288 N.W. 521 | Neb. | 1939
Lead Opinion
This is an original action of mandamus, which calls for the construction of certain language used by the legislature in the bill making appropriations for the state government for the current biennium.
The petition alleges that the relators are the attorney general and two of his assistants, and that the respondent is the state engineer; that, in said appropriation bill, the legislature provided a highway cash fund for the department of roads and irrigation, and that “not more than the-sum of $9,200, to be expended under the direction of the attorney general and subject to the approval of the state engineer, for salaries and office maintenance in the office of the attorney general.” Laws 1939, ch. 133, sec. 42. The petition further alleges that legal services were furnished to the department of roads and irrigation by the entire staff of lawyers, clerks, and stenographers in the attorney general’s office, and that they performed all services during the month of July, 1939, required by said department;.that each person on the staff of the attorney general’s office is paid a regular salary; that the attorney general had directed the payment of the salary of the relator Beck in the
This court issued an alternative writ. Respondent in his answer admits the status of the parties, the passage of the appropriation act, the receipt and demand for approval of the vouchers; that he did not approve the vouchers, and that the attorney general’s office provided legal services during the month of July for the department of roads and irrigation; and alleges that there was not submitted with said vouchers supporting information as to the time devoted to said services by the attorney general’s office; that the relator Beck did not devote his full time to the department during that month, and that all of the services rendered by the attorney general’s office to the department of roads and irrigation did not require the equivalent of the services of one full-time assistant to the attorney general;
The respondent sets out the history of the appropriation bill, the amount of the appropriation made directly for the salaries and maintenance of the attorney general’s office, the further fact that several appropriations carried for various departments of the state government were similarly limited to the approval of the head of the department, and that the legislature did not intend that the appropriation involved in this action would be used for the general purposes of salaries and maintenance of the attorney general’s office.
The respondent further alleges that the appropriation act vests in the respondent, and not in the relator, the authority and the discretion to determine whether, when, and to what extent, the $9,200 appropriation shall be used for salaries and1 maintenance of the attorney general’s office; that unless demands of the department of roads and irrigation are so great that they cannot be met from direct appropriation to the attorney general’s office, these funds should not be used. The respondent prays for a declaratory judgment fixing the rights, status, and legal relations of the parties under the act, and avers that he will cheerfully abide the judgment of the court.
The relators moved for the issuance of a peremptory writ on the ground that the answer does not state facts sufficient to justify the refusal to approve the vouchers, and that the answer does not constitute a defense.
The parties to this litigation do not occupy the position of ordinary litigants. They appear here in their official capacities. In their official capacities they are servants of a common master, to wit, the state of Nebraska. Their rights, duties, and responsibilities are fixed by the state Constitution and the acts of the legislature. The parties here are re
The solution of the issue here presented, then, rests upon an interpretation of the law of the state of Nebraska and the intention of the legislature with reference to- the expenditure of this fund. One of three propositions must be true: First, the discretion and the exercise of judgment as to the expenditure of the fund rests with the relator, and after the relator has reached a decision as to its expenditure, approval by the respondent is a ministerial act; or- second, the relator and the respondent have a discretionary power in the expenditure of the fund, and there must be an affirmative determination by both before' there can be an expenditure; or, third, the discretion and judgment with reference to the expenditure of the fund rests solely with the respondent, and the acts of the relator with reference thereto are ministerial.
In determining which of the three propositions is controlling, we consider the duties of the two parties, which the legislature must have contemplated, and the language of the act. Generally speaking, the relator islffie legal adviser of the officials of the state and represents the state in litigation. To perform that function properly, it is necessary that his office be maintained, and that the employees of the office of the relator receive their compensation as provided by law and without delay.
So far as the duties covered by this appropriation are concerned, the general duty of the respondent is to build and maintain the highways of the state and to look to and receive from the relator legal advice as to any problems connected therewith. The respondent is responsible for the work of his department, and the decision of the question as to whether or not legal service is needed rests with him; Questions of personnel, methods of doing the work, and the correctness of the service given to the respondent by the relator are matters that rest with the relator, not with the respondent.
It must also be recognized that the purpose of the state,
What was the intention of the legislature in making the appropriation subject to the expressed limitation? It is necessary that we define the terms used in the language under consideration, and, in doing so> give to that language the usual meaning. Each expression is to be construed in the light of the other; the expressions are to be reconciled and a meaning given to each if possible.
The word “direction” is defined by Webster as “that which is imposed by directing; a guiding or authoritative instruction; * * * order; command.”
The words “subject to” are defined as “dependent upon; * * * limited by; * * * under the control, power, or dominion of.” 60 C. J. 673.
The word “approval” is defined by Webster as meaning “approbation, sanction.” It is defined in the authorities as follows:
“The word ‘approved’ naturally imports the exercise of judgment and discretion; and the power to approve ordinarily implies a power to disapprove.
“To ‘approve’ or give ‘approval’ is in its essential and most obvious meaning to confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent to some act or thing done by another. The word ‘approve’ does not, ex vi termini, necessarily import the exercise of discretion, but from the connection in which the term is used it often involves the idea of discretion and adjudication, and is seldom construed as requiring a mere ministerial act. 4 C. J. 1464.” Apfel v. Mellon, 33 Fed. (2d) 805.
It is apparent that the second proposition stated above, to wit, the relator and the respondent have a discretionary power in the expenditure of the fund, and there must be an affirmative determination by both before there can be an expenditure, is controlling.
We cannot agree with the contention of the respondent
We cannot agree with the contention of the respondent that this work should be figured on a piece-meal basis. The contrary legislative intent is clearly demonstrated by the provision that the appropriation shall be used for the payment of salaries and office maintenance. The payment of salaries means something in the nature of a regular pay for work performed rather than for the payment of services on a job basis. The adjustment of the cost of. this service as fixed by the attorney general appears to be reasonable and a proper basis upon which to place the cost of that service.
Holding, as we do, that the respondent has a discretion
The respondent has no duty to perform in the matter except to determine the need for legal service and to request' and receive the same. After the service is requested, the determination as to what shall be done, the research involved, and the mechanical work in rendering such service rests with the attorney general.
We conclude, therefore, that the approval of the respondent for the expenditure of funds from this appropriation is indicated when the services are requested and rendered. From the record here presented, it appears clear that services were rendered to the department of roads and irrigation by the relators during the month of July, 1939. The respondent has exercised the discretion which is vested in him by the act, and therefore has approved the expenditure in fact. There remains nothing for him to do but to perform the ministerial act of examining the voucher as to form and place his signature thereon. ■ The peremptory writ is therefore granted.
Writ allowed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I agree that the appropriation involved is available for payment of salaries and maintenance in the attorney general’s office, to the extent of the time and cost to that office of any services rendered the department of roads and irrigation. The method of attempted withdrawal in this case, however, is to me improper. I am unable to accept the view that the appropriation is intended as a general fund that may be drawn upon whimsically, merely because some services have been rendered the department. It seems to me rather that the fund was intended to be used only in direct payment of time actually spent or cost actually incurred. Certainly it would be unnatural and misleading, for example, to allow the salaries of any of the members of the attorney general’s staff to be paid out of the fund, whose time had not actually been spent upon the business of the