State Ex Rel. McDougall v. CrawfordState Ex Rel. McDougall v. Crawford
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Haire
Lead Opinion
OPINION
HAIRE, Presiding Judge.The state has appealed from the superior court’s order dismissing its special action on the ground that the state had a remedy by direct appeal. The special action challenged a city court judge’s order striking an allegation of a prior conviction for driving while under the influence (DUI) and sentencing the defendant as a first-time offender. The background facts are as follows.
Appellee Mike E. Richardson (defendant) was charged in Phoenix Municipal Court with DUI, a violation of
Convinced that the defendant’s prior conviction was valid, the state filed a special action petition in the superior court and requested that court to set aside the order striking the allegation of a prior conviction, vacate the sentence imposed and remand the matter for resentencing consistent with the statutory requirements for a second DUI conviction. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the special action. He claimed that the state had an adequate remedy by direct appeal from the city court judgment, and that the state’s special action was merely an attempt to avoid the consequences of having failed to timely file an appeal. After taking the matter under advisement, the superior court judge granted the motion to dismiss the special action, stating:
“On the basis of State v. Sands, 145 Ariz. 269, 700 P.2d 1369 (App.1985), the Court finds that the granting of Defendant’s motion to strike allegation of prior conviction and subsequent sentencing of Defendant as a nonrepetitive D.W.I. offender is appealable pursuant toA.R.S. § 13-4032(6) . While Sands dealt with a Hannah prior situation, the Court finds that factual distinction to be unimportant here.
“The availability of an appellate remedy and the State’s failure to take advantage of it mandates the granting of Richardson’s motion to dismiss.”
The state then appealed to this court, seeking to have the superior court’s dismissal of its special action set aside.
A.R.S. § 13-4032(6) states in part:
“13-4032. Appeal by state
“An appeal may be taken by the state from:
“(6) A sentence on the grounds that it is illegal, or if the sentence imposed is other than the presumptive sentence authorized by § 13-604 or 13-701.”
The portion of
In the city court proceedings, defendant was convicted of a first offense violation of
In rejecting the state’s contention, the trial judge relied on State v. Sands, 145 Ariz. 269, 700 P.2d 1369 (App.1985), a decision of Division 2 of this court. Because Sands is distinguishable, we find such reliance unjustified.
We start from the premise that, in a criminal proceeding, appeals by the state are not favored and cannot be taken in the absence of a constitutional provision or statute clearly conferring that right. State v. Lelevier, 116 Ariz. 37, 567 P.2d 783 (1977); Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 101 S.Ct. 1657, 68 L.Ed.2d 58 (1981). With this viewpoint in mind, we do not believe that the provision of
Turning now to State v. Sands, the decision relied on by the superior court to support its holding that the state had an adequate remedy by appeal, we note that Sands was not a case in which the trial judge had found the prior convictions invalid before sentencing and accordingly had granted a motion to strike the allegations. In Sands, the alleged prior convictions had not been stricken, but remained before the court as valid convictions at the time of sentencing.
The defendant in Sands had been convicted of charges involving several separate felonies occurring on the same day, and one felony occurring on the following day. At the time the indictment was filed, the state alleged that certain of the offenses charged were prior convictions to certain of the other charges, pursuant to
When the defendant in Sands appealed challenging the validity of his convictions, the state cross-appealed, contending that the sentences were illegal because the trial judge had refused to apply the admittedly valid convictions as priors to enhance the defendant’s sentences.2 In considering the issue raised by the state, the Sands court held that the trial judge correctly ruled that the convictions for felony offenses committed on the same day could not be considered as prior convictions for other felony offenses also committed on the same day. However, the appellate court also ruled that since the felony offenses committed on the first day were alleged as prior offenses for the marijuana offense committed on the second day, the trial judge committed error when he failed to consider them as prior convictions for the purpose of enhancing the sentence on the marijuana offense.
In our opinion Sands presents a situation in which the state could validly appeal pursuant to
Applying the foregoing to the facts before this court, there is no contention that the sentence imposed on the defendant for a first offense DUI was not a legally correct sentence for the conviction before the court. Instead, the state argues that the defendant should also have been found guilty of the prior offense, and that the city court committed error when it found
We agree with the state that, based on the only conviction found by the court, no illegal sentence was imposed. The state’s contention goes to the city court’s alleged prior error in refusing to find that defendant had a valid prior conviction. Therefore, we find that the superior court erred in dismissing the state’s special action on the ground that the state could have appealed from the imposition of an illegal sentence.3
As an alternative basis for upholding the superior court’s order dismissing the state’s special action, defendant contends that the state had an adequate remedy by appeal pursuant to
Defendant’s argument is correct to a degree. By the express terms of
For the above reasons we reject defendant’s alternative contention that
The superior court’s dismissal of the state’s petition for special action is reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions that the superior court consider the petition on its merits.
Notes
.
“H. Cpnvictions for two or more offenses not committed on the same occasion but consolidated for trial purposes may, at the discretion of the state, be counted as prior convictions for purposes of this section. Convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction for purposes of this section.”
. Although the appellate court in Sands commented that the state was permitted to take such an appeal, referring to the illegal sentence provisions of
. In State v. Roylston, 135 Ariz. 271, 660 P.2d 872 (App.1983), Division 2 of this court granted special action relief where, prior to hearing the evidence, the trial judge granted the defendant‘s motion to strike the state’s allegation of prior offenses. In granting special action relief the court stated: “Since the state had no adequate remedy by appeal . . . we assume jurisdiction.” Id. at 272, 660 P.2d at 873. Since the Roylston court did not cite
Concurrence Opinion
concur.
Note: The Honorable Richard M. Davis was authorized to participate in this case by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Su