614 N.E.2d 827 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
Lead Opinion
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *201 This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas dismissing the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Maharathah Karmasu, a.k.a. James Lee Paxson, petitioner below and appellant herein, against Arthur C. Tate, Jr., Warden of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility ("SOCF"), respondent below and appellee herein. Appellant posits the following assignments of error for our review:
"I. The court made errors in reviewing only one argument[.]"
"II. The court errored [sic] in not properly construing an inmate pro se petition in the best interest of the filer."
"III. The court abused its discretion and errored [sic] in denying motion without a hearing."
"IV. The court errored [sic] in failing to determine if mandamus or injunctive relief was the proper relief[.]"
A short summary of the facts pertinent to this appeal is as follows. Appellant is an inmate incarcerated at SOCF. On November 8, 1991, he filed a rambling sixty-page petition for a writ of mandamus to be issued against appellee, commanding that certain acts be performed to assist appellant in the practice of his religious faith. On December 20, 1991, appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On December 27, 1991, the lower court entered judgment granting such relief and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed. *202
We begin our analysis from the well-settled proposition that, in order to establish the right to a writ of mandamus, a relator must demonstrate (1) a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and (3) that the relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State exrel. Evans v. Indus. Comm. (1992),
In the cause sub judice, the petition was not denied on its merits, but rather dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).1
A petition in mandamus will be deemed to state a claim, for purposes of Civ.R. 12(B)(6), so long as it alleges the existence of a legal duty and the want of an adequate remedy at law.State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock (1989),
With this standard in mind, we turn our attention to the fourth assignment of error wherein appellant argues, among other things, that appellee was under a clear legal duty to perform the requested acts set forth in his petition. These acts included (1) the provision of a special diet to accommodate appellant's religious faith; (2) the provision of fasting and alternate meal arrangements to accommodate his religious faith; (3) the provision of traditionally mandated foods *203 from his religion; (4) the allowance of his wearing "his Hindu Tuft of [h]air"; (5) the more frequent provision of razors to accommodate the shaving of body hair in compliance with his religious faith; (6) the provision of a Hindu rosary; (7) the provision of the sacred texts of his faith; (8) the cessation of administrative orders that he not speak of his religion or show books of his religion to other prisoners; and (9) that his religious name be used for prison administrative purposes.
After a thorough review of appellant's petition, we find merit only with respect to his claim that appellee has a duty to provide him with the sacred text(s) of his religion. The provisions of R.C.
It would also appear that appellant has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by which to enforce this mandate. Appellee counterargues that alternate injunctive relief or monetary damages could be sought or an institutional grievance be filed. However, we are not persuaded that monetary damages or an injunction would force compliance with the statute.4 Moreover, appellant's petition states, among other things, that he "has exhausted all remedies * * *." Presuming this and other averments throughout the petition are true, and making all reasonable inferences in favor of appellant,Mitchell, supra,
However, we are not persuaded that there was any error in dismissing the remainder of the petition. Appellant's claim of a duty to provide access to religious text(s) was supported by a clear and specific statutory mandate. There does not appear to be any comparable basis of support for his remaining claims. Although appellant cites us to a number of general propositions to support his arguments, he appears to ultimately rely on the provisions of the
We concede that, while lawful incarceration may deprive a prisoner of certain rights he would otherwise enjoy in a free society, a convict does not loose all his rights upon entering the prison population. In re Lamb (1973),
Nevertheless, the "Free Exercise Clause" of the
Moreover, we recognize that the practice of any religion, however orthodox its beliefs and however accepted its practices, will be subject to strict supervision and extensive limitations in a prison. Sostre v. McGinnis (C.A.2, 1964),
The duty to be enforced by a writ of mandamus must bespecific, definite, clear and unequivocal. 67 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1986) 218, Mandamus, Procedendo and Prohibition, Section 19. The provisions of the
We now return to appellant's first assignment of error wherein he argues that the lower court erred in dismissing the petition solely on appellee's arguments without also considering his arguments. We disagree. A trial court is not required to consider any legal theory, or argument, beyond that which will adequately dispose of the case at hand. Coulverson v. Ohio AdultParole Auth. (May 11, 1992), Ross App. No. 1790, unreported, at 4-5, 1992 WL 97805. As discussed above, most of appellant's claims could be disposed of under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and, therefore, there was no need to address the specific merits of appellant's arguments. To the extent that the lower court should have considered such arguments with respect to the claim of access to religious text(s), we have already reversed the court's judgment on that issue and, thus, there was no prejudice. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. *206
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by not construing his petition so that it requested some other form of relief and thereby avoided dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). We disagree.
To be sure, this court has firmly rejected all notions thatpro se litigants be held to the same standard as attorneys during trial court proceedings. See Wright v. Miller (Mar. 8, 1991), Highland App. No. 752, unreported, at 5, 1991 WL 37926. We have also ruled that considerable leniency must be afforded to pro se actions brought by prisoners. In re Paxson (July 1, 1992), Scioto App. No. 91CA2008, unreported, at 1-2, 1992 WL 154139. There is, however, a limit. Principles requiring generous construction of pro se filings do not require courts to conjure up questions never squarely asked or construct full-blown claims from convoluted reasoning. See Beaudett v.Hampton (C.A.4, 1985),
Appellant's petition spans sixty pages and contains enough religious material to, as stated in his brief, provide "an in depth study of Hinduism equivalent to a high school course in theology." The petition is also replete with accusations and commentaries against SOCF personnel and references to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say, this superfluous material detracts from the clarity of the petition and renders it extremely difficult to understand. We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that the trial court erred in not construing the pleading as anything other than the petition for mandamus by which it was titled.
Alternatively, appellant argues that the lower court should have appointed counsel to redraft the petition as a civil rights action and that failure to do so constituted an impermissible denial of access to the courts. Again, we disagree. Appellant relies on the cases of Bounds v. Smith (1977),
The action below was commenced in mandamus. Mandamus is a civil action. State ex rel. Spirko v. Court of Appeals (1986),
In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without granting him a hearing to present evidence on his claims. We disagree. The dismissal was entered below under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) proceedings to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. During such proceedings, the trial court is confined solely to the averments of the petition and cannot consider matters outside the pleadings. See Popson v.Henn (1984),
Having sustained a portion of appellant's fourth assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The claim in mandamus for access to Hindu religious text(s), or bible, is hereby remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment affirmed in part,reversed in partand cause remandedfor further proceedings.
GREY and PETER B. ABELE, JJ., concur.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment and opinion giving the broad construction to the word "Bible" so as to include any sacred text. But I think in remanding on the issue of the sacred texts, we should do so with the instruction that the petitioner be required to state which writing he wants.
In Hinduism, there are the Shivite and Vishnavite divisions much like the divisions among Protestant and Catholic Christians or Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims. Since there are also many volumes of sacred Hindu texts, like the Rig Veda or the Upanishads, it would be very difficult for a non-Hindu to decide what texts should be made available.
In remanding for access to the sacred Hindu texts, we ought to give the trial court some direction on the extent of relief to be allowed. It appears that petitioner is a Vishnavite and that he is asking for the Bhagava Gita. It also appears that he has other books, but that there are prison regulations limiting *208 the number of hardback books a prisoner may have and limiting access to the prisoner's property in storage, like books.
On remand, the trial court should require petitioner to state specifically which sacred texts he seeks and then to frame an order which will permit petitioner access to those texts equal to, but no greater than, the access allowed to any other prisoner.