State of Ohio ex rel. Pression Jean-Baptiste, Relator, v. Honorable James W. Kirsch, Respondent.
Case No. 10CA3338
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY
RELEASED 04/18/11
[Cite as State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 2011-Ohio-3368.]
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Angela M. Lloyd and David Boylan, Justice for Children Project, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, for Relator Pression Jean-Baрtiste.
Mark E. Kuhn, Prosecuting Attorney, and Chadwick K. Sayre, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Respondent Honorable James W. Kirsch.
Harsha, P.J.
{¶1} Relator Pression Jean-Baptiste filed a complaint for peremptory writ of prohibition against Honorable James W. Kirsch seeking to prevent Judge Kirsсh from classifying Jean-Baptiste as a juvenile sexual offender registrant. Judge Kirsch contends that he is authorized by
{¶2} We agree with Judge Kirsch that Jean-Baptiste meets the statutory definition of a “child.”
Therefore, we deny the writ of prohibition.
Factual Summary
{¶3} On January 19, 2007, the day after Jean-Baptiste‘s eighteenth
{¶4} Judge Kirsch scheduled a juvenile sexual offender classification hearing for February 8, 2010. Shortly before the hearing date, Jean-Baptiste filed a verified complaint for peremptory writ of prohibition seeking to prevent Judge Kirsch from classifying him as a juvenilе sexual offender registrant after
Applicable Law
{¶5} A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ; its purpose is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 1998-Ohio-275, 701 N.E.2d 1002. A writ of prohibition is customarily granted with caution and restraint, and is issued only in cases of necessity arising from the inadequacy of other remedies. Id.; see, also, State ex rel. Barclays Bank PLC v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 74 Ohio St.3d 536, 540, 1996-Ohio-286, 660 N.E.2d 458, 461 (“Prohibition is an extraordinary writ and we do not grant it routinely or easily.“).
{¶6} A writ of prohibition “tests and determines ‘solely and only’ the subject matter jurisdiction” of the lower court. Tubbs Jones at 73, citing State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 534 N.E.2d 46, 52. It does not lie where the court has madе a mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction, i.e., simply reached a legally incorrect result. Brooks v. Gaul, 89 Ohio St.3d 202, 203, 2000-Ohio-133, 729 N.E.2d 752. But see State ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 77 Ohio St.3d 40, 1996-Ohio-354, 671 N.E.2d 5 (writ of prohibition was appropriate remedy to challenge lower court‘s gag order because once thе order was enforced and the hearing conducted, relator would have no adequate remedy at law) and State ex rel. Connor v. McGough (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 546 N.E.2d 407 (writ of prohibition issued where trial court had subject matter jurisdiction but patently
{¶7} In оrder for a writ of prohibition to issue, the relator must establish that: (1) the lower court is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers; (2) the exercise of the power is unauthorized by law; and (3) the denial of the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists. State ex rel. Henry v. McMonagle, 87 Ohio St. 3d 543, 2000-Ohio-477, 721 N.E.2d 1051. Only requirements two and three are at issue here as the parties agree Judge Kirsch is attempting to exercise judicial powers by holding a juvenile sexual offender hearing.
Exercise of Power
{¶8} The parties dispute whether Judge Kirsch‘s exercise of judicial power is authorized by law. Judgе Kirsch argues that he has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction in this case. Jean-Baptiste contends that the juvenile court does not have personal jurisdiction over him because he is over age twenty-one.
{¶9} Judge Kirsch argues that the Ohio General Assembly has given juvenile courts the exclusive authority to hear cases “[c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is alleged * * * to be a juvenile traffic offender or a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child * * *.”
(1) “Child” means a person who is under eighteen years of age, except as otherwise provided in divisions (C)(2) to (7).
(2) Subject to division (C)(3) of this section, any person who violates a federal or state law or a municipal ordinance prior to attaining eighteen years of age shall be deemed a “child” irrespective of that person‘s age at the time the complaint with respect to that violation is filed or the hearing on the complaint is hеld.
(3) Any person who, while under eighteen years of age, commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and who is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age is not a child in relation to that act.
* * *
(6) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to attaining eighteen years of age until
the person attains twenty-one years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that adjudicatiоn, except as otherwise provided in this division, a person who is so adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twenty-one years of age. * * *
* * *
{¶10} Judge Kirsch argues that Jean-Baptiste is a “child” under
{¶11} When interpreting a statute, courts must first look to the plain language of the statute to determine legislative intent. Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, at ¶ 11. We must read words and phrases in context, giving words their common, ordinary and accepted meaning unless the legislature has clearly expressed a contrary intention. Kunkler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 135, 137, 522 N.E.2d 477; State v. Singer (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 108, 362 N.E.2d 1216. We cannot interpret the plain language of a statute to mean something it does not sаy. State v. Hix (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 129, 131, 527 N.E.2d 784.
{¶12} Under
{¶13} Jean-Baptiste violated state law by committing a delinquent act that would have been a first degree felony, i.e. rape, if committed by an adult. And, he committed this violation before his eighteenth birthday. Therefore, he is considered a “child” under the plain language of
{¶14} Because Jean-Baptiste is still considered a “child,” the juvenile court is required to hold a juvenile sexual offender hearing under
The court that adjudicates a child a delinquent child shall issue as part of the dispositional order or, if the court commits the child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, shall issue at the time of the child‘s release from the secure facility an order that classifies the child as a juvenile offender registrant.
See State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 925 N.E.2d 614, 2010-Ohio-1471, at ¶¶ 10-13 (if delinquent child is still a “child” under
{¶15} Jean-Baptiste cites In re G.M., 188 Ohio App.3d 318, 2010-Ohio-2295, 935 N.E.2d 459, in support of his contention that a juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to conduct a juvenile sexuаl offender classification hearing once a juvenile offender has reached age twenty-one. However, G.M. is distinguishable because G.M. was adjudicated a delinquent child at age sixteen; therefore, under
Adequate Remedy at Law
{¶17} Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a party challenging a court‘s jurisdiction generally has an adequate remedy via postjudgment appeal within which to pursue a jurisdictional challenge. Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 695 N.E.2d 751. Because we have concluded that Judge Kirsch does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, we find that Jean-Baptiste has an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal.
Failure to Hold Hearing Within Reasonable Time
{¶18} Jean-Baptiste also argues that the juvenile court was statutorily required to hold the juvenile sexual offender classification hearing upon his release from the secure DYS facility and, because it waited over a year and a half to hold the hearing, it lost jurisdiction. Specifically, Jean-Baptiste states that he was released from the sеcure DYS facility on July 17, 2008 and the hearing was not scheduled until February 8, 2010. Judge Kirsch argues that Jean-Baptiste is relying on facts not in evidence to support his claim because he stated in his complaint that he was released from DYS on January 18, 2010.
{¶19} While we agree with Judge Kirsch that the timeline in this case is unclear, Jean-Baptiste did state in his affidavit and his complaint that he was
{¶20} Jean-Baptiste primarily cites two cases to support his argument that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction to hold the juvenile sexual offender hearing because it did not hold the hearing in a timely manner – In re McAllister, 2006-Ohio-5554, and In the Matter of B.W., 2007-Ohio-2096. However, neither of these cases involves a writ of prohibition and neither the Second nor the Fifth District held that a delay in scheduling the hearing may affect the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction. Therefore, Jean-Baptistе‘s claim that the hearing is untimely should be raised by way of an appeal as it is not a challenge to Judge Kirsch‘s jurisdiction.
Conclusion
{¶21} We hereby DENY the requested writ of prohibition. WRIT DENIED. COSTS TO PETITIONER. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Abele, J. & Kline, J.: Concurs
FOR THE COURT
William H. Harsha
Presiding Judge