727 N.E.2d 181 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1999
Lead Opinion
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *215 Appellant, Chauncey Mason, appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to appellees, State Employment Relations Board ("SERB"), SERB Chairwoman Sue Pohler, SERB board member Jonathon McGee, and SERB Executive Director Jeffrey Taylor.
Appellant brings this action under the Ohio Sunshine Law ("Sunshine Law"). The Sunshine Law, codified under R.C.
Appellant asserts that appellees deliberated and decided upon issues in a series of meetings closed to the public in violation of the Sunshine Law. Appellant seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting appellees from conducting deliberations and making decisions on official business in meetings closed to the public. Additionally, appellant seeks a writ of mandamus requiring appellees to publish the board members' concurring and dissenting opinions in the agency's official reporter, even when no majority opinion is published. *216
In granting summary judgment for appellees, the trial court concluded that appellant did not have standing to assert an action under the Sunshine Law because he did not have a personal stake in the matters discussed in the meetings closed to the public. In so deciding, the trial court relied upon our decision in Ohio Valley Mall Co. v. Wray (1995),
As well, the trial court concluded that it could not compel appellees to publish appellant's concurring and dissenting opinions. The court so held because appellant failed to point to any authority that imposes a clear legal duty on appellees to publish these opinions in SERB's official reporter.
Appellant appeals, assigning the following assignments of error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A SERB BOARD MEMBER DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION TO ENFORCE THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLANT HAS NO CLEAR LEGAL DUTY TO PUBLISH HIS CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINIONS IN SERB'S OFFICIAL REPORTER OR OTHER PUBLICATION."
In his first assignment of error, appellant criticizes our decision in Wray. In Wray, we examined whether a taxpayer had standing to assert an action under the Sunshine Law to challenge the Ohio Department of Transportation's non-publicized and closed meeting deliberations over contract bids. Wray, at 634-635. We acknowledged that the Sunshine Law provides that "any person" may bring an action to enforce the provisions of the law. Id., citing R.C.
Appellant asserts that we should re-examine Wray and conclude that any person has standing to seek enforcement of the Sunshine Law regardless of whether he or she is an aggrieved party as a result of an official action deliberated or decided upon in a closed meeting. We agree and, in so doing, *217
overrule our decision in Wray, which held that the "any person" language in R.C.
Under common-law principles, a person has standing to assert an action in court so long as that person demonstrates that he or she has been aggrieved and has a personal stake in the outcome or controversy before the court. Middletown v. Ferguson
(1986),
When interpreting a statute, a court shall not ignore its plain and unambiguous language. State v. Krutz (1986),
The statute contains clear and unambiguous language that injury is to be "conclusively and irrebuttably presumed" upon proof of violation or threatened violation. R.C.
Further, a court must also consider the statute's legislative intent when construing a statute. State ex rel. Cincinnati Postv. Cincinnati (1996),
The Ohio Legislature specified its intent and purpose in enacting the current Sunshine Law in the preamble. R.C.
In 1975, the Ohio Legislature enacted the current version of the Sunshine Law in response to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron
(1965),
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the purpose behind the Ohio Sunshine Law in White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1996),
"A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."
Id. at 419, quoting The Complete Madison, His Basic Writings (1988), 337 (Letter to W.T. Berry, August 4, 1822).
As such, we find that the legislative intent and purpose of the current Ohio Sunshine Law is to enable any member of the general public to seek enforcement of the statute when public officials circumvent the public's right to observe public officials as they conduct official business. Accordingly, a conclusion that any person may seek enforcement of the Sunshine Law regardless of whether he or she has been aggrieved or has a stake in the outcome, or controversy conforms with the Ohio Legislature's intent and purpose in enacting the current version of the Sunshine Law. *219
Our previous conclusion in Wray, that the "any person" language in R.C.
For example, under the "any aggrieved person" definition, no member of the public would have standing to seek enforcement of the Sunshine Law after a public body holds or threatens to hold secret deliberations on proposed city budgets. Because a member of the public may not at the time of the meeting have a personal stake in the allocations contained in an annual budget, a claim that he or she has standing to assert, the Sunshine Law claim would fail.
Similarly, under the "any aggrieved person" definition, criminal ordinances or their penalty provisions could be passed by city council following closed, secret deliberations and no immediate action could be taken under the Sunshine Law, because nobody would be affected by the criminal provisions until the provisions were enforced. If the prosecution of the criminal statute occurs beyond the time limit provisions of the Sunshine Law, nobody would ever be able to challenge the decision under the Sunshine Law. See R.C.
Finally, courts must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. Cincinnati, at 544. The Sunshine Law provides for injunctive relief for future meetings involving official business. See R.C.
Similarly, the statute provides for injunctive relief for "threatened" violations of the Sunshine Law. R.C.
Our decision, that the "any person" language in the Sunshine Law is not construed as meaning "any aggrieved person," is consistent with decisions from other courts of appeals in this state. For example, the Sixth District Court of Appeals examined a case where, under common-law standing principles, the *220
plaintiff had not been injured by actions taken during a closed meeting. Vermilion Teachers' Assn. v. Vermilion LocalSchool Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994),
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has allowed members of the general public or the media to bring actions in court to seek enforcement of the Sunshine Law. See, e.g., Cincinnati; White;State ex rel. The Fairfield Leader v. Ricketts (1990),
We hold that any person may bring an action to enforce the provisions of the Sunshine Law. As such, we hold that a person seeking action to enforce the Sunshine Law need not demonstrate that he or she has been aggrieved or has a personal stake in the outcome or controversy in an official action of a public body deliberated or decided upon in a closed meeting. Accordingly, we overrule the part of our decision inWray that held that the "any person" language in R.C.
In addition, we hold that the Sunshine Law affords standing to an individual member of the public body to enforce the statute's procedural requirements. Under the rationale discussed above, a conclusion, that an individual member of the public body is not "any person" and may not enforce statutory provisions of the Sunshine Law, would be contrary to the clear and unambiguous language in the statute, the legislative intent and purpose of the statute, and would lead to an absurd result. Indeed, we find that the procedural requirements of the Sunshine Law are most appropriately enforced by an individual member of the governing board or agency. A member of a public body, such as appellant, is best situated to know that there is an illegal meeting being held in *221
the dark that requires light and legality. A board member of a public body should not be left with the unenviable choice of failing to discharge his or her duties by refusing to participate in the business of the public body or participating in an illegal meeting. Here, we conclude that appellant made the correct and only legal choice available to him, an action under R.C.
Therefore, based on the reasons noted above, we sustain appellant's first assignment of error. In so concluding, we acknowledge that the trial court was adhering to precedent established in Wray when rendering its decision in this case.
In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that appellees have no clear legal duty to publish appellant's concurring and dissenting opinions in the administrative agency's official reporter. As such, appellant argues that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on his request for a writ of mandamus compelling appellees to publish his concurring and dissenting opinions, even when no majority opinion is published. We disagree.
According to Civ.R. 56, a court may grant summary judgment if: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and, viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the moving party, that conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party.Bostic v. Connor (1988),
A court may grant a writ of mandamus if the person requesting the writ demonstrates: (1) that he or she has a clear legal right to the relief requested; (2) that respondents are under a clear legal duty to perform the acts requested; and (3) that the person requesting the writ has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Berger v.McMonagle (1983),
Neither SERB's enabling statute, R.C. 4117 et seq., the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, R.C. 119 et seq., nor SERB's administrative rules, Ohio Adm. Code 4117 et seq., compel appellees to publish opinions or dictate procedures upon which appellees would decide to publish opinions in SERB's official reporter. Therefore, we conclude that appellees have no legal duty to publish any *222 opinion; in particular, a dissenting or concurring opinion, even when no majority opinion is published.
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that appellant failed to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to the relief he is requesting or that appellees are under a clear legal duty to publish concurring and dissenting opinions, even when no majority opinion is published. Thus, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error.
Appellant's first assignment of error is sustained, and appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of appellees in regards to appellant's request for a writ of mandamus compelling SERB to publish appellant's concurring and dissenting opinions is affirmed, and the judgment granting summary judgment in favor of appellees in regards to appellant's action under the Sunshine Law is reversed.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
LAZARUS, P.J., concurs.
DESHLER, J., concurs separately.
Concurrence Opinion
While I concur in the judgment rendered today, I do not agree with the majority that, in reaching a judgment, we must overrule our earlier decision in Ohio Valley Mall Co. v. Wray
(1995),
This court's earlier decision in Wray should remain intact, as I do not agree with the majority that R.C.
Because I believe appellant had standing in his own right to challenge the activity of SERB, as violative of the "Sunshine Law," I agree with the judgment *223
of the court, but without overruling our decision in Wray.
Any substantive change in R.C.
