This is а second appeal. The former, in which the lower court was reversed, is reported in
vvThe second amended complaint contains substantially the. sаme averments. as the complaint in the former appeal -except in the former appeal there was. an averment in the complaint that plaintiff’s photograph with *363 number across the breast thereof, his finger prints etc. were put or intended to'be put in a “rogue’s gallеry”which it was averred the Indianapolis Police Department maintained. This averment is-omitted from the complaint now before us. Since in the former appeal-the., cause was reversed solely because of the presence of this averment in the complaint,- it appears that many-of the questions attempted to be raised are res adjudicate/,, and that the one proposition upon which the reversal was based, has bеen purposely abandoned by-appellant.
The rule is quite general “that when a case has been' once taken to an appellate court, and- its judgment obtained on points of law involved, such judgment, however erroneous, becomes the law of ■v -. the case, and сan not on a second appeal ■ be altered or changed.”
Dodge
v.
Gaylord
(1876),
The opinion in the former appeal is an exhaustive discussion оf the law on the questions then before the court and we adopt it as the “law' of the case” on the same matters présented by this appеal, binding alike on the parties and the court. Cohoon v. Fisher, supra.
In the second amended complaint there is an averment that the Acts of 1945, page 1622 et seq., §47-846 et seq., Burns’ 1940 Replacement (Supp.), and particularly § 47-857. et seq. under which it is аlleged defendants purport to hold plaintiff’s, photographs, finger prints, etc. is unconstitutional in *364 that it is in violation of the fourteenth amendment of thе Constitution of the United States and of Art. 1, §§ 1 and 21 of the Indiana Constitution. That part of the fourteenth amendment with which it is contended this statute conflicts is as follows: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deрrive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection оf the laws.” Appellant has presented neither reasons or authorities indicating that the statute complained of in. any way attempts to аbridge the privileges or immunities of citizens and we know of none. There is nothing in this, statute conflicting with “due process” or “equal protection of thе laws” as provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Art. 1, § 1 of the Indiana Constitution contains nothing that the statute complained of could conflict with. Among other things it provides: “that all power is inherent in the People; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and well-being . . . .”
Art. 1, § 21 provides: “No man’s particular service shall be demanded, without just compensation. No man’s property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.” It has been said that it is a duty of the courts to uphold the acts of the legislature if it can possibly be done, without doing violence to thе constitution, and in doing so, every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the legality of the act.
Morgan
v.
State
(1913),
The legislative power to protect the сitizens in their health and safety is a very high power, but one justly exercisable and one which the legislature cannot alienate.
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus and Indianapolis Ry. Co.
v.
Harrington
(1892),
*366
The legislature hаs the right to learn for itself the reasons which impel it to act. A very large measure of authority is vested in the legislature upon that subject, and unless wе can say that the act is unreasonable, we are not authorized to overthrow it.
State
v.
Barrett
(1909),
The extent to which the individual right may be subordinated to the public weal cannot be fully defined. It seems to be a matter that necessarily grows as our society grows and becomes more and more complex. The matter of the legislative element of sovereignty as opposed to individual liberty, in the absence of other constitutional rеstrictions must be left to the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion as the cases presented for decision require.
Parks
v.
State, supra; Davidson
v.
Board of Admrs. of New Orleans
(1878),
“Solus populi est suprema lex”
is an anсient legal maxim. Jt applies with salutary effect to the situation here presented. With full recognition of the rights of the citizen we must nevertheless hоld that the safety of the people is the first law and this law must prevail even as against some of the apparent rights of privacy. See
Chicago etc., R. Co.
v.
Anderson
(1914),
Under the police power possessed by every state as a sovereign, the general assembly was within its rights in enacting the several sections of the questioned statute. In so doing it exercised that full final power involved in the administration of the law as the means to the attainment of practical justice upon *367 which the very existence of government depends, as well as the ’security of the social order, the life and health of the citizen, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. 11 Am. Jur. §§ 245, 246, 247 Constitutional Lato, pp. 966 to 974. We find nothing in the act comрlained of that places an unreasonable restraint upon the right of the individual ^as guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions. It is, therefore, not vulnerable to this attack.
Finding no error the judgment is affirmed.
Note..—Reported in 74 N. E. (2d) 914.