*1 two-year intervening regular of between sessions legislative assembly.” ex effect are rel. To the same State Toomey Examiners, State Board of Erickson, Tipton (2d)

True, the indebt- supra, Rankin relation to state Case, had edness, justify can a differ- no amount rationalization of from “debt,” applied ent as to the state the word attempt a dis- to draw to a district. XII, tinction Article between the because two Constitution, cannot, my opinion, be sustained. Section grant rights power. upon is not a It the state. confers simply power It limitation an additional legislature. No limitation been state such constitutional has way This came made as to a school district. (Secs. 964 Rev. Codes

enactment. my school district is not that defendant indebted It is view limit, prayed and that the writ beyond its constitutional be denied. should 27, 1933, Mr. Angst- December

Rehearing denied dissenting. man KUHL, Relator, KAISER et

STATE al., ex Rel.

Respondents. 7,155.)

(No. 18, 1933.) 1933. Decided December (Submitted November (2d) [27 1113.] *2 Raymond Nagle, Mr. Attorney General, Morris, T. Mr. F.C. Attorney Assistant General, Hansen, County and Al. Mr. At- torney County, of Fallon brief; Appellants, for submitted a argued Morris orally. cause Young, Respondents,

Mr. D. R. submitted a brief. MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN delivered the court-. proceeding compel

This is mandamus a in the issuance of certificates of election Wilson William to G. E. and Nicklas county, as trustees of school district No. 55 Fallon a dis- question trict of the third class. Its consideration involves the who, conflicting claimants, as to are entitled to offices. agreed elected trustee W. Kaiser was facts are these: V. spring for a election held term at the school spring in the elected for the same term 1930; A. E. Hoff was B. Kuhl the same term election of 'J. resigned, and In election Hoff summer vacancy.' Kuhl appointed fill the defendant John Fried de- resigned 25, 1933, spring in the on March Acting vacancy. fill the fendant Weinschrott was General, Attorney thus con- on the advice of the board posted calling for stituted caused notice of election to be 1933', Saturday April, of three trustees— election on the first two-year term, and one three-year term, one for one for March one-year for a were filed on term. Petitions two-year term, and William nominating G. Wilson for E. met one-year On 29 the board for the term. March Nieblas Attorney pursuant opinion of the General and, a second deter- lots, Weinschrott drew and thus advising, so Fried and *3 two-year the mined hold over for that Weinschrott should term, one-year printed were Fried the term. Ballots and for term, three-year for calling the election the for of one trustee provision for the other two making and for election Attorney pursuant the trustees —all to the second General. by writing in the by

At of stickers election, use thirty-six for the terms, Wilson votes two- names and received one-year term, forty-four term, and Nieklas year being any opposing for either highest candidate vote duly elected for the three- Carrington M. was five. F. controversy here. term, him is no year and as to there of election Wilson refused to issue certificates board held theory Weinschrott and Fried on that and Nieblas taxpayer and by a resident over, proceeding, initiated and this facts the district court foregoing On the elector, followed. appealed. The correctness and defendants relator, found for placed depends the construction be provisions. statutory upon certain Section that a provides Kevised Codes the term of years. provides trustee shall Section be three that a trus- tee vacancy fill hold office “shall until next election, at which election there shall be elected unexpired trustee for the term.” Section declares that “when at annual school election the terms aof. regularly expire of the in trustees districts of the first class, trustees, class, three in the second districts of two in class, third one trustee, districts shall be elected years, remaining for three trustee or trustees whose years shall or two hold over for as one necessary prevent the terms of the board of a expiring of trustees one it year; provided, that shall be by over, determined lot what trustees shall hold and for what term.”

The word “term” applies person to the office and not to the

holding (State Knight, it. Morgan 71, 245 Shaw, see Iowa, 28, 188 and Wilson v. W.N.

Under the facts here the the majority “terms” regularly expire

trustees did the time at election, 1001, supra. within the of section The term expired, of but one time, at that and that by was filled Carrington. the election of The other two terms not expire 1935, respectively. will until in In conse quence it properly held the trial that court application presented. has no to the facts here Section 998 controls, properly and under it three trustees were elected 1933', three-year one regularly expiring for the term at ending term who hold for would unexpired ending regularly for the term *4 expiring regularly in one for the term The case 903, Jersey Peacock, 46, 223 v. Mont. is relied compelling a different conclusion. by defendants as That case controlling here, there not all three terms had is expired long election therein involved. before the adjust merely

Section 1001 intended to terms of expire majority school trustees thereof so that a should accomplished at the same time. After has once been this district, application has no further such the section statutory provisions complied with. district if other have been greatly application restricts the fact that this conclusion argument against of section 1001 such construction. is regularly ex- fewer of the terms the eases wherein a pire effectually at the more is the same expressed intent, 1001, accomplished. in section plan purpose paralyze Section 1001 reveals no people’s except privilege selecting their own adjustment he the case where must there year so that thereof shall not —a situation not presented here. for, properly prayed issued mandate court writ of judgment is affirmed. Justice Stewart concurs. Callaway: me I concur. It seems to

Mr. Chief directly controlling supra, applicable is statute, and, Section 1001 is an obscure whatever this case. applicability may mean, I am unable to see its to the condi- it presented. I think the lower tions court correct. Every part I dissent. stat

Mr. Justice Anderson: (In possible operative, ute must made if it is to do so. re Estate, 527; City Billings 68 Mont. 220 Pac. McLure’s Commission, 608; 67 Mont. v. Public Service 782; Daley Torrey, Stange 230 Pac. Esval, 215 Pac. Statutes must be so con meaningless, to be that no word therein is considered strued reasonably give found that will can be if such a construction Estate, supra; Daley Torrey, (In McLure’s it effect. re Court, 290, District supra; ex rel. Foot v. Walker, Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. A. L. R.

555 65 414, 62 353; Mason, 180, Mont. 211 Pac. State v. Mont. 204 358; Co., 579, Pac. Dosen v. 78 East Butte C. Min. Mont. 880.) 254 elementary This is said to be an rule of stat utory (In Estate, supra; construction. re McLure’s State ex Duncan, rel. 376, Smith v. 55 Mont. 177 Pac. ex rel. 147.) Commrs., 355, Board 56 Mont. 185 Pac. Koefod The rule grounded referred above presumption on the legislature meaning. did not without use words (State ex The Duncan, supra.) court, rel. Smith v. when con struing statute, has to determine intent from language employed (McNair District, 87 v. School 423, 188, 866), 288 69 having A. before recourse to L. R. other (Great rules of construction Northern Utilities Co. Commission, 294). Public 180, Service 293 Pac. “term,” The word when defining used a statute longest occupied time an office be before re-election or re- appointment, applies person holding to the officeand not (State Morgan it. 76 Knight, 71, 267.) used, When the “term” there may word is thus within given term any incumbents, office one or more all of whom occupy the office under the identical “term.” word “term” as to the holder of an officemeans either actually time he is entitled hold the or the time (62 723.) served an officer. C. J.

Section part Revised Codes was enacted as a Chapter 76, subsequently Laws of 1913. It was (Laws 1919, Chap. 196, amended in 1919 11), sec. changed applicable portion amendment nowise part here. law Section was enacted as a of the same chapter and section of the Laws of 1913. legislature said: section 1001 “When at

school election the terms aof of .the trustees expire.” used, The word “terms” was there not with refer- period might occupy of time ence to the that a school office, concerning during but was used of time “reg- might incumbent which an retain the office. word custom; way ularly” means conformable to in a or law method according to rule or mode; established in uniform (Matter order. (In Liquor McCusker Certificates), re Misc. Supp. 281; N. Y. City Belleville v. Citizens’ Ry. Co., Horse 152 Ill. N. E. R.L. A. The trustees of the school district who had been *6 fill vacancies until following, the election under pro- the clear visions of section right were without to continue in office by appointment virtue of their after such election. Their right so to do had ceased because express provisions of the law; of it terminated at the annual expiration election. The right of their regular, right was their hence to continue in “regularly expired.’’ office legislature express

The did language appli- limit the of three-year cation section period necessary to the the trustee as to the time and manner of election of school Chapter trustees when 76 of the of 1913 Laws was It enacted. * ** language: used all-inclusive “When at time, Theretofore the entire board of trustees aof district could be years. elected at one time for a term of three legislature It is contended that the intention of the was to apply only period have section to the of transition from system the old new for election of school apply and also that it to the identical situation would such as prevailed in Jersey Peacock, the ease of legislature 903. If the intention of the was in accordance namely, majority opinion, with the that section 1001 three-year majority term when the of a of the trustees expired, district then the decision in the of a case of erroneous, for the full Jersey v. Peacock expired persons last-elected trustees had all so holding over, that situation been does not come elected had if statute, attribute the of this we purview within it, the terms did not “at suggested to since expired The long in the section. terms had election,” as stated election. to the prior purpose 1001 declared the legislature section terms of of the board of prevent to be

Act give In year. order to effect to expiring trustees legislative declared, expressly this intention as we hold that section 1001 applies A to the situation now before us. trustee who was provisions under the of section holds officeuntil provided; and, the next therein annual election as if thereafter such right occupy secured the gained right additional he do toso as a proceedings result had under 1001. That section section operative only powers becomes granted after the under section 998 have been point exercised to the of exhaustion. Both harmony sections stand in complete without conflict and one with the other. This result is in accord with the rules statutory adopt any construction adverted to above. To other construction meaningless lapse renders after the years following three enactment its and thwarts the de- clared adopted intention. The construction conformity pronouncement with the of this court in Jersey v. Peacock, supra. ignores provisions at least of sec-

tion should be reversed. *7 I Matthews: expressed by concur the views

Mr. Justice Anderson above. STATE ELEVATOR CO., v. FARMERS’ Appellant, Respondent. CO.,

ELEVATOR (No. 7,152.) (Submitted November 1933. Decided December (2d)

[27 743.]