This is аn original action in mandamus and prohibition brought by relator, Massaro Corporation, requesting that this court issue a writ of prohibition permanently enjоining and prohibiting respondent from enforcing its order requiring relator to file a counterclaim, and further that this court issue a writ of mandamus compelling respondent to rescind its order requiring relator to file a counterclaim and not otherwise require relator to file a counterclaim as long as its action in Pennsylvania exists. The requested writs are sought on the basis that relator cannot be compelled to file a compulsory counterclaim pursuant to Civ.R. 13(A)(1). This matter is before the court pursuant to relator’s response to this court’s order of October 6, 1989 directing relator to shоw cause why this action should not be dismissed because relator has an adequate remedy at law.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio in
State, ex rel. Aycock, v. Mowrey
(1989),
Relator contends that a writ of prohibition should issue in the present case on the basis thаt respondent may not require relator to file a compulsory *430 counterclaim since relator’s counterclaim falls within the provision of Civ.R. 13(A)(1). Civ.R. 13(A) provides in pertinent part:
“A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s clаim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action * *
In this case, the trial court’s order directed relator to file its counterclaims “forthwith” or be barred from asserting those claims in the future. Essentially, the trial court’s order is a determination that relator’s counterclaim does not fall within the exception enumerated in Civ.R. 13(A)(1). Assuming ar-guendo that the trial court erred in that respect, relator nevertheless has an adequate remedy at law which is to appeal the alleged erroneous order.
The purpose оf Civ.R. 13(A) requiring a party to file a counterclaim is to enable a court to settle all related claims in one action and thereby avoid a wаsteful multiplicity of litigation on claims which arise from a single transaction or occurrence. Pursuant to Civ.R. 13(A)(1) an exception has been created which provides that where a party’s claim would ordinarily constitute a compulsory counterclaim, where such a claim is the subject of аnother pending action, that claim need not be pled. As stated by the court in
Dungan v. Bryant
(Mar. 2, 1983), Lorain App. No. 3393, unreported, at 6,
“ ‘The purpose of this exception is seemingly to prevent onе party from compelling another to try his cause of action in a court not of the latter’s choosing when the same cause of actiоn is already the subject of pending litigation in another forum, one which was probably chosen by the owner of the cause of action concerned.’ ” (Quoting Union Paving Co. v. Downer Cory. [C.A.9, 1960],276 F.2d 468 , 470.)
While relator contends that its rights granted pursuant to Civ.R. 13(A)(1) will be defeated absent the issuance of a writ of prohibition, such is not the case. Thе trial court’s order does not interfere with the Pennsylvania court’s jurisdiction to proceed with plaintiff’s claims. An appeal from the order of the trial court, if sustained, will result in a determination that plaintiff’s counterclaim was not compulsory because of the previously filed Pennsylvania clаim. If the trial court is sustained, the result is only what Civ.R. 13(A) would have required whether the trial court had issued its order. The risk of the application of Civ.R. • 13(A) to an unpleаded compulsory counterclaim is the same whether the trial court had issued its order or not. *431 Thus, post-litigation appeal remedy preserves whatever rights relator has to litigate the claim in the Pennsylvania court. The action herein seeks, by extraordinary writ, to obtain a declaratory determination of the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, and, in reality, is no different than if a declaratory judgment was sought in this court to determine whethеr the counterclaim is compulsory under Civ.R. 13(A). We have no jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments. That relief may not be obtained by mandamus or prohibition where appeal provides an adequate remedy.
In
State, ex rel. Eaton Corp., v. Lancaster
(1988),
“Prohibition tests and determines ‘solely and only’ the subject matter jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. * * * Where the tribunal has such jurisdiction, prohibitiоn is not available to prevent or correct an erroneous decision. * * * It is also not a remedy for an abuse of discretion. * * * ” (Citations omittеd.) Id. at 409-410,534 N.E.2d at 52 .
The
Eaton
court quoted from
Kelley v.
State,
ex rel. Gellner
(1916),
“In all cases where an inferior court has jurisdiction of the matter in controversy and keeps within the limits prescribed by law for its operation, the suрerior court should refuse to interfere by prohibition, for it should not consider whether the court below erred in the exercise of its powers, since it has nothing to do with the correctness of the rulings of the inferior court, but only with its exercise of jurisdiction.” See, also,
State, ex rel. Rhodes, v. Solether
(1955),
The trial court’s order does not аmount to a complete and total usurpation of judicial authority from which an appeal would be inadequate. The trial court has at least basic jurisdiction to determine whether relator’s counterclaims are compulsory under Civ.R. 13(A) or permissive under Civ.R. 13(A)(1). Merely because the trial court’s determination may be erroneous does not deprive it of jurisdiction over the claims. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court has jurisdiсtion to make a decision as to whether relator’s claim is compulsory in nature and falls without the exception enumerated in Civ.R. 13(A)(1). Assuming that there еxists error in the trial court’s decision, such an error is properly corrected on appeal and is not an adequate ground for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
As we have determined that the trial court had jurisdiction in the present case to make a determination as to whether relator’s claim fell within the exception set forth in Civ.R. 13(A)(1), we must also find that a writ of *432 mandamus is not properly issued to require respondent to rescind its ordеr requiring relator to file its counterclaim. Any error which may exist in the trial court’s order requiring relator to file its compulsory counterclaim may be properly corrected on appeal.
The action is dismissed because relator has an adequate legal remedy by way of appeal.
Cause dismissed.