145 Iowa 298 | Iowa | 1910
Lead Opinion
Belator was duly chosen chief of the fire department- of the city of Council Bluffs in the year 1906, and at the time of the commencement of this suit was acting as such. On or about April 8, 190J, the then mayor of said city appointed defendants . B. M. Sargent, a [Republican, and Hubert Tinley and L. Zurmuehlen,
Sec. 679 a. . . . There is hereby created and established a board of police and fire commissioners in cities of the first class and cities under special charter which, according to any state or national census heretofore or hereafter taken, are shown to have a population of more than twenty thousand.
. -Sec. 679b. Said board of police and fire commissioners shall consist of three members, who shall be citizens of the state of Iowa, and who shall have been residents of the city in which they are appointed for more than five years next preceding their appointment; they shall, except as hereinafter specified, hold their office for six years and until their respective successors have been appointed and qualified. All vacancies in such board by death, resignation, removal or for any other cause, shall be filled as soon as practicable in the same manner as provided for appointment. Said commissioners shall receive no compensation for their services.
Sec. 679d. Immediately upon the taking effect of this act the mayor of such city shall appoint said board of police and fire commissioners, who shall be confirmed by the city council, and the said commissioners so appointed shall hold their office, one of them until the first Monday in April, 1904, one of them until the first Monday in April, 1906, and one of them until the first Monday in April, 1908, and on the last Monday in March, 1904, and
It will be observed that the law applies only to cities having a population of more than twenty thousand; that the mayor shall appoint the bonrd thereby created, which shall consist of three members, who shall be citizens of the state and residents of the city for more than five years next preceding their appointment; and that they shall be selected from the two leading political parties, so that so far as practicable two members shall be of the dominant political party and one of the next in numerical strength, :as shown by the votes cast at the last, state or national election. It is conceded in argument that the city of Council Bluffs had a population exceeding twenty thousand when the appointments were made, that the two dominant" polit
It is admitted of record that, at the time the fire and police commission were appointed by Donald Macrae, there were more than a thousand persons who were members of the Republican party in the city of Council Bluffs, Iowa, and all of them voters, and that prior to making said appointments that the mayor of the city of Council Bluffs requested four members of the Repiiblican party to act as members of the fire and police commission, and that they declined the appointment and requested not to name them members of said commission. It is admitted of record that there are numerous voters in the city of Council Bluffs, Iowa, who had been residents of said city less than five years at the time the police and fire commission was appointed.
The exact points relied upon for a reversal are so suc'cinctly stated in the brief of appellant’s counsel that we here quote therefrom as follows:
(1) Defendants were appointed in violation of law; two of them being members of the Democratic party, whereas the Republican party was, at the time of their appointment, the dominant political party. (2) Chapter 2A, title- 5, of the Supplement, is void because it requires a political test as a qualification for the right to be appointed to the office of member of the board of police and fire commissioners. (3) Section 2A, title 5 of the Supplement is void because it controverts section 1, article 2, of the Constitution of Iowa, by placing a burden and penalty upon electors otherwise qualified by hindering and hampering them in their freedom of choice as such electors.
We shall and must 'assume that an elector, in exercising his privileges at the polls, does so from some higher motive than to place himself in line for a future appointment to' some office. If the desire to hold office predominates, then he may easily qualify himself by voting a party ticket, and, if that be the dominant idea with him, he is not deprived of much, when compelled, in order to place himself in line, to vote a party ticket. No ease has been called to our attention which holds that such a law as is now under consideration is invalid because it interferes with the freedom or rights of an elector. Appellant relies upon the expression found in Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa, 267, reading as follows: “Those whom the Constitution declares to be electors can not be disfranchised; and not one jot or tittle can lawfully be added to or taken away from the qualifications which the Constitution prescribes.” Granted that this ‘expresses a correct rule of law, which it undoubtedly does, still there is nothing in the statute-under consideration which in any manner attempts to fix the • qualifications of electors. Attorney-General v. Board, 58 Mich. 213 (24 N. W. 887, 55 Am. Rep. 675), also relied upon by appellant, is not in point for the reason that the constitutional provision is quite different
Appellants rely, in this connection, upon Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426 (21 N. E. 267, 4 L. R. A. 93); Attorney-General v. Detroit, supra; Bowden v. Bedell, 68 N. J. Law, 151 (53 Atl. 198); Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459 (45 N. E. 15, 34 L. R. A. 408) ; and Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 379 (74 Am. Dec. 572). In the Evansville case it is held the Legislature can not make a requirement of five year’s residence as a qualification for office, and that a provision to the effect that officers and patrolmen of a fire and police department should be selected equally from the two leading political parties is void. In the Shaw case, supra, we disregarded that decision, and the
It must be remembered, in this connection, that we have no constitutional provision fixing the qualifications for municipal office. The Constitution does provide, however, that no religious test shall 'be required as a qualification, for any office of public trust. See section 4 of article 1 of the Bill of Rights. In this respect it differs from the fundamental law - of many of the other states,' which provide that no religious or political test shall be required. There is no absolute right to hold office or to be a candidate therefor; and the Legislature, in the absence of constitutional prohibition, has plenary power in fixing the qualifications therefor. The act in question is largely advisory in character, and the requirement that the commissioners shall be selected from the two dominant political parties was intended to make the board when appointed nonpartisan in character and to give, the minority representation. The office is not one created by the Constitution, but is municipal in character, and the Legislature in creating such an office, and' in delegating its power to these public corporations, has the right to say who shall exercise the functions so delegated. The office is not elective, but appointive, and exists only by reason of legislative enactment, and there is, as was said by Justice Peckham in the Rogers case, supra, no analogy between the cases of elective officers and those where the office is to be filled by appointment, and no argument which rests for its foundation
We need not pursue the argument further. The case is governed in principle by Shaw v. Marshalltown, supra, and other like cases. No constitutional provision is violated by the act in question, and we are constrained to hold that, as applied to municipal appointive boards, there is nothing contrary to the spirit of our institutions or inimical, to our free government in such an enactment.
The judgment of the trial court is correct, and it is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — To my mind the result announced in the majority opinion is not only startling, but is little less than revolutionary. The logical and necessary result of the reasoning there employed and of the conclusion there reached is that, except as to a few offices for which the qualifications are expressly fixed by the Constitution, the Legislature has unlimited power to impose whatsoever condition it pleases upon the right of a person to hold public position or to receive the support of his fellow citizens therefor. If there be a partisan majority in the Legislature, then, under this doctrine, it may make membership in its party an essential condition of the right to hold all county, township, and city offices. It may make the citizen’s partisan affiliation a qualification or a bar to his right to serve as a school director or notary public or mayor or justice of the peace. It may even prescribe the shade of political opinion which shall be represented upon the bench. Its power of ostracism need not be confined to the domain of politics. It may invent some “grandfather clause,” by which the man who honorably aspires to public office must show his eligibility to membership in the Sons of the Revolution or his right to wear the heraldic emblem of a peer of. England. To show that this is a fair, though perhaps an -extreme, deduction from
The majority say: “There is no such thing as a right to hold office. This is a privilege at all times within the control of the Legislature save where limited by some constitutional provision. We shall presently see that there is no such limitation in our fundamental law.” Again it is said: “Of course, the Constitution guarantees a republican form of government; but there is nothing in the Constitution or in a republican form of government which prevents the Legislature from fixing qualifications for office.” And again: “It can not be said as a matter of law that any qualification for office fixed by the Legislature, is arbitrary or oppressive, or so much so as to be set aside by the courts.” ■ I have taken these propositions which lie at the very foundation of the majority opinion out of their setting and reproduced them here to concentrate our attention thereon, for I am persuaded that, when carefully read and candidly considered, their essential unsoundness will become evident to the unprejudiced mind. Opposed to the first of these declarations, I affirm there is “such a thing as the right to hold office” under our form of government, and I deny that the Legislature has unlimited power to restrict that right by affixing qualifications or conditions contrary to the fundamental ideas and purposes of republican government. No one, of course, may demand an office as his right unless he has been duly elected or otherwise duly chosen thereto; but the right to hold office if elected or appointed, and the right to be chosen to office if his candidacy shall be favorably considered by the people or by the appointing power (if the office be appointive), is inseparable from the idea of a republican form of government. A government in which, by the law of the land, public officers must be selected from some particular political party, is in no sense republican in- form or in fact, and a government which-' by law proscribes any citizen on
But even this conceded power may be- abused in such manner as to trench upon the natural and constitutional rights of the citizen. Bor instance, suppose our Legislature should by statute provide that to be eligible to any county, township, or city office a citizen must have reached the age of seventy years and must have resided all his life in the precinct in which he is now a voter. Or suppose it be made a necessary qualification for all these offices which most nearly touch the life of the common people that the candidate shall pay taxes on a million dollars worth of property, or shall be' able to show a membership card in an accredited labor union, or is in good standing in the Masonic fraternity. Would anybody contend that such regulations are compatible with our form of government? And yet, if the doctrine announced by the majority is to be approved, not one of these conditions is in excess of the constitutional power of the Legislature to impose upon the people. Against such usurpation the power of the people at the polls is unavailing, for a reckless partisan majority once in power may, by imposing extreme conditions upon the right of the people to select their officers and upon the right of the ordinary citizen to aspire to office, erect against the popular voice a barrier which nothing but revolution by violence can remove. The republican government founded. by our fathers is the product of revolt against class privilege, and they sought in the national Constitution to hedge against the temptation of any state
Is aspiration to office, inconsistent with the highest quality of personal character or good citizenship ? Hitherto preferment at the hands of one’s fellow citizens has been supposed to be an honor for which the best may honorably strive; but such will cease to be. the case when we have firmly established the rule of law that to be eligible to such service one must “put himself in line” by surrendering his political opinions and voting the ticket of some party to which: a partisan Legislature' has granted the exclusive privilege of holding the offices. To say, as does in effect the majority, that, because the Constitution does not in so many words prohibit the making of political opinion a legal test of qualification for public office, the Legislature is left without any limitation upon its power in this respect, is to ignore the entire spirit and purpose of our governmental charter. While wé may not test the consti
This court has not hesitated to appeal to the spirit and fundamental ideas of the Constitution even in the absence of any express provision to meet the case. In State v. Van Beek, 87 Iowa, 569, we had to deal with the eligibility of an unnaturalized person of foreign birth to the office of sheriff, and, after conceding that there was “no provision in our Constitution or statute” on that subject, felt impelled to hold that “it is certainly a fundamental principle of our government that none but qualified electors can hold an elective office unless otherwise specially provided.”
' In deciding a question submitted to it by the Legislature, the Massachusetts court, though failing to find an express provision of the "Constitution on the subject of inquiry, disposed of it by resort “to the whole frame and purport of the instrument itself and the universal understanding and unbroken practical construction for the greater part of a century.” See 107 Mass. 604.
Dealing with an inquiry into the constitutional power of the Legislature, Judge Cooley says:
The doctrine that within any general grant of legislative power by the Constitution there, can be found authority to take from the people the management of their local concerns, if practically asserted, would be somewhat startling to our people, and would be likely to lead hereafter to a more careful scrutiny of charters of government, lest some time by an inadvertent use of words they might be found to have conferred upon some agency of their own the legal authority to take away their liberties altogether. We have taken great pains to surround the life, liberty, and property of the individual with guaranties; but we have not as a-general thing guarded local government with similar protections, We must assume either an intention that the legislative control should be constant and absolute, or, on the other hand, that there are certain'fundamental principles in our general framework of government which are
Citing the authority of Justice Story, Judge Cooley further adds: “Constitutional freedom means something more than liberty permitted. It consists in civil and political rights which are guaranteed, assured, and guarded; in one’s liberties as a man and a citizen; his right to vote, his right to hold office, his right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience; his equality with all others who are his fellow citizens; all these guarded and
Speaking of the restraints upon legislative power, Justice O’Brien, a distinguished New York jurist, says: “Such restraints may be found either in the language employed or in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the. enactment of the particular provision as a part of the organic law. A written Constitution must be interpreted as the paramount law of the land according to its spirit and the intent of the framers as indicated by its terms. In this sense it is just as obligatory upon the Legislature as upon other departments of the government or upon individual citizens.” Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459 (45 N. E. 15, 34 L. R. A. 408).
Says the same court, in People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 55:
An act violating the true intent and meaning of the Constitution, although not within the letter, is as much within the purview and effect of a prohibition as if within the strict letter, and an act in evasion of the terms of the Constitution as properly interpreted and understood and frustrating its general and clearly expressed or necessarily implied purpose is as clearly void as if in express terms forbidden. A thing within the intent of the Constitution is for all purposes to be regarded as within the words and terms of the law. A written Constitution would be of little avail as a practical and useful restraint upon the different departments of government if a literal reading only were to be given to it to the exclusion of all necessary implication, and the clear intent ignored, and slight evasions or acts palpably in violation of its spirit should be sustained as not repugnant to it.
The Legislature is not the state, nor the people, nor is. it their authorized representative clothed with sovereign power, except as that function has been bestowed by the people in the charter, or “letter of authority,” which we
Judge Herrick, in Rathbone v. Wirth, 6 App. Div. 277 (40 N. Y. Supp. 535), states the rule as follows: “In interpreting the power of the Legislature under the Constitution, we are not confined to the strict letter of that instrument, or compelled to point out the exact article, clause, or phrase therein which grants or denies the power in question. There are some things so contrary to the purpose and spirit of the Constitution that they must be said to be in conflict with it, although it can not be contrasted with any specific portion of it. The object of its adoption and its purpose and intent, taken as a whole, must be considered.” Nor is this, when properly understood, inconsistent with tire general rule that, except as restrained by the Constitution, the Legislature has plenary power to legislate upon all matters affecting public interests. State v. Moores, 55 Neb. 480 (76 N. W. 175, 41 L. R. A. 624).
The Constitution is not the source or the foundation from which the rights of the people are derived. Popular rights are older than written Constitutions, and the purpose of the latter is to preserve, and not to destroy, them. The framers of our present State Constitution served a people already organized into a popular form of government in which freedom of speech, thought, and opinion was univer
Thus far the authorities I have cited'go principally to the right and necessity of interpreting constitutional guaranties with due reference to the purposes for which our republican government was organized, and in accoi’d with the spirit and intent which pervades and inspires that instrument as a whole. I now wish to demonstrate that the position I have taken has the support of
The Constitution giving the right of election and ■ the right of appointment, these consisting essentially in the freedom of choice, and the Constitution also declaring that certain persons are not eligible to office, it follows from these powers and provisions that all other persons are eligible. Eligibility to office is not declared as a right or principle by any express terms of the Constitution, but it results as a just deduction from the express powers and provisions of the system. The basis of the principle is the absolute liberty of the electors and the appointing authorities to choose and appoint any person who is not made ineligible by the Constitution. Eligibility to office .therefore belongs not exclusively or especially to electors enjoying the right of suffrage. It belongs equally to all persons whomsoever not excluded by the Constitution. I therefore conceive it to be entirely clear that the Legislature can not establish arbitrary exclusion from office or any general regulation requiring qualifications which the Constitution has not required.
The question we are considering was before.the Alabama court in Dorsey’s case, 7 Port. 293, where it was held that, under the declaration in the Bill of Bights entitling each citizen to all the rights and privileges given to any other citizen, it was not competent for the Legislature to limit or destroy a citizen’s right to aspire to public office.
In the Michigan case (People v. Hurlbut, supra) the statute being considered contained a provision requiring the selections to certain offices to be confined to members of two political parties. The court says of this provision that it is “simply nugatory, because the Legislature on general principles have no power to make party affiliation a qualification for office.”
It is urged that the political proscription in this law is less than actually takes place without it; that those having the appointing power under the old law do in fact
In the heat of partisan excess and bitterness which marked the days immediately preceding the Civil War, the Legislature of Maryland, in enacting a law for a board of police commissioners for the city of Baltimore, inserted therein a condition that “no black Republican or indorser or approver of the Helper book” should be appointed to such office. The Supreme Court of that state, in passing upon the act, conceded that, if by this provision it was
The Legislature of the state of Indiana enacted a statute by which eligibility to a city board of police and fire department commissioners was confined to persons representing two political parties and having resided in the city five years. This act was held tó’ be á violation of the constitutional prohibition, of special privileges and immunities. The court there says: “The act classifies the citizens of Indianapolis and Evansville as to eligibility for commissioners of the Metropolitan Board: (1) Those who have resided in -the cities five years, and . (2) those who have not. Those of the first class are eligible to be elected commissioners, and those who belong to the second class are ineligible.' To the first class privileges and immunities are granted which upon the same terms do not equally belong to the second class. It is no answer to say that, when those who belong to the second or disqualified class have resided in the city for the required length of ■time, the disqualification is removed, and they become eligible .for the reason that five years’ residence transfers, them to the eligible class. The act also classifies the citi
In Bowden v. Bedell, 68 N. J. Law, 451 (53 Atl. 198), the New Jersey court had to deal with a statute creating a board of five excise commissioners, but provided that in elections to such board no voter should be • allowed to vote for more than three, and that not more than three
In Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196, (52 Am. Rep. 626), the Virginia court held unconstitutional an act forbidding certain school and judicial officers to engage in political activities, saying: “If our government is a government by the people, to seek active participation in the government is the plain privilege of every citizen.”
Speaking of the limitations upon the power of the Legislature to impose qualifications for office, the Massachusetts court has said: “The Legislature, in establishing offices not provided for by the Constitution, has often required that the persons or some of the persons to be appointed ' shall possess" certain qualifications, or that some shall be women and- some men; but in all cases, so far as we are aware, the qualifications required bear such relation to the. duties imposed that they tend to secure that kind
It is unnecessary to prolong this citation of authorities, already of tedious length. I desire to say, however, that the conclusion for which I contend is not inconsistent with the decision announced by us upon the soldiers’ preference act. While dissenting therefrom upon principle, I concede its authority as a precedent; but that statute in no manner trenches upon the right or privilege of the citizen to hold what political opinion he pleases without being made thereby ineligible to office. 'Had that act gone further alo'ng the line of the statute now, before us, and classified the veterans according to their political opinions, and provided that only those of Republican or Democratic affiliation should be entitled to its benefits, I am sure that the result in that case would have been very different. Nor do the cases cited in the majority opinion bear out the conclusion there reached. The principal case, Rogers v. Council, 123 N. Y. 173 (25 N. E. 274, 9 L. R. A. 579), construes a very different statute from the one before us. There the provision was that of the members of a certain board not more than two should be of the same political party. ’ The appointing power Avas not confined in its selection to any one or tAvo parties, but could make its selection from the entire citizenship, being limited only as to the number to be selected from any one party. ' Thus eA^ery citizen was eligible to be considered in connection with the position. The court there itself dreAV the distinction between that case and those from Michigan, Indiana, and other states which I have cited. Most of the other decisions cited by the majority fall within the same class as jhe Rogers case. In State v. Bemis, 45 Neb. 724 (64 N. W, 348), the Nebraska court contented itself with the sug
In none of these cases has the constitutional objection based on the prohibition of special privileges and the fundamental principles of republican government been considered or held inapplicable. Nor are any of the decisions cited by me to be disregarded because of the peculiar provisions of the Constitutions of the states whose statutes have been held invalid, for in each instance, while these peculiar provisions have been cited, the court has discussed and disposed of the questions on general principles of constitutional power and fundamental rights. which are common to all states. Approve the classification of the people by law according to party lines, and the exclusion of some as against the others from the right to be considered for public position, and we open a gate to the gravest abuses. The power to thus classify without restraint is the power to utterly destroy republican institutions. If we may classify by parties, we may classify according to financial and social position. If we may exclude from the right to hold these offices the members of three out of five political parties, we may exclude the fourth, • and, when this is accomplished, proceed to a pro- • cess of exclusion against the recalcitrant elements of the fifth until none are left save the select few wlm bear the h^H-mark of regularity attested by some party potentate.
Were it not for the gravity of the issues involved in this decision and the far-reaching consequences which must logically follow from the precedent established by the majority opinion, I should not be justified in this extended expression of dissent; but believing, as I do, that this case signalizes a regretable breach of constitutional guaranties which lie at the very foundation of republican government, my only apology is for my inability to protest in more effective terms.
The judgment appealed from ought to be reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — I agree in the main with the argument of the dissenting opinion by Justice Weaver, but with the following qualification: I think that the unconstitutional provision in section 67 9 d is all contained in oné sentence, i. e., “the said. commissioners shall be selected from the two leading political parties,'” etc. I see no reason why this unconstitutional proviso may not be eliminated and disregarded without destroying the integrity of the remainder of the act. In this particular case, it is true, the defendant has made his appointments in purported obedience to this part of the statute, and the appointment should be held invalid on that account. I agree therefore that the case should be reversed on that ground., I think, however, that the form of the adjudication should go no further than to hold this particular proviso -invalid as being unconstitutional, and that it should not in any manner restrain the defendant mayor from exercising his power of appointment hereafter in accordance with the valid provisions of the act in question.