State ex rel. Jennings v. NurreState ex rel. Jennings v. Nurre
Jennings asserts in his sole proposition of law that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his mandamus action. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, all factual allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the nonmoving party. Perez v. Cleveland (1993),
Mandamus will lie to compel the filing of findings of facts and conclusions of law when they are required. State ex rel. Brown v. Court (1986),
Judge Nurre contends that mandamus will not lie because findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required when successive petitions for posteonviction relief are dismissed. He claims that our decision in State ex rel. Workman v. McGrath (1988),
“ ‘Under R.C. 2953.23(A), it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to entertain a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief based upon the same facts.
“ ‘Accordingly, we hold that a trial court is not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law when declining to entertain a second or successive petition for post-conviction relief which alleges the same grounds as earlier petitions. See State v. Perdue (1981),2 Ohio App.3d 285 [2 OBR 315,441 N.E.2d 827 ]; State v.*598 Knight (Aug. 20, 1981), Franklin App. No. 81AP-274, unreported [1981 WL 3417 .]’ ” Id: at 91,532 N.E.2d at 106 .
Jennings claims in effect that Workman does not support dismissal of his mandamus action because, unlike the relator in Workman, his complaint alleged that his successive petitions alleged different grounds than those in his first petition. See Sherrills v. State (Oct. 2, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 60294, unreported (writ of mandamus to compel trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law on dismissal of successive postconviction relief petition granted and motion to dismiss overruled where respondent neither asserted nor demonstrated, under Workman, that successive petition alleged the same grounds as alleged in earlier petition).
However, the holding of Workman that a trial court is not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law in dismissing a successive petition alleging the same grounds as those in the prior petition was premised on the trial court’s discretionary authority to “ ‘entertain a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief based upon the same facts.’ ” Workman, supra. R.C. 2953.23(A) provides that “the court may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, entertain a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of the petitioner based upon the same facts or on newly discovered evidence.” (Emphasis added.) The “good cause” requirement of R.C. 2953.23(A) places the entertainment of a successive petition for postconviction relief within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Steffen (1994),
This conclusion is supported by Knight, supra, which was cited with approval in Workman. In Knight, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that based on R.C. 2953.23(A), a “trial court is not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law when declining to entertain a second or successive petition for post-conviction relief.” Knight did not limit its holding to successive petitions based only on the same facts as those in the previous petitions.
Jennings further alleged in his complaint that Judge Nurre abused his discretion by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. A writ of mandamus will not issue to control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is abused. State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994),
Judgment affirmed.