150 Minn. 80 | Minn. | 1921
On July 26, 1921, the board of parole, again considering his case, took this action: “Parole rescinded and warrant for arrest issued.” Dnder this warrant relator 'is now held.
We construe the action of April 26 as a conditional discharge. This is just what it purports to be, a discharge on condition that relator should be taken into custody by the Illinois authorities. Since the Illinois authorities did not take him into custody the condition fathed and it was inoperative.
The learned district judge was of the opinion that the condition was void and that, the condition failing, the discharge became absolute. We cannot agree that the condition was void. Pardons and paroles upon
This statute gives to the board the power to order the return of a paroled prisoner in the exercise of their judgment -and discretion. No trial or hearing is provided for. The board in causing the arrest and demanding the return of relator accordingly acted within the law, unless this statute is for some reason unconstitutional. We know of no constitutional provision that- it violates. The propriety' of such legislation is impliedly recognized in State v. Wolfer, supra, and is sustained in other states, and it is generally held that there is no infringement of any constitutional guaranty of the personal rights or liberty of the convict. Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 South. 146, 45 L.R.A. 502, 82 Am. St. 1; Kennedy’s Case, 135 Mass. 48; Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596, 131 N. W. 914; Spencer v. Kees, 47 Wash. 276, 91 Pac. 963; Woodward v. Murdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N. E. 1047; State v. Stephenson, 69 Kan. 405, 76 Pac. 905, 105 Am. St. 171, 2 Ann. Cas. 841; State v. Page, 60 Kan. 664, 57 Pac. 514; State v. Peters, 43 Oh. St. 629,
The theory is that a parole granted under such a statute, is granted, not as a matter of right, but of grace, and that the convict, by accepting this form of parole, is bound by the conditions imposed by the statute under which it is granted.
There are decisions in other states holding similar legislation wholly .or in part invalid as an infringement of particular constitutional provisions vesting the pardoning power in the Governor of the state. People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 496, 29 N. W. 80; State Board of Corrections, 16 Utah, 478, 52 Pac. 1090; In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 73 Vt. 414, 51 Atl. 10, 56 L.R.A. 658; People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N. W. 310, 14 L.R.A. 285.
Our Constitution creates a board of pardons "whose powers and duties shall be defined and regulated by law.” Const. Minn. art. 5, par. 4. We think this provision permits the legislation here in question. (See also People v. Cook, 147 Mich. 127, 110 N. W. 514.)
Order reversed and writ discharged.