Mаndamus proceeding by John William Kangas (respondent here) to compel the Hibbing civil service commission to certify his 'name to the appointing officer of the Hibbing fire department, on the ground that he was entitled under L. 1931, p. 112, c. 317, Mason, 1931 Supp. §§ 1369-1 to 1369-3, to a preference as an honorably discharged veteran оf the world war. A demurrer was interposed to the petition. The court, Freeman, J., overruled the demurrer. An answer was served, and the case was tried to the court, Magney, J. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were made granting the relief asked. A motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal taken.
Respondent is a resident of Hibbing and has lived there for 30 years. He served in the army of the United States during the world war and received an honorable discharge. The fire department of Hibbing operates under a civil service commission (the individual appellants here) formed under and pursuant to L. 1929, p. 51, c. 57, Mason, 1931 Supp. §§ 1933-23 to 1933-11. Its rules and regulаtions were drawn pursuant to that law, which does not provide for preference to honorably discharged soldiers; such soldiers and nonservice men take the civil service examination on the same footing. The fire department, organized under a two-platoon sys *159 tem, was later changed to a three-рlatoon system, thus requiring eight additional firemen.
Under the rules of the commission, applications for examination (mental and physical) are made on printеd forms. The applications contained the question whether claim was made for preference by reason of military service under L. 1919, p. 194, c. 192 (G. S. 1928 [
Kangas is not entitled to the relief asked unless L. 1931, p. 442, c. 347, Mason, 1931 Supp. §§ 4369-1 to 4369-3, gives it to him. That law reads in part as follows:
“An act relating to the appointment, emрloyment, promotion and removal of employees of the state and other governmental agencies, and to the application theretо of Mason’s .Minnesota Statutes of 1927, Sections 4368, and 4369, known as the Veterans’ Preference Law, and acts amendatory thereof.
“Section 1. The provisions оf Mason’s Minnesota Statutes of 1927, sections 4368 and 4369, known as the Veterans’ Preference Law, and acts amendatory thereof, shall apply to and govern thе appointment, employment, promotion, and removal of all employees of the state and of all other governmental agencies within the stаte enumerated in said sections and amendatory acts, notwithstanding *160 any provision to the contrary in any other existing law or in any city charter relating theretо.
“Sec. 3. All acts, parts of acts, and city charter provisions inconsistent herewith are hereby superseded, modified, or amended so far as necessаry to give effect to the provisions of this act.”
This court in State ex rel. Abati v. MacDonald,
“In such a case, if the rules are followed, other applicants who are honorably discharged soldiers and sailors, but who did not rank аs high in the examination, will be unable to have their names placed before the appointing officer. Such a situation should not be permitted to arise and the rules should be amended to make them fit in with the provisions of chapter 192, p. 194, L. 1919, but of course that is a matter which can only be considered by officials who make the rules.” See also State ex rel. Giles v. Scott,171 Minn. 208 ,213 N. W. 738 .
The desired result could of course be secured by appropriate legislative act.
The cоnstitutionality of our soldiers preference laws has been sustained in numerous cases and can no longer be questioned in this state. State ex rel. Kinler v. Rines,
The 1931 act is not violative of the equality provision of the state constitution (art. 1, § 2). It merely makes operative again the 1919 soldiers preference law.
*161
That lаw “fixes the standard of qualifications and fitness. * * It intends that the soldier applicant, to be entitled to preferential appointment, shall be capable of performing the duties of the position in a reasonably efficient manner. It does not intend that a soldier shall have a preference if he can perform the duties of the position merely after a fashion, though not with genuine efficiency. If the applicant has the degree of fitness stated, his relative efficiency, when compared with that of his competitors, is unimportant.” State ex rel. Meehan v. Empie,
Such ex-service man’s fitness and qualifications must, in so far аs the examination given is concerned, be judged by the same standard as that of nonservice men. A statute prescribing a lower passing mark for service men thаn for nonservice men would doubtless violate the equality provision of the constitution. State ex rel. Boyd v. Matson,
It has been the laudable purpose of the Minnesota lawmakers, declared on numerous occasions, to give a well-earned preference in appointments in the public service to those who have honorably served the nation in its time of pеril. There are many sound reasons therefor, even if efficiency and the good of the service alone are considered. See suggestion in 55 A. S. R. 370 (
A reading of L. 1931, p. 442, c. 347, Mason, 1931 Supp. §§ 4369-1 to 4369-3, convinces us that its purpose, in part, was undoubtedly to cover a situation such as is hеre presented. We are of the opinion that L. 1929, p. 54, c. 57, was amended by the 1931 law.
L. 1931, p. 442, c. 347, Mason, 1931 Supp. §§ 4369-1 to 4369-3, was approved by the governor on April 25, 1931, the dаte that *162 Kangas took the physical examination. The results of the physical examination were not arrived at until several days thereafter. The relativе standings of the various applicants could not be ascertained until the final marks in the mental and physical examinations had been averaged. This tabulation was not completed for some time. The names on the eligible register were not certified to the appointing officer until May 28. The suggestion that the 1931 law was not operative as far as Kangas was concerned is without merit.
All points raised by appellants have been considered. We hold that Kangas was entitled to have his name placed on the list certified to the appointing officer and that the decision of the lower court was correct.
Affirmed.