68 Conn. 16 | Conn. | 1896
Lead Opinion
This was an application for a writ of peremptory mandamus, to require the defendants to build ■approaches at each end of Washington bridge. The defendants are the county commissioners of New Haven county and of Fairfield county. The Superior Court issued an alternative writ which was duly served. On the return day the defendants appeared in court and moved that the alternative writ be quashed. The court granted that motion and the relator has appealed to this court.
It is necessary to consider but one question. The alternative writ—paragraph ten—alleges that “ it is the legal duty of the county commissioners of said counties of New Haven and Fairfield, to build safe, substantial and permanent terminals or approaches at either end of said bridge structure, in order to provide the public with safe and reasonable access to said bridge.” If the facts set forth in the writ do not show this averment to be correct as a legal conclusion, then the motion to quash was properly allowed, and there is no error.
The General Assembly passed an Act in 1889—Public Acts of 1889, Chap. 214, p. 129—by which the owners of all bridges across the Housatonic river between the counties of New Haven and Fairfield, were authorized to transfer all their right, title and interest in and to the stock, property and franchises in the said bridges, to the said counties. The Act then further provided as follows: “Sec. 4. Upon such transfer being made to said counties, it shall be the duty of said counties to take the charge, management, and control of the said bridges, and to keep, maintain, operate, and control them as free public bridges. Sec. 5. The expense of maintaining and repairing said bridges shall be paid in equal proportions by each of said counties, by orders drawn by the county commissioners upon their respective treasurers, and the county commissioners of said counties, acting as a joint
After the passage of that Act, the towns of Stratford, Bridgeport and Milford, took such steps as they deemed necessary to convey all their interests in the Washington bridge to said counties; and presumably all the other towns in said counties between which there were bridges over the Housatonic river, did the same as to such bridges. In that condition of things the case of New Haven and Fairfield Counties v. The Town of Milford, 64 Conn., 568, arose, and was decided as appears in our reports. That decision showed that it was the duty of the commissioners of said counties to build and maintain all the bridge structures named in said Act, but that their duty in such behalf extended no further; that it was not their duty to build or maintain any approach to any of said bridges. While it is true that the town of Milford was the only one of the towns interested which was a party to that record, both counties and the county commissioner's of both were parties. That decision defined the duty and liability of the counties and of the county commissioners, under the said Act. The duty of the towns remained precisely the same that it had been before that Act was passed, except so far as changed by that Act, as construed by that decision. That is, it remained the duty of the town of Milford to build and maintain the approach at the end of said Washington bridge which is in that town, because it was a part of the highway in that town ; and for the same reason it was the duty of the town of Stratford to build and maintain the approach at the end of said bridge which is in that town. And it was, in like manner, the duty of each of the other towns to build and maintain the approach to any bridge named in said Act, which was in such town. We understand this to be conceded by the relator.
It ought to be said that the defendants are those executive officers of these counties who are charged with the duty of carrying out whatever obligations these counties are under in respect to any of these bridges. Whatever obligation rests on the counties in this matter, it is the duty of the
It is claimed in behalf of the relator, that certain legislation in 1895 transferred the duty of building and maintaining the approaches to the Washington bridge, from the towns of Stratford and Milford to the two counties of New Haven and Fairfield. In other words, that such legislation had relieved the said towns of the duty which theretofore rested upon them in respect to these approaches, and had imposed it upon the counties.
The legislation of that year which it is claimed has effected this change, is in two Acts; chapters 245 and 246, p. 615, of the Public Acts of that year. It had been provided in § 1969 of the General Statutes of 1888, that any county might take land which the commissioners deemed necessary for the site, or for an addition to the site, of any county building; and chapter 245 of the Public Acts of 1895 added to the said section of the General Statutes the words, “ or for the construction of bridges or bridge approaches.” Chapter 246 of the Public Acts of 1895 amended Chap. 214 of the Public Acts of 1889, hereinbefore quoted, by adding to section five of said Act, the following: “ The terms bridge or bridges in this Act shall be construed to include the bridge approaches.”
The Act of 1889 did not impose upon the counties any immediate duty. But a duty which was to arise afterwards, when the owners of the several bridges over the Housatonic river between the said counties, should convey to the counties all their interest therein. A certain conveyance of Washington bridge had been made to the said counties, and it appears that all the duty which devolved on the counties in respect to the Washington bridge by that conveyance to them of that bridge, had been fully discharged.
The question then in the case is this : Did the legislature intend by the said Acts of 1895 to impose any new and fur-'
It is a firmly established rule of construction that all statutes are intended to operate prospectively. Retroaction is never to be allowed to a statute unless the words in which it is expressed, so clearly require it as to exclude any other reasonable interpretation. Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn., 355; Smith v. Lyon, 44 id., 177; Middletown v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 62 id., 497.
If the intention above mentioned is the one which the legislature designed to express by the Act of 1889 as amended by the Act of 1895, then the Act as amended is simple, easy, consistent, has only a prospective operation, and produces equality among all the towns affected by it. From the language of these Acts, and becausé there is a total absence in them of any words imposing on the counties such a duty as the relator claims, we think this is the construction which ought to be put on them. The interpretation urged by the relator would produce the contrary effects; especially it would require that a retroactive force be given to the Acts of 1895; a result which, as we have shown, ought not to be allowed.
There is no error.
In this opinion Fenn and Baldwin, Js., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). The Act of 1889 (Public Acts of 1889, p. 129) placed upon the counties of Fairfield and New Haven the duty of maintaining and operating as free public bridges, five bridges across the Housatonic river. Some of these bridges were toll bridges, owned by private corporations or individuals ; all were subject to some property rights in individuals or towns; as incidental to the duty
Washington bridge was owned by a corporation and operated as a toll bridge; the stock of this corporation was owned by the three towns of Milford, Stratford and Bridgeport, and they were authorized to transfer to the counties, without compensation, all their interest in the stock, property and franchises of the corporation, and in the bridges. Bennett’s bridge, between the towns of Southbury and Newtown, was owned by private persons; these “ owners ” were authorized to transfer in the same manner their interest in the bridge, but the towns of Southbury and Newtown, having no property rights in the bridge, were not authorized to transfer anything. As to the other three bridges, each town having property rights in each bridge, was authorized to transfer such' interest. Having thus provided for securing the counties in the case of each bridge, against any claims for the appropriation of property rights, the real object of the Act is expressed in § 4, which provides that “ upon such transfers being made to said counties, it shall be the duty of said counties to take charge, management, and control of said bridges, and to keep, maintain, operate, and control them as free public bridges.” Section 5 provides for apportioning between the counties the expense of maintenance, and that “ the county commissioners of said counties, acting as a joint board, shall have control and management of said bridges.”
In 1895 (Public Acts of 1895, p. 615) this Act was amended, by adding to section five of said Act the following : “ The terms bridge or bridges in this Act shall be construed to include the bridge approaches.” The relator claims that this definition of “ bridges ” applies to that term as used in the Act, in respect to the duty of maintenance imposed upon the counties in sections 4 and 5, and that from the passage of the amendment the imperative duty of maintenance of bridge and bridge approaches, is placed upon the counties. The respondents claim that the language of the
The literal application of the respondents’ claim makes the amended Act difficult of any rational construction. The language of the amendment is certainly loose and not in proper form for accomplishing the evident purpose of the legislature; but when the legislature expresses its will in language open to criticism for want of accuracy and appropriateness, it is the duty of this court to give effect to a legislative purpose plainly, however awkwardly, expressed; and certainly this court should not be asked to employ the subtleties of hypercriticism to discover a possible meaning that will make the law ineffective. “ In arriving at the legislative intent as expressed in any statute, it is always expedient to recur to the circumstances which surrounded the legislature at the time the statute was passed.” N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co.’s Appeal, 62 Conn., 527, 534.
Applying this rule to the Amended Act so far as it affects Washington bridge, the legislative intent expressed in the language used seems to me unmistakably plain. In pursuance of this Act as originally passed, the towns of Stratford, Milford and Bridgeport, not merely as municipal corporations, but as property owners, had transferred to the counties their interest in all the stock, franchises and property of-the bridge corporation ¿and in the bridge owned by that corporation, and any interest owned by the corporation in the approaches of the bridge were included in that transfer; the towns were not authorized, .and are not authorized by the amended Act, to transfer any so-called interest either of-
I must dissent from the conclusions reached by the majority of the court. I think it is clearly the legal duty of the counties to maintain the approaches to the Washington bridge, as recited in the alternative writ, and that there is error in the judgment complained of.
In this opinion Tokrance, J., concurred.