25 Minn. 215 | Minn. | 1878
These two cases are in the nature of quo warranto, one to determine the right of A. J. Parker to hold and exercise the duties of the office of county auditor in the county of Big Stone, the other, to determine the right of F. A. Parker to hold and exercise the duties of the office of clerk of the district court, in the same county. The general question presented is, whether the county of Big Stone is an organized county, and entitled to have a county auditor and clerk of the district court.
The constitution, article 11, recognizes a distinction between organized counties and established counties. The statutes, both before and since the constitution, recognize a distinction. For instance, the Revised Statutes of 1851, c. 1, divide the territory into nine counties. Of these, three are declared to be organized counties, “invested with all and singular the rights, privileges and immunities to which all organized counties in the territory shall be and are by law entitledone is declared to be organized after January 1,1852, and five are declared organized only for the appointment, of justices of the peace, constables, and such other judicial and ministerial offices as may be specially provided for. All through the acts of the legislature, the usual formula in declaring an established county is, “So much of the territory (or state) as is embraced in the following boundaries, be and the same is hereby established as the county of-,” and in declaring an organized county, “that the county of-be and the same is hereby declared to be organized, with all and singular the rights, privileges, and immunities, to which all organized counties in this territory (or state) are entitled by law. ”
This court, in State v. McFadden, 23 Minn. 40, defines the-distinction between organized and established counties, by stating, in effect, that the establishing of a county is the setting apart of certain territory to be in the future organized as
The establishing and organizing of counties is left (with some restrictions as to boundaries) wholly with the legislature, and, until some act of the legislature authorizing it, the people of no district have the right to act as an organized •county.
It is conceded that the county of Big Stone has never been expressly declared by the legislature to be an organized county, and that there has never been an express legislative grant to the people of that county of the right to elect the officers in question. But it is claimed that by reason of the provisions of Gen. St. c. 8, tit. 3, Big Stone, as well as all other counties in the state, was recognized as organized. That chapter is entitled, “Counties and County Officers.” Title 1 divides the state into seventy-three counties, naming them, and devotes a section to each county. The formula as to every county is the same: “The county of-is established and bounded as follows.” The names and boundaries of counties, as previously existing, are generally, if not in all cases, preserved. Some of the counties named were previously organized, and others only established counties. Title 2 is entitled, “Organization, Powers and Duties.” It provides that “each organized county within this state is a body politic and corporate, and, as such, empowered to act for the following purposes.” Then follows the power to sue and be sued; to purchase, hold and convey property; to make contracts; and provisions in regard to county buildings, to the manner of suing and being sued, and of determining claims against the county. The fact that some counties are organized, and others are not, is frequently recognized throughout the chapter as distinctly as in title 2. Title 3, relied on by defendants as by implication or recognition organizing all the counties in the state, is entitled, “County Commissioners.” The first section provides, “Every county shall be deemed an organized
Following this title are ten others, providing for and prescribing the powers and duties of other county officers. Title 4 provides for and regulates the powers and duties of county auditors, title 5, of county treasurers, and so through the chapter, each title being devoted to one county officer. From the peculiar phraseology in some of these titles, a doubt might be raised whether it was not intended to provide for some of these officers — such, for instance, as county treasurer, register of deeds, and sheriff — in all counties, whether organized or not. But the language used in others — as in title 4, “There shall be elected, in each organized county, a county auditor;” in title 8, “There shall be elected, in each county organized for judicial purposes, a county attorney;” in titles 10 and 12, providing for court commissioner and coroner in each organized county — clearly recognizes the distinction between organized and unorganized counties. From the tenor of the entire chapter, we conclude that it was not the intention, in title 3, to organize all the counties, except so far as was done by entitling each county to a board of county commissioners, nor to provide that each county should have all the officers referred to in the title. In prescribing all the powers and duties of county commissioners in both organized and unorganized counties, it was necessary, in order to cover the whole
From the conclusion at which we have arrived, it follows that Big Stone is not an organized county, and is not entitled to the officers in question. The acts of state officers are referred to as recognizing the existence of Big Stone as an organized county; but the legislature alone is competent to affect the status of a county.
Judgment in each case is reversed, and judgments will be entered as prayed for in the complaints.