51 Wash. 548 | Wash. | 1909
Lead Opinion
— This is a petition for a.peremptory writ of mandamus against the respondent, as auditor of the state, commanding him to draw against the state treasurer two warrants, in the sum of $1,000 each, in favor of Frank J. Barnard, treasurer of the board of regents of the State College of Washington, and a warrant in favor of J. B. Duthie in the sum of $21.85.
The State College of Washington is an institution of learning located within the state, created and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state. It has a board of regents consisting of five members, one of whom, Frank J. Barnard, is its treasurer. The board consists of Lee A. Johnson, J. J. Browne, Peter McGregor, Frank J. Barnard, and J. A. Anderson. The income of the college is derived in part from the general and state governments, in part from
The law-making body of the state in 1891, Laws 1891, page 334 et seq., enacted a law entitled “An act to provide for the location and maintenance of the agricultural college, experiment station and school of science of the state of Washington,” The name of the institution was later changed to
Other applicable code provisions are as follows: Section 2516 (P. C. § 7436), provides that the management of the college, the care and preservation of all property of which it shall become possessed, the erection and construction of all necessary buildings, the disbursements and expenditure of all money, shall be vested in a board of five regents to be appointed by the governor by and with the consent of the senate; and that each regent, before entering upon the discharge of the duties of his office, shall give a bond in the sum of not less than $5,000, conditioned for the faithful performance of official duties. Section 2517 (P. C. § 7437), provides, that the board of regents shall meet and organize by. electing a,president .and treasurer from their own number; that the treasurer shall, before entering upon the discharge of his duties as such, execute a good and sufficient bond to the state, with two or more sufficient sureties, in the penal sum of not less than $40,000, conditioned for the faithful performance of official duties, and to be approved by the governor. Section 2518 (P. C. § 7438), makes the treasurer the financial officer of the board and requires him to keep a true account of all moneys received and expended by him. Section 2520 (P. C. § 7440), provides that “the board of regents shall direct the disposition of any moneys belonging to or appropriated by” the college. Section 2527 (P. C. § 7447), requires the treasurer of the board to make disbursements of the funds in his hands upon the order of the board when countersigned
The respondent contends that, under the law of 1907, pages 179, 180, it was his duty to refuse the requisition made upon him by the board of regents and its treasurer. In passing upon the demurrer it will therefore devolve upon us to consider the act, its relation to the former laws of the state, and the respective duties of the parties under such statutes. The act of 1907 is entitled, “An act relative to the finances of the state of Washington and providing the time when and manner in which moneys shall be paid into the state treasury.” The part of the act which the respondent treats as applicable to the issue is as follows:
“Section 1. That it shall be the duty of each state officer or other person (other than county treasurers) who is authorized by law to collect or receive moneys belonging to the state or to any department or institution thereof, to transmit to the treasurer of the state each day, all moneys collected by him on the preceding day, together with a statement of the source from which each item of said money was derived and to transmit to the state auditor a' duplicate of said statement.”
The purpose of this act is clearly defined in its title, viz., that it was intended to apply to “the finances of the state.” It contains no repealing clause. In accordance with his construction of this .act, the treasurer of the board of regents paid certain money to the state treasurer. It is urged by the relators that the act has no application to the funds of the state college.
The first contention of the respondent, that the college is a state institution, may be conceded under the rule announced in the following cases: In re Royer's Estate, 123 Cal. 614, 56 Pac. 461, 44 L. R. A. 364; Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Industrial University, 71 Ill. 310, Tucker v. Pollock, 21 R. I.
The important question is, do the words in the act of 1907 heretofore quoted, “or to any department or institution thereof,” include moneys of the state college, as set forth in its petition? The obvious purpose of the act was to daily place in the hands of the state treasurer the “finances” of the state. The finances of the state in its broadest sense would probably include the money deposited by the college with the state treasurer. A reading of this act in connection with the then existing laws heretofore quoted makes it apparent that the legislature did not intend by this general language to reach out and include the fund in controversy. In addition to the code provisions to which reference has been made, Bal. Code, §’2514 (P. C. § 7434), provides for an extensive and costly course of instruction. Section 2515 imposes duties involving large expense on the board of regents. How can the board discharge its duties and meet the expenses of the same if its funds fall within the provisions of the act of 1907? The history of the general legislation of 1907 relative to this college forces the conclusion that it was the legislative intention to enlax-ge and increase its usefulness, rather than to lessen its efficiency. The act under considex'ation evidently contemplated that the money of the state arising from such sources as taxation and the sale of state lands, subject to the exceptions noted in the act, were the finances for which it provided. It does not purport to take from the board “the management of the state college and experiment station, the care and preservation of all property of which such institution shall become possessed, and the disbursement and expenditure of all money.” It is worthy of observation that, not
It is a familiar canon of construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In the case of Meade v. French, 4 Wash. 11, 29 Pac. 833, there was presented for the consideration of the court the construction of two acts. The old act provided that, in an action for assault and battery, if the plaintiff recover less than $10, he shall be entitled to costs only to the extent of the damages recovered. The later act provided that in any action in the superior court the prevailing party should be entitled to his costs except in actions in the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, when commenced in the superior court. The court held that the later act did not repeal the former one. In the course of the opinion it remarked:
“Hence the rule obtains that repeals by implication are not favored, and courts will seek to harmonize the laws and preserve them, rather than declare them abrogated or repealed; and if by any reasonable construction they can stand together, they will both be enforced; and in construing statutes for the purpose of ascertaining whether repugnancy really exists, as well as to gather the intention of the legislature in any particular, the whole statute on the subject must be construed together.”
See, also, State ex rel. Purves v. Moyer, 17 Wash. 643, 50 Pac. 492; State v. Binnard, 21 Wash. 349, 58 Pac. 210.
“It is but a particular application of the general presumption against an intention to alter the law beyond the immediate scope of the statute, to say that a general act is to be construed as not repealing a particular one. . . It is usually presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special act, or what is the same thing, by a local custom. Having already given its attention to the particular subject, and provided for it, the legislature is reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that special provision by a subsequent general enactment, unless that intention is manifested in explicit language, or there be something which shows that the attention of the legislature had been turned to that special act, and that the general one was intended to embrace the special cases within the previous one; or something in the nature of the general one making it unlikely that an exception was intended as regards the special act. The general statute is read as silently excluding from its operation the cases which have been provided for by the special one. . . . The fact that the general act contains a clause repealing acts inconsistent .with it does not diminish. the force of this rule of construction.”
As supporting this view of construction, the act of 1907, pages 423-4, is both persuasive and instructive. Section 1 of said act reads:
“The state of Washington hereby assents to the purposes, terms, provisions and conditions of the grant of money provided in an act of Congress approved March 16, 1906, said act being entitled ‘An act to provide for an increased annual appropriation for agricultural experiment stations and regulating the expenditure thereof,’ and having for its purpose the more complete endowment and maintenance of agricultural experiment stations theretofore or thereafter established under an act of Congress approved March 2, 1887.”
In section 2 it is provided that such annual appropriation shall be paid to “the treasurer or other officer duly appointed
The respondent has directed our attention to art. 6, § 4, of the constitution, but its applicability is not apparent. Keeping in mind the old law as well as the new, the title of the act of 1907, and the subsequent legislation to which reference has been made, we have no difficulty in. reaching the conclusion that the act. of 1907 was not intended to embrace the fund in controversy.
The writ will therefore issue as prayed for.
Rudkin, C. J., Fullerton, Chadwick, .&nd Crow, JJ., concur. ....
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — In my opinion the act in question does not except the state college-, from its provisions. If that college- is an institution of • the state, which seems to' be decided by the majority, then it is expressly included within the provisions of the act. The regents have so construed the act, because they have complied with its provisions and have deposited more than $7,000 with the state treasurer. No moneys can be drawn from the state treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation. Const., art. 8, § 4. No such appropriation has been made in this case. The decision in this case sets aside both the act in question and also this provision of the constitution. If the state college is not included within the meaning of the act, then upon the same reasoning no state institution is included, and the act is rendered nugatory as to such institutions.
I think the writ should be denied, and therefore dissent.
Dunbar, J., concurs with Mount, J.