. (decided at this term), 108 N. W. 33. Applying this test, we can conceive of no reason -which would warrant this manifestly unjust discrimination in favor of city taxpayers as against other taxpayers in the county. We must therefore hold that section 124 of chapter 62, p. 122, Laws 1905, is invalid, to the extent that it requires the county treasurer to pay the interest and penalties on city and city school taxes to the city. Special assessments for local improvements are obviously in a class clearly distinguishable from ordinary taxes, and this distinction is properly recognized by section 1260, Rev. Codes 1899.
The judgment appealed from is reversed.