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State Ex Rel. Kansas City v. Public Service Commission
524 S.W.2d 855
Mo.
1975
Check Treatment

*1 ex rel. KANSAS Missouri STATE Municipal

CITY, Missouri, Corpo

ration, Relator-Appellant, COMMISSION

PUBLIC SERVICE Jones, Missouri, E. and Marvin

State of

Chairman, al., Respondents, et Railway Company,

Intervenor-Respondent. 58285.

No. Missouri,

Supreme Court Banc. En

June 1975.

Rehearings July Denied

reassignment. We reverse and remand with directions. right

No issue is raised as to to direct P.S.C. the work on the viaducts. determined whether cost thereof is to be borne Terminal pursuant prior to a contract between it and City agreed wherein Terminal to assume all expense or whether that contractual provision abrogated adoption Service Commission orAct 1963 amendment of that Act. City In 1909 and Terminal entered into a year awarded Terminal 200 franchise for the operation system the city, within including the to use alleys streets and purpose. for that As agreement City agreed to and streets, did alleys vacate various places in order right-of-way to make availa- ble for Terminal. One hundred and two return, such tracts were involved. In Ter- minal assumed obligations, certain includ- Wilson, Atty., City A. Carrol C. Aaron expense to bear the Kennett, City, for City Atty., Asst. Kansas construction, maintenance and reconstruc- relator-appellant. tion, necessary, specifically of certain des- Parker, D. Stapleton, M. Sam William ignated tracks, viaducts over Terminal’s Downey, Jefferson City, Thomas J. Kansas plus subways such other viaducts or intervenor-respondent. City, might required during the term the franchise. This contract was embodied in FINCH, Judge. an ordinance which was submitted to and approved by City the voters of Kansas judgment af- appeal from a is an This formally accepted then by Terminal.1 Service Com- firming an order of the Public (P.S.C.) City determined that ne- that directed In 1922 mission required cessity over a viaduct Terminal’s viaducts over of certain reconstruction Railway it called City Terminal tracks at Oak Street and of Kansas tracks pur- apportioned (Terminal) and Terminal to construct such viaduct Company provisions Kansas contract. suant of the 1909 thereof between Terminal affirming comply, following opinion refused to (City). An City I. On proceeding in Division which a was instituted before was written judgment motion, seeking approval proposed case was then court’s own After banc. viaduct and a direction to Terminal erect to the court en transferred failed of opinion approved it. Commission the viaduct the divisional reargument, bear the written on and directed that Terminal should and the case is now adoption Ry., ar franchise (banc nal 324 Mo. details S.W.2d 1055 1. Additional 1929). rangement are set out City City Termi Kansas Kansas court reaching In 1969 information the P.S.C. Ter- cost of construction maintenance. investigation undertake an caused it to This sought minal review that order. Prospect Avenue and Main inso- court affirmed the order of the P.S.C. over Street viaducts Terminal’s tracks far that a viaduct should determined City. Both were Terminal and be constructed at Oak in accordance Street *3 appear present ordered to and facts con- plan, approved with an but reversed safety of cerning the these viaducts and the judgment as it the cost of insofar allocated employment Commission ordered of an construction and maintenance of the via- making engineering purpose firm City rel. Terminal duct. ex Kansas State Meanwhile, 1970, a study thereof. Ter- Commission, Ry. v. Public 308 Mo. emergency repairs minal made to the Oak 359, (1925). held That and, Street viaduct at request, its that via- that the decision as where and when proceedings. duct was included in the P.S.C. to be viaduct should be constructed was one Terminal requesting filed motion P.S.C., by the but made Commis- to allocate costs P.S.C. between it and the sion leave for in an should determination ruling thereon, City.2 Before the Commis- appropriate interpretation forum the and sion Terminal City present ordered and alleged enforcement of the contract with agreement their repairs needed on respect to cost of such viaducts. the various viaducts and allocation of those City Subsequently, instituted an action in made, City costs. No compel the circuit court to Terminal to com- taking position the 1909 that under ply with contractual obligation its to build contractually contract Terminal was obli- of the pay and the cost Oak viaduct. Street gated pay all of the costs and that the City In City Kansas v. Terminal Kansas validity of that been estab- contract had Ry., 882, (banc 324 Mo. S.W.2d 1055 litigation parties lished in between 1929),this court held that the 1909contract the second Oak Street case. City and Terminal was valid 1972, its issued the P.S.C. March On consideration; supported by contract that it In- proceeding. in this and order report limit, abridge did not or hamper the exer- finding: therein was this cluded state; cise of the this jurisdiction has in 1913 “This Commission enactment the Public Serv- 389.640,RSMo ice cause under Section abrogate Commission Act did not V.A.M.S., to determine destroy 1909 contract or carrying viaducts City mentioned paid thereunder to have above viaducts tracks, order and to over railroad Terminal. streets Accordingly, the court di- if such thereof and reconstruction specific performance repairs rected of Terminal’s there- needed, the cost and to allocate obligation to construct are for the Oak Street viaduct. of.” (originally 50 of of RSMo 1969 intervening 3. Sec. 389.640 Apparently, Terminal in the Act, Service Commission Laws years the Public Mo., acquiesced in had the 1909 589), p. in the P.S.C. referred to in the case. construed second Street Oak railroads, order, crossings provides that City’s brief so states and Terminal has not roads, fact, shall streets street railroads contended otherwise. As a matter of permission during successfully be constructed without period Terminal power to which shall have exclusive sought recovery City P.S.C. from Kansas Transit manner, prescribe in- “the determine cluding its cost of of some of maintenance crossing, particular point of City Ry. viaducts. Kansas installation, operation, mainte- City Transit, Inc., the terms 359 S.W.2d 698 nance, apportionment expenses, use and 1962). (Mo. banc crossings, protection” whether at of such grade or otherwise. addition, points stated: case. It City the P.S.C. order out Terminal and (the herein) same as those there “City contends that raised; litigated the same as now be allocated in and reconstruction should namely, did enactment of the Public provisions with the accordance vesting authority Service Commission Act of 1909 and Franchise Ordinances allocate costs of railroad are contracts between asserts crossings necessarily abrogate super- Assuming the ordi- it and Terminal. obligation cede the of Terminal under the contracts, they were not nances are such 1909 contract to bear all of such costs? entered into after October City insists that since this court in the into after only contracts entered second Oak case held such contract Street un- binding on this Commission date provisions valid and that as to the terms of 389.640. The Commis- der *4 payment by Terminal for such installations therefore, is, obligated apportion sion did not interfere with the exercise of the the factors and costs in accordance with provi- state’s that and such out in that statute.” standards set abrogated by sions were not the enactment under amended Having concluded that Act, of the Public Service Commission appli- the 1909 contract was not 389.640 § issue has been settled. applied, the P.S.C. cable and was not to be stands, If that decision necessarily it City to the proceeded apportion then is decisive of the issue by City’s raised viaduct of the cost of the per cent unless, appeal per as the remaining 10 P.S.C. the circuit engineering with the held, court the amendment entire 389.640in paid by § Terminal. The cent 1963has altered the situation. The the viaducts at order of reconstruction of cost of premise is on City P.S.C. based to the that it Prospect and Main was allocated did, and that under the terms of the 1963 any that this work was not on the basis only amendment contracts dated after Oc Terminal. benefit to 13, 1963, tober may govern how may application filed for review of apportioned. reject interpreta We foregoing order the Circuit Court of tion, it our conclusion that the 1963 County. Cole That court affirmed the or- validity amendment does not affect the or City appealed. der of the P.S.C. and applicability of the 1909 contract. We do City, seeking of the order reversal language proviso not construe the costs, allocating primarily relies on the deci- saying added the amendment as or im sion of this court in the second Oak Street plying ignore that the P.S.C. shall a con- benefits, determining 389.640(2) (Laws such 4. In the commission was amended Mo., 1963, including shall p. 501) consider all relevant following pro- factors and the volume, speed type traffic; viso was added: vehicular “ volume, speed traffic; type * * * of train sav- provided, however, any ings, any, party if which will inure to either entered into after October project; advantages as the result of the any corporation such and the public corporation and to such result- state, county, municipality or other ing delays from the elimination of authority interest, apportion- as to the crossing. Any reduction of hazard at the portion any section, ment of cost mentioned in this any project of the cost of such binding upon filing shall be final apportioned excess of such benefits shall be with copy the commission of an executed against corporation, to and assessed agreement. parties such If such are unable county, municipality, or other author- agree upon of said make, ity desiring proposing, or such cost, shall, except the commission as to installation, alteration, abolishment, sep- or projects commission, highway of the state aration.” apportion among parties ac- cording accruing to the benefits to each. Alton R.R. Public Service Commis It rel. tract October dated before (1934). sion, Mo. Pur S.W.2d does itself to question not address legislature had suant to prior only It deals what contracts. on the exclusive right to confer the P.S.C. (October occurs after its effective date permit whether to 1963) right to determine simply says if thereafter authorized, and, specify agency intersections agree appor- railroad and on where, costs, when and in what manner the inter tionment of shall abide thereby. says nothing justify section should be constructed. that would legislature conclusion intended but There also no by the nullify amendment to an earlier con- thereun abrogation of contract tract, particularly previously one held proper exercise of der as a result of binding court to be valid and or feder police state power does violate Furthermore, thereto. if the second against impairment of con provisions al correctly Oak Street case concluded that tracts. This because against impair- constitutional limitations by con may not be hindered or frustrated obligation ment preclud- of contracts companies or tracts between individuals impairment by ed the 1913 Public Service governmental If subdivisions. obligation Commission Act of Terminal’s should have the effect interfer contract, to costs under the 1909 it seems therewith, necessarily give way must *5 obvious that such limitations likewise would police appropriate to an exercise preclude impairment or abrogation thereof City rel. power. ex State legislative the 1963 amendment. For Commission, 308 Mo. Ry. v. Public Service both of these reasons we hold that the (1925); 359, ex rel. 272 957 State Wa S.W. P.S.C. and the circuit court were in error in Commission, Ry. v. Public Service 306 bash holding that the 1963 obligated amendment reversed (1924), 102 Mo. 267 S.W. the ignore P.S.C. to the 1909 contract and 273 47 S.Ct. 71 grounds, other apportion the costs on the basis of bene- reinstated, 295 S.W. 86 L.Ed. but fits. v. (1927); Co. Missouri American Tobacco Terminal asserts that even if the 1963 (banc 502 Ry., 247 Mo. 157 S.W. Pac. amendment did not have the effect of abro- recognized in the 1912). fact was first This gating the 1909 contract still the court said, 272 case when the court Oak Street should affirm because the second Oak at 962: S.W. Street case on which the City relies was “ * * * municipali- A railroad and a wrongly decided and should be overruled. cannot, agreement, determine the ty This contention is based on premise the that manner, point, including particular the of 389.640, authorizing in apportionment of street, by a crossing of railroad the the as vesting as well the P.S.C. of paramount interest the because of the where, exclusive when, determine safety question of involved.” public in the crossings constructed, and how are to be merely prescribes appropriate an not contend otherwise on this City does exercise of police power for the purpose protect- appeal. of ing public safety. Hence, appeal the real in issue this is protect that whether, contends, no doubt apportion- be as Terminal can

There railroads of intersections crossing by at ment of the cost of the of proper exercise is a inseparably roads was so of streets Missouri, K. ex rel. police State Commission’s action under power. police Commission, 271 necessarily had the effect its exercise v.Ry. T.& ex 1917); State (banc abrogating 270, Mo. they between the wherein had Terminal in city relies. The that case ar- agreed pay that Terminal would gued cost of the provision in the contract be- projects. discussing question, such this it tween whereby the railroad lat- Terminal’s brief assumes the inevitability of ter would entire cost reconstruc- question. affirmative answer to an It any tion not way did limit the any not in does manner demonstrate that powers of the Commerce Commission and the P.S.C. does not allocate costs of the simply provi- was a voluntary contractual viaducts, protection sion entered into for a valid consideration. police power by means of the will be argued frus- primary concern of the trated even hindered. Cases on which Commerce Commission was to determine also assump- Terminal relies make whether the reconstruction was sufficient example, tion. For Terminal cites two Illi- preserve promote public safety support nois cases in contention that require done, the work to be not with second case wrongly Oak Street paid opinion who therefor. court in its City Chicago The first decided. v. depart concluded that would it not from the Commission, Illinois Commerce Ill. principles announced in the case earlier (1934). N.E. Examination of that Chicago Illinois Commerce Com- appellant city argued mission, discloses that supra, stating, 122 at N.E.2d 558: “ provisions therein that * * * contract be- conclude, therefore, We requiring it tween the lat- there, we did defray ter to the improvement cost of reconstruction the viaduct public safety per- did not involve the but grade crossing over the is an only private arrange- tained financial inseparable element of the parties. ments between For rea- exclusively vested the Com- son, contended, said financial ar- Commission, may merce rangements scope did not come within the abrogated by the contract subsequent exercise of the state’s seeks enforce.” *6 power police thereby. and were not affected Obviously, the what court said in the two did opinion say response What the court’s provided analysis Illinois cases no of wheth- Simply thereto? of “contracts the er objective achievement of the of the exer- character of the ordinance under review are power the police any cise of was affected subject by to subsequent modification stat- permitting way by the to cost be allocated the fide utes enacted in bona exercise of the parties pursuant pre- between the to their power police promote public health, to the a contract rather than on basis morals, safety, general welfare, or the by ordered the Commission. did not con- not, do reason the by and of contract clause sider whether the health or of the (Const. of the Federal or State Constitution protected just would be as much if 10, 1; 1, 2, art. Ill. subd. Const. art. § according paid the were to the con- costs 14), enjoy any immunity legis- from such according tract as to the Commission’s di- lation.” 190 N.E. at sim- rective. ply unsupported stated the conclusion that We find that other cases cited Termi- part nal not do demonstrate that allocation of police power superceded its and exercise of improvements cost so directed is in- allocating expenses. contract those

separably part a of police power as to Subsequently, question again arose require impairment obliga- of contractual City Chicago Chicago of Ry., v. & Nw. 4 Furthermore, they tions. do not deal with (1954), Ill.2d 122 N.E.2d 553 which is comparable example, situations. For see the second of Illinois cases on Q. which Chicago, State ex rel. B. & R.R. v. Public

861 community and to Commission, (Mo. threat the health 334 54 Service S.W.2d The ordi- they be eliminated. Wellston, must 1960); City v. Wabash R.R. of 276 specified date all provides that (Mo.1955); nance 208 State ex rel. St. Paul S.W.2d they removed and outhouses must be K. C. Short Line R.R. v. Public Service & toilets which Commission, by inside replaced Mo. 126 shall be 338 92 S.W.2d to obligated install (1936); property rel. v. owners of State ex Alton R.R. Public cases, Commission, Clearly, under decided pay 334 70 for. Service Mo. S.W.2d city’s of (1934); valid exercise ex rel. Kirkwood this would be a City 57 State v. v. Hoevel Commission, power. City of Louis police Mo. St. 330 50 Co., 59 617 Building S.W.2d (1932). Real & S.W.2d Other cases cited deal Estate Nash, v. (Mo.1933); City of St. Louis with situations wherein held the court However, suppose that (Mo.1924). fixing- charg-ed rates specifying services S.W. ordinance a shortly prior passage of that by public companies be utility rendered is his tenant entered into police an exercise landowner and agreed do whereby owner contracts which undertake to fix or limit contract tenant includ- police rates or impinge things such services on the various desired bedroom, power and installa- Typical are invalid. of another addition paving group of of a cases are State ex rel. Kansas inside toilet City tion an Latshaw, 909, driveway. Public Service entered into Co. 325 Mo. a new (banc 1930); lease City 30 S.W.2d 105 which established Cape amount of rent to specified Girardeau v. period St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., agreement, Mo. of that (banc 1924); paid. As a be installing pay ex rel. cost agreed State of Sedalia v. tenant Public Serv Commission, circum- ice 275 Mo. Under toilet. S.W. 497 the inside (1918). the ordinance group stances, passage This by respon- of cases cited would pertinent to install they duty dents owner imposing because deal abrogate prior with prohib- situations wherein the inside toilet the own- very thing arrangement contractual had achieve, not, whereby the tenant here, seeks to er and the tenant Clearly not. pays agreed incidental of who that cost? to assume what is protect done objective this exercise health health and safety. We protect conclude none cases cited installa- safety. achieved establish that the This second the removal toilet and wrongly Oak Street case was tion of the inside decided or *7 outhouse, thereby eliminating dis- it should be old overruled. the might af- which materials charge of waste We It disease. spread decided or supplies that when a state fect water city properly to attain- directs something completely immaterial be would be done in protect order to the cost of objective whether public the health or ment of that safety, by ultimately does not is borne necessarily or toilet universally the new inside follow that allocation of The the the tenant. by costs thereof is the owner or such an inseparable part one iota the not affect of that exercise does pays of of who police power the that it public of the automatically the health protection over of rides and abrogates agreements the par of of elimination of by the reason the achieved ties as to expenses how such of the new construction are to and be old outhouses hypothetical borne. A true, apportionment or example will demon toilet. That why strate this is true. the cost of the Suppose by a the of assignment passes an insepa- ordinance such an which not be improvement recites that the require existence of old-time as to poses outhouses a the rable of 862 “ * * *

abrogation of contract between Under system pow- our the owner and Recognizing his tenant. and lodged er is branch of legislative with the enforcing the allocating costs government. belongs It to that would not hinder city’s or frustrate the department are to exert what known police power. state, police powers and to determine, primarily, what measures are There is an analogy hypo- between that protection appropriate or needful for example thetical and the facts case morals, health, public public objective at bar. It is clear that the sought safety. by protect safety P.S.C. was to every “It does not at all follow that traveling public by making the viaducts ostensibly promo- statute enacted sufficiently safe, strong specify not to ends, accepted tion of these is to be degree The who should therefor.5 legitimate police powers exertion of the safety by is not affected the allocation are, necessity, There of the State. parties. pub- between the costs beyond legislation limits cannot just pays if Terminal lic will as safe be every possible pre- rightfully go. While pur- improvements repairs costs of the indulged in favor of sumption is to be obligations under suant contractual Cases, statute, Sinking validity Fund of a per it will contract as be if the 1909 496], L.Ed. the courts 99 U.S. [25 per cent of the cost of construction rather obey Constitution than must by is cent of the cost of borne law-making department govern- order of the Com- City as directed ment, must, upon responsi- their own mission. whether, any bility, particu- determine passed. limits have been lar these the function of the courts to Marbury it was said in purpose,’ ‘To what determine whether statute purporting Cranch, 137, Madison, v. [5 constitute exercise limited, powers 60], ‘are 2 L.Ed. has a real and substantial relationship to is that commit- purpose limitation what protection health, safety, any may, if at writing, these limits ted unjustifi morals or welfare and whether it time, by those intended to be passed ably invades secured the Constitu distinction restrained? long tion. recognized principle This is well limited unlimited government with Kansas, Mugler stated in 123 U.S. abolished, limits do not if those powers 273, 297, (1887). 31 L.Ed. S.Ct. they persons on whom are confine the court, discussing In that case the imposed, prohibited and acts acts police power, extent, its exercise and its obligation.’ equal allowed are stated: forms, bound mere nor courts dissenting opinion Judge 5. The Seiler sion. No contention whatsoever was made contends the interest of the in this party case either that allocation of this case was not limited to the the Commission pur- was for the *8 Rather, says, pose protecting viaducts. he it was interested stability financial stability also in the financial condition and the railroad or the charge rates it would ability of Terminal and its to serv- maintain services fact, it would during In render. comply requiring argument ice Terminal to oral arguing counsel respon- might equipment expressly with its contract to cause its dents response ques- stated in to a become unsafe and service to deterio- tion from the bench that the Commission’s making rate. ing In this assertion and seek- allocation of solely costs was based on evi- justify to on allocation costs herein dence as to vehicular traffic count over the basis, position takes a the dissent viaduct passing and trains on the tracks by supported appeal or con- the record below nomic relationship no had to the eco- by by tended for Terminal the Commis- situation the railroad.

863 pretences. they by companies, to be misled mere it did not utility property of liberty indeed, are They impair- are at under extent of possess right — duty look at the substance of rights solemn when it did not ing existing contract —to they upon the in- things, good whenever enter public would appear legislature tran- quiry company whether the has withholding from the by served If, authority. the limits of its authority scended issue bonds in accordance therefore, purporting a statute to have rights. with its contractual health, protect been enacted to state, case, morals, acting public safety, By analogy the or the Commission, right through

has no real or substantial relation to had objects, reconstruction of via- palpable those or is a invasion of direct law, safety of the rights by protection secured the fundamental it ducts for the duty adjudge, authority to abro- is the of the courts to so but it did not thereby give gate effect to the Constitu- the contract between and Termi- nal with reference to allocation of the costs tion.” thereof when it was not shown that rule is The above followed Missouri. taking public good served would be 474, 61 Layton, In 160 Mo. State right to have away City’s contractual 171, (1901), ap- quoted 174 the court enforcing pay Terminal those costs or that including proval Mugler from v. Kansas frustrate or hinder the those quotation. much of the above also 16 See police power. exercise of the state’s 281, 282, Am.Jur.2d Law Constituutional §§ 283; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 198. § Missouri, supported also

This view is Oklahoma, 271 Ry. v. U.S. K. & T. The conclusion harmony we reach is in (1926), 70 L.Ed. S.Ct. with our Joplin decision in State ex rel. & the second Oak upon in discussed and relied Pittsburg Ry. Commission, v. Public Service T., city In M. K. & the en- case.6 Street (banc 289 Mo. 1921). S.W. 388 In with the railroad tered into a contract company the railroad had a 1910 city right- granted the whereby the latter mortgage contract to issue bonds on tracks and the under its of-way for a street subsequent property additions. Sec. 57 of for the agreed to construct city prohibited P.S.C. Act issuance of bonds Thereafter, obtained street. for additions made more than years five corporation commis- the state order from prior application to the Commission for construct an directing the railroad sion bonds, leave to issue and when the railroad the cost thereof. pay half underpass and sought authority from the Commission to that the contract held Supreme Court bonds, issue it approve declined to on the the railroad did not prohibited by basis that it was 57 of the police power, on the a restraint constitute authorizing court, Act from issuance. This supported it was a valid proceeding mandamus, in a directed the and that it was adequate consideration grant authority Commission to to issue the of the constitutional protection within the bonds, holding although the state un- the obli- forbidding impairment of provision authority regu- der its had by the state. gation of contracts prohibit late and issuance of bonds omm’n, C 306 Mo. urging S.W. 102 that these two cases should not (Mo.1924). However, followed, should be noted Judge Bardgett be relies dissent of that M. K. & T. is a later heavily decision on the cases of Northern Pa Supreme U.S. Court than Duluth, Northern Pacific cific R.R. v. Minnesota ex rel. and second Oak Street is a later (1908), decision S.Ct. L.Ed. 630 *9 this court than the Ry. Wabash case. and State ex rel. Wabash v. Public Service distinguish seeks to how the costs improvements M. K. & T. from the of such should they case at bar be analogous.7 but borne since there has been no show-

ing that enforcing those will frus- appro We hold that when the state trate or hinder police power the state’s or priately directs that work be done in order the achievement objective, of its the state’s protect safety, to health or police power should not abrogate be held to police power right state includes obligation Terminal’s pay to for the im- payment to direct for the work ordered to provements involved prior herein under said necessary the extent to the achievement of arrangement.8 contractual objectives police power for which the is adopt recognizes rule we that exercised, being even if the result is to police power is essential to the achieve infringe rights, contractual but objectives ment of such protecting beyond necessity, that allocation of health and of the and that it is inseparable part such costs is not an objec as broad as need be to achieve those police power. A that denial determination time, recognizes tives. At same it city of the state or police power powerful is not so it agency frustrate to allocate will impairs obligations of contracts where police power hinder enforcement impairment necessary is not objective necessary is achievement of its objective achievement of the for which the abrogating existing a condition to contrac interpreta exercised. Such rights. tual harmony tion is in with the definition of the police power adopted by state’s this court in case, in the absence of the instant In City, Marshall v. Kansas 355 S.W.2d re agreement between an 1962): (Mo. banc costs, to allocation spect for under 389.640 proper § been Carpenter ex rel. “State St. the work only specify not Commission Louis, 722[13], Mo. S.W.2d thereof also how but done be adopted this pow- has definition However, par since the be borne. should appears er as it now in 16 C.J.S. Constitu- a valid and into had entered previously ties p. tional Law 889: ‘Police they spelled out whereby binding contract sovereign right the exercise of the of a city right-of- 7. In M. K. & T. received a an issue is wherein raised as to whether the way from the railroad for allocating which it under- costs of or recon- obligations including took agree- certain does frustrate or struction hinder the state’s pay ment to construct and for the police power, street. In exercise of its the court can rights-of-way this case Terminal received issue on the basis of the resolve evi- year and a 200 franchise from presented in that case. dence obligations, which it including assumed agreement pay constructing and re- Actually, 389.640(2) amendment to § pairing agree- viaducts. In both cases the adopted in 1963 confirms this conclusion in ment between the railroad and the impliedly recognizes that it that allocation supported by substantial consideration. improve- of the costs of the intersection showing both cases there was no that the necessary ments inseparable part the P.S.C. is not a agreement allocating costs constituted a re- directing of the act of what straint on the exercise of the or frustrated in provides if, work is to be done. in an any way the achievement of agreement 13, 1963, dated after October objective. city (or governmental other unit) agree upon The fact that the cost, contract has a considerable allocation of the years thereby number may to run is not decisive. Dur- P.S.C. is bound tion appor- enjoy Only time Terminal the costs continues to otherwise. in the ab- right-of-way agreement sence of such franchise and which it re- is the Commission ceived costs of viaducts. Under return for its allocate the insepara- costs. If it were an police power, ble the rule an- arrange- herein, nounced inappropriate. a case ment would arises the future *10 (hereinafter Act), by State Mis- order, safety, promote government souri rendered contracts between certain morals, general welfare of health, types parties, railroads, to wit: which The limits.’ within constitutional society, subject jurisdiction P.S.C., attribute of is an essential police power municipalities, and prior to the which constitutional government without adoption of police the Act exercised their property and personal guaranties power with respect to railroads contracts meaning and ineffective would be railroads, with or affecting ordinances un- nature, very neither less. In their enforceable to the extent that such con- police nor constitutional limita power tracts or subject ordinances concerned absolute; they are necessar tions can be matter over which the given P.S.C. was dependent the com ily and relative jurisdiction. McQuillin, plexities modern life. Ed., 19.22, p. Corporations, 3d Municipal Whether municipality exercised its 531; Smith, 231 Mo. parte Ex police power by contract or ordinance 609[3].” should not be any great concern. This is so because municipality, prior to the judgment reverse the Accordingly, we adoption of the Act in pow- had the remand with directions circuit court do it ordinance remanded to the Public the case be er — —to (law). an order consistent Service Commission expressed. In herein so with the views principal opinion undertakes to de- not, suggested by Ter- directing we are whether, case, the allocation cide in this minal, inter- ordering that Commission improvements inseparably costs of is so the 1909 contract. That pret and enforce require power so as to by this court in the second has been done impairment obligations. of contractual ease and that decision is reaf- Oak Street merely direct firmed We herein. I do not believe that it is for this court to recognize and abide Commission effect give decide whether con- how judicial the costs of determination apportionment tractual deciding of costs are to reconstruction be borne case-by-case apportionment on a if the basis under the 1909 contract. of costs is the attainment of essential to

improvement. me that It seems to DONNELLY, J., MORGAN, preempted Act the has C. HOL- P.S.C. state field HENLEY, JJ., law and concur. a matter of MAN and declared as else, P.S.C., policy that the and no one has BARDGETT, J., separate dissents in dis- authority to allocate costs. senting opinion filed. language of the Act—-“The commis- SEILER, J., separate dissents dissent- sion shall the exclusive de- separate prescribe and concurs in manner . filed termine and BARDGETT, apportionment J. the terms . . dissenting opinion of . ” mine)— expenses (emphasis . . . BARDGETT, Judge (dissenting). the courts means not left to case-by-case basis whether respectfully I dissent. basic issue determine necessary authori- costs was this the extent of case is obtaining improvement. ty of the Public Service Commission other words, P.S.C.). (hereinafter Put in more limited I do not the continued believe validi- ques- ty this way applicable to of enforcement of contractu- adoption provisions depends upon the P.S.C. al what court tion whether 389.640, Act, relationship concerning RSMo thinks now § *11 obtaining improvement the one-half of the costs of subway vis-a-vis the a ap- portionment legislature of costs. The under its tracks. The P.S.C. ordered the made improvement that decision adopted apportioned in when it costs the the $18,246; Act opted Railway, P.S.C. in follows: Wabash placing favor of M. the K. $14,749; Railway, city $11, T. Moberly, authority exclusive in the P.S.C. In so doing, the state took part police that of the

power to municipalities, itself and ousted said, This court cit. loe. 59-60: “Assum- railroads, and all other entities from exer- ing, deciding, but without that the above- it, cising whether ordinance contract. duly in mentioned contract was fact exe- that, the requires would seem cuted as law exe- principal under the contracts opinion, by municipality, yet if in cuted a year or so the contract the P.S.C. orders improvement appellant cannot the respect made avail [Wabash] proceeding, crossing one the for viaducts the reason such a con- Terminal’s tracks, against public that, tract is policy, street or viaduct was void referred valid, the to in if held it ordinance of would amount to a City, limita- again then court will tion on the decide the the exercise state of its alloca- power. tion of point costs to obtain This exact improvement passed upon was Supreme inseparably necessary was the objective Court United States sought, so improvement that if the the case of Railway Northern Pacific cannot except Duluth, by allocating be obtained 208 U.S. S.Ct. some of L.Ed. cost to the the railroad then the 630. In that case a contract was allocation entered bewill valid. the If court decides into between the railroad company that the and the improvement city provided be accomplished by can of Duluth which the con- point enforcement of the struction of a at a 1909 ordinance—all viaduct where one paid by city, city’s then the court streets crossed will the railroad. again paid, $50,000 enforce the contract. initial cost was $23,000by railroad and the city. The con- I do not appropriate believe that provided city, tract period for a determine the of whether years, should maintain impaired unconstitutionally P.S.C. bridge right way, over the railroad’s under contracts on the basis city perpetually should maintain improvement of whether or not can be approaches. Later viaduct obtained there without an allocation approaches dangerous became of costs different from the 1909 ordinance use, city under exercise provisions. franchise power delegated from the state undertook require company the railroad at its own make the Act does P.S.C. expense improvement. to make needed costs de- to allocate commission’s city proceeding mandamus under- upon any such considerations. pendent took to enforce its order. The railroad com- gives exclusive simply the P.S.C. Act That pany pleaded defense. the contract as a controls— costs. Which allocate granted The trial court the relief or the ordinance 1909 franchise Supreme prayed. Upon appeal the state Act? judgment. Court affirmed the 98 Minn. Ry. M. K. T. Co. and ex rel. In State Upon 108 N.W. 269. error to Su- Commis v. Public Ry. Co. Wabash preme judg- Court of the United States 1917), (Mo. the Wa sion, banc 197 S.W. 56 affirmed, saying: ment court of a by virtue contended that bash “ into between entered (citing) ‘The result of these cases is to obligation city had the Moberly in 1887 establish doctrine of this court be Wabash police power in the that the exercise of the the contract ed be could not interest of health and is to be commissioners the Forest Park parties. all unhampered by pri- consent of maintained contracts without changed thority of the state or public safety.’ nor can it be abrogate made with the railroad legitimate compromise least doubtful as to which ed exercise of the policy, cases referred to in this court. But it is alleged that at the time this contract was this consistent with the to undertook to limit the exercise of this was without vate preme violative of ing and future safety, mon charter of the *12 Federal Constitution. dience to laws is immaterial the exercise contracts behalf, interests, law, contract Court of Minnesota has held ought and to hold its charter and void. This doctrine is were, this required property rights protected by the and that destroyed by compromise, to be carried out. But rest, consideration, against public and that ” company, police power for reasons of passed in its exercise is not streets, of the upon principles as it is what the so railroad, between the In this case the Su- to maintain them in any legislative power uncompensated the contract was a what consideration company as well as the com- necessary beyond cannot be limit- municipality contract which decided in the rights subject public policy, as to exist- it was at entirely the au- parties, obe- longer doubted to to highways upon condition occupancy or use constitutional mission, over 65 L.Ed. sioners and ous has tract or Minnesota suant to contract prevent the state from railroads. so that the tracks [Missouri, Commission, K. & void. Northern The court held The court separate require cannot be human impose the entire cost grade 28 S.Ct. railroad. Erie leased its tracks and title to cross through Forest Park were Utilities, compromise. All such 272 Mo. highways, as the state grade and location 322; ex rel. crossings life, 341, then held: “Nor 271 Mo. power to State railroad, T. R. grades Pacific the state has 254 U.S. that a railroad 52 L.Ed. 650, renders them at 108: v. Public Service R.R. Co. v. at the [270] Co.] power of the state 199 surrendered to the Rock of] require the Railway v. eliminating danger- and to 394, occupy the 630; that, when such v. Public Service Duluth, 208 of so that the Wabash S.W. expense of the Wabash “It cannot park does the 41 contracts are 197 go State may doing upon 999.” dangerous made S.Ct. Board of holds under or railroads [State S.W. commis- by con- plenary Island, direct, ex rel. Com pur- U.S. fact 169, 56; Service 1924), In State the court had before Commission, ex rel. Wabash Ry. S.W. it an Co. v. Public order (Mo. American Tobacco R. Co. S.W. 502.” and] St. (emphasis Louis, Co. v. 247 mine.) 267 S.W. 108. Mo. [Missouri [374] Pacific 157 Ry. City Terminal City v. Kansas abolishing grade crossing the P.S.C. 1929), known Co., (Mo. banc 25 S.W.2d track and Delmar boulevard St. Wabash case, upheld the Oak Street required the construction Second Louis. The order is the validity the same contract tracks and a viaduct over Wabash the instant case. subject matter of against the the costs 40% allocated case Oak Street opinion in the Second Wabash contended against Wabash. 60% Moberly case with sought distinguish impaired rights under the order pri- of costs under legisla reference to allocation an act of the Missouri authority of made to an allocation 25,1874, by opposed or contract as ture, March approved saying at 1066: “Contracts grade thereof the P.S.C. right way of cross- reference to the construction through Park as it with Forest was established primarily void on the provid- ings have been held that it was in 1924 and existed still ground they say, were without considera on to 346: “But S.Ct. tion. was the Moberly Such the exercise of the Case. State cannot be Commission, ex rel. v. Public 271 limited for reasons of 270, 197 Mo. 56.” policy; But this court in the nor can it destroyed by compro- Moberly mise; case did not declare the contract and it is immaterial what con- void for lack rest, of consideration. The court sideration the contracts as it beyond explicitly declared the authority contract void municipali- “as of the state or the against public policy, that, valid, ty abrogate held necessary so it would amount to a public safety. Q. limitation Chicago, on the B. & R. Co. Nebraska, exercise the state police power.” of its 170 U.S. 18 S.Ct. (emphasis mine.) 197 S.W. at 60. L.Ed. 948.” In 1936 division two of this court decided Oak Second Street case then went on the case of ex State rel. St. Paul & K. C. say Moberly case followed *13 Line Short R. Co. v. Public Service Commis Northern Pacific Railroad v.Co. Minnesota Missouri, sion of (Mo.1936). 92 S.W.2d 126 Duluth, 583, ex rel. 208 U.S. 28 S.Ct. That claims to follow the Second 52 L.Ed. quoted and por- first case, Moberly Oak Street case. M. K. & tion of the paragraph second to last in that Oklahoma, Ry. T. v.Co. 271 U.S. case. The entire paragraph quot- has been (1926), S.Ct. 70 L.Ed. 957 is referred to supra ed in this dissent. It is seen that the exact converse of Paul St. & K. C. Supreme United States Court was first set- Short Line. In the Paul & K. C. St. Short ting holding forth the of the Minnesota case, County Line and railroad Caldwell Supreme Court from where the case came agreed upon plan grade separation a Supreme to the U.S. saying Court that approved by which was filed with and Supreme the Minnesota Court said that They agreed also that P.S.C. Caldwell “any contract which undertook to limit the $10,000 County pay yearly in install- right exercise of this was without consider- ments of as its of the cost and $500 ation, against public policy, and void.” agreement recognized by was mine.) (emphasis Supreme The U.S. Court The P.S.C. railroad was construct say went on to the Minnesota ruling viaduct and did so at a cost in excess of principles consistent with the in cases $23,000. County refused to Caldwell decided Supreme the U.S. Court and agreed-upon share so the railroad filed a recognized then the railroad’s contention petition apportion before the P.S.C. the contract between it and the peti- cost. The commission dismissed the ought given Duluth effect because it ground agreement tion on the be- compromise was a rights. doubtful That County tween the railroad and Caldwell statement was made support the rail- therefore the commission controlled and road’s contention that there was contractu- jurisdiction lacked in the matter. The com- al agreement. consideration for the by the mission was affirmed Circuit Court Supreme gave Court then its own deci- County appealed the railroad of Cole recognized sion on the matter and in it this court. Division two of this court re- there agreements could be and would be doing, versed the commission. In so that had been entered into between rail- said, 129: court S.W.2d which, municipalities par- roads and if the subject ties had the to contract on the “Frequently separation grade in the matters, valid, would be and struck down crossings highways of our state and railroad regardless all such contracts of the exist- tracks, highway department and the ence of contractual considerations. The companies agreed plans submit railroad language pervasive. is all The court went separation, apportion- as well as the where specific viaduct of costs of examination, If, upon ment of cost. an and re- performed void fully had approval meet plans separation with the appor- to the matter manded Commission, the com- of costs. tionment plans adopts the enters an or- mission der that effect. The should commission K. C. Paul and in holding St. procedure follow the same with reference to Mob- compatible with the Line case Short appor- cost. The v. Du Pacific the Northern erly case upon examined, agreed tionment should be with M. incompatible case, It is supra. luth satisfactory equitable, and if found v. Oklahoma, M. K. T. supra, unless K. T. v. enter commission should an order ba distinguished the same on Oklahoma plans same manner as with reference to the in Judge Blair’s dissent forth sis as set words, In other separation. appor- as set forth Street Oak Second tionment of the cost should be order of North Chicago Chicago It has commission. never been contend- Co., Ill.2d 122 N.E.2d R. Western ed company that in a case where a railroad in both forth (1954). distinction set highway agreed commission repre K. T. M. v. Oklahoma cases is that separation plan which had been ordi the contract where sented a situation commission, submitted in- effect, or set was, nance interpretation volves the of a contract. the railroad tlement is conceded that such an agreement is not to a proceedings domain lieu of eminent binding commission. Under rul- *14 property the railroad point on specific Moberly made in the Case and in the crossing. In a city could make where the Case, Oak Viaduct by Street the court en of con words, it was the settlement other banc, agreements of the kind now before us damages. demnation stand on the same footing agreements with Judge in made distinction the I believe plans separation. Statute, as to the of sec- Street the Oak in Second dissent Blair’s (Mo.St.Ann. 1929 tion R.S.Mo. in Supreme Court by the Illinois case p. 6585), grants to the commission ‘the ex- Co., supra, R. C. & N. W. Chicago v. City of clusive to prescribe determine and Oklahoma, M. T. v. In K. correct. manner, including the particular point the the United of Supreme Court the supra, crossing, installation, and the terms of would be railroad that the saying States in operation, maintenance, apportionment of process due property without its deprived etc., expenses,’ grade crossings of all the talking about was, my opinion, in of law the thereof. separation only The limitation could the railroad property real in this statute the power of the com- proceed- eminent domain taken only be mission is that is authorized assess to not where- agreement of an absence ings in the separa- more than one-half of of a way to right of granted a the railroad grade crossing, tion of a a railroad crossing. the Comanche Street city for the company highway, against high- the Co., R. Chicago & N. W. C. & In therefore, department. cases, way as Chicago v. City of progenitor, supra, the us Moberly one now before and the Comm., etc., Ill. 356 Commerce Illinois counties, Case, cities, agreements between Supreme (1934), Illinois the N.E. state, companies, railroad as Chicago and a a contract down Court struck to apportionment separation of cost of apportionment by which the ordinance binding upon no more grades, are the railroad Chicago and as between costs than an as commission to grounds on was controlled company plans separation.” Act vested Public Utilities Illinois that the it is seen that division two of this apportion

Thus authority to exclusive court held a contract Commission. Commerce Illinois tract involved in Missouri Act also exclusive au- this case if it vests even were thority in into after apportion our P.S.C. to costs entered the amendment became should, given effective. The my opinion, effect entire be context and, amendment operative as stated in Erie R. Board of shows that it is only Co. Com’rs, 394, 411, Utility specific where improvement been has or- 169, 171, (1921), particular S.Ct. L.Ed. “Con- dered P.S.C. and as to improvement made agreed upon tracts road made [railroad] subject possible constitutionality to the of the sover- cost allocation. The exercise amendment, eign right.” scope, even in its limited is not before the court in this case. think, accepted, It must be I that our The P.S.C. order in this allocated case Act did render unenforceable certain 90% of the cost of viaduct to relating which under the laws and 10%to the The costs railroad. private contracts been could not have void- of construction were allocated 100% provisions ed under United city. study The costs of the engineering and Missouri relating States constitutions were allocated 90% the and 10% impairment of contracts. But this is not railroad, expenditures were the where, here, unconstitutional $148,663.48 the railroad of for the Oak continuing obligation constitutes a repairs. Street viaduct upon the opera- state to oversee railroad improvements necessary tions vis-a-vis only the com- presented evidence public. obligation, my And this opin- by the mission was a traffic count made ion, must exercised as the need arises. of motor showed the number railroad which permitted It cannot be to lie dormant for a using the the number vehicles viaduct and period years, of 200 term of contract (not cars) passing under trains ordinance the instant under a theo- testimony city put no viaduct. ry that the ordinance was an exer- benefits, Ap- etc. respect to relative cise of an abandon- this was because this court parently of it. ment *15 upheld validity Street case Second Oak supra two Illinois cases cited held the ordinance and the relied of the 1909 power apportion of the commission to Re- upon that decision before the P.S.C. improvements inseparable that, expense of should have come gardless was of upon necessity bearing cost from to determine with evidence forward allocation, accomplishment. agree of I and manner and had there been substantial Supreme holdings Illinois the allo- support with the Court’s evidence to competent entered, a requires the Missouri favor and believe Act I would not cation order interpretation. supra, As stated record same is on that issue. As the rehearing legislature however, that my opinion stands, the Missouri the allocation supported by that decision when is made it enacted the Act the commission not made It is competent in 1913. and substantial evidence. or- to base an allocation simply unrealistic agree ruling I a principal involving projects in of size on com- der train, that the amendment 389.- one automobile with one parison § required may 640 which the commission consist of to ac- when the train particularly any agreement cept entered into after the to 150 more anywhere from one date of the may effective amendment alloca- also affect factors cars. Other crossing controlling allocating tion of costs is not in order commission’s not, That amendment on my presented this case. does in the commission may be type validate the of ordinance opinion, con- remand. public anvil on the policy out hammered

For the reasons in stated this dissent and certain recognizes apparently It discussion. Seiler, J., those stated in the I dissent principles accepted economic generally City City would overrule Kansas v. Kansas (like utility conditions, a wit: That Co., Ry. Terminal Mo. S.W.2d service, nature etc.) in its water, is car gas, authority and hold that the exclusive is inade- competition monopoly; in is to allocate costs mentioned 389.640 in exists, and, if it public, protect quate to the Public Service Commission and that the waste; economic likely to become 1909 ordinance involved in this case is void place regulation takes state insofar it undertakes to allocate costs of regula- competition; stands crossing improvement over 200-year pe- patron or respect tion, from command riod. the name of owner, be in utility must However, because, my opinion, in the al- effective, state, overlord, to be respect building location order with intelligent visita- power of possess the must improvement was not based every plenary supervision tion evidence, competent substantial I finally (however in- feature business would reverse the order the circuit court quality of in rates visible) reflected which affirmed the order of the commission every expendi- recognizes service. and remand the matter to the commission stock, dereliction, every ture, share of every for a full hearing the cost allocation finally surely is bond, issued as or note question. service to quality reflected rates reasons, For the foregoing I dissent. which arises public, does the moisture in rain finally descend atmosphere in the (em- unjust nilly” willy just and SEILER, upon the Judge (dissenting). supplied). phasis I respectfully required, This dissent. opinion, 389.640, my because Sec. subd. said, my opinion, It cannot be 1969, provides RSMo that “The commission only here is interest shall have the exclusive to determine also has the viaducts. expenses provid- of service quality an interest such viaduct and re- [of City Terminal Railroad Com- ed city] construction between the railroad and Railroad If Kansas pany. (emphasis supplied). This per cent Company has to provides the 1909 contract which otherwise of the viaducts repair and reconstruction yield must to this exercise of the (this being the years next 134 over the

power of the state. year remaining in the 200 of time *16 balance such burden contract), it could become on ourselves enlightening to refresh It is company have no railroad the Public purpose of overall the broad Its money any purposes. other left Act, deals with which Commission Service might deteriorate. Its of service quality are mo businesses regulation Other might become unsafe. equipment in is in this such as the nopolies, It disrepair. -into might fall viaducts first case to As was said stance. of these broad considerations because Act, Utilities new Public analyze the then give saw fit to legislature City v. rel. Kansas ex on Inf. Barker State ap- power exclusive Commission 515, 163 Company, 254 Mo. City Gas costs such repair and reconstruction portion 1914): (banc 857-8 to be con- There had as are here involved. law bottomed more than immediate is an elaborate sidered “That act making safe. There also evidences the viaducts police power. had range ques- the long considered were safe see viaducts tions of how to what Judge extent the cost of comparable situation would be repairs ability would affect the railroad’s example. Finch’s But this is not what operations conduct its as a railroad. What provides we my opinion statute and in the 1909 contract does as the ma- ruled should not arrive at a result which is the jority opinion per to make cent cost opposite pre- exact of what statute repair reconstruction of the position viaducts scribes. mere statement a first priority on the assets of the railroad that the contract before us controls who company. may happen Whatever else every subway the pays for each and viaduct or railroad company must for next city re- might now or which the years pay percent charges in- quire the construct for the bal- railroad to volved prove and this could year disastrous to of the full hundred term ance two operation. majori- balance of their invalidity the contract demonstrates ty opinion removes from the Commission against contract as the exercise of determine what is best of the state set forth in Sec. as of the time it 389.640, is called subd. 22. decide. expressed by concur in the views I also put In the example by Judge Finch about BARDGETT, J., dissenting opinion his requiring ordinance elimination of , herein. toilets, outdoor while the force of the ordi-

nance against was directed the landlord or

owner and he would be the one who would prosecuted outdoor toilet were not

removed, it pub- made no difference to

lic health paid who for the

improvement, long so as the outdoor toilet NIBECK, Respondent, Donald G. replaced by removed and an inside toilet.

But in our the statute makes no DISTRICT, WELLSTON SCHOOL attempt against party to direct its force one Appellant, or the fix repairs. other to the cost of Instead it this to the leaves exclusive deter-

mination of the Public Service Commission. System The Public School Retirement This is the case because in utilities Missouri, Defendant. pays does make a difference who and how No. 58701. much; regulation a monopoly is involved and reconstruc- Supreme of Missouri, Court tion is one of the factors which affect the Division No. 2. utility overall ability being regulated June 1975. perform public. to the services Allo- important objective cation of for Rehearing costs is Motion or to Transfer en sought. July Banc Denied *17 parallel For our example case to be Finch,

put by Judge statute would provide city (or railroad) all the costs of and recon-

struction on viaducts. could then said only was to interest state

Case Details

Case Name: State Ex Rel. Kansas City v. Public Service Commission
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: Jun 9, 1975
Citation: 524 S.W.2d 855
Docket Number: 58285
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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