10 Nev. 155 | Nev. | 1875
By the Court,
On the 9th day of February, 1865, the legislature passed an act granting to Frederick Birdsall and his associates a franchise to collect such tolls as the commissioners of Storey and Lyon Counties might fix, for the space of ten years after the passage of said act, upon the road known as the Dayton, Virginia and Carson Toll Road. (Stat. 1864-5, 144.)
The road was built prior to the passage of said act over and upon the public land of the United States. Respondent was incorporated January 15, 1874, and is the successor in interest of said Birdsall and his associates. It is claimed by the relator that the franchise, granted by said act, lapsed on the 9th day of February, 1875, and that by
Respondent, in order to avoid the plain provisions of the statute, asserts a right under section three of the act of February 9, which provides■ that “the owners of said road may incorporate the same under the general incorporation laws of this State,” and argues that Birdsall and his associates could under this section incorporate, and that by so doing, notwithstanding the provisions .of section one of said act limiting the franchise to ten years, they were given the right to collect toll for fifty years from the time of their incorporation, that being the time specified in the general law for the existence of the corporation. Can this position be sustained by any rule of law or logical course of reasoning?. We think not. In arriving at the intention of the legislature we must look at the whole act, its object, scope and extent, and find out, from the act itself if possible, what the legislature meant, and the statute should be so construed, as to avoid absurd results. The object of the law was to give a franchise to the parties therein named to collect tolls upon a certain road for a fixed period of time.
Why was section three inserted in the act?
The general law providing for the formation of corporations in existence at the time of the passage of the act in question was limited to “manufacturing, mining, milling, ditching, mechanical, chemical, building and farming purposes.” (Stat. 1864, 49.) It did not authorize an incorporation for the purpose of constructing or maintaining toll-roads. In considering the entire act with reference to the then existing laws it seems to us quite clear that it was the intention of the legislature to give to Birdsall and his associates special authority to create and form a corporation to conduct and carry on the business of collecting tolls, and under their corporate name to possess and enjoy the rights,
Respondent did not incorporate until the general law was
Under an almost universal rule of construction, the act under review must be considered and treated as an agreement between Birdsall and his associates and the public, the terms of which are expressed in the statute. If there is any ambiguity in the language used, the act must be construed against the grantees and in favor of the public. The grantees take nothing by implication and can claim nothing but what is clearly given them by the law. (Angell on Highways, Sec. 368; Lake v. Virginia and Truckee R. R. Co., 7 Nev. 299, and authorities there cited.)
The fact, claimed by respondent, that the road was private property at the time of the passage of the act, and that no person could travel over it without permission of the owners, does not destroy the statutory contract to dedicate the road to the public in consideration of the privilege of collecting tolls thereon for the period of ten years. By allowing travelers to pass over the road and by collecting tolls thereon they dedicated their road to the public use, and the general public have acquired such an easement to travel over the road as precludes the owners frorg asserting any ownership inconsistent with such use. (Angell on Highways, Sec. 142; Ogle v. P. W. and B. R. R. Co., 3 Houston’s Bel. 272; City of Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526; State ex rel. Boardman v. Lake, 8 Nev. 284, and authorities there cited.)
It is so ordered.