State ex rel. J.W.
I ¡.The trial court adjudicated J.W.
J.W. contends there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate him delinquent of illegal possession of stolen things. J.W. asserts there was no eyidence that thе backpack was stolen and that there was no evidence that he knew or should have known the bag was stolen. The State argues that although its case was founded, in part, on circumstantial evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that J.W. possessed a backpack that was stolen from a truck and that J.W. knew or should have known the backpack was stolen.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found proof of delinquеncy or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the delinquent adjudication of illegal possession of stolen things is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 22, 2011, J.W. and an adult female were observed by Sergeant James Clarkston as they rode their bicycles against traffic on Marigny Street. Sergeant Clarkston noticed that J.W. constantly looked back at him as he cycled, which piqued the Sergeant’s attention. He decided to follow J.W. as J.W. turned | -¡onto Burgundy Street. As J.W. turned, Sergeant Clarkston saw J.W. drop a backpack from his back. After discarding the bag, J.W. rode toward Sergeant Clarkston, as directed. J.W. repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and questioned Sergeant Clarkston’s purpose for wanting him to stop. J.W. continued riding at a slow pace during the time the Sergeant spoke to him. J.W. subsequently rode away on his bicyсle; the female stopped. Sergeant Clark-ston dispatched a description of J.W., and J.W. was subsequently detained and arrested by other officers, including Officer Lawrence Weathersby, Jr. During the pat-down of J.W., a camera was discovered in his possession. After J.W. was detained, he was relocated to Sergeant Clarkston for identification. Sergeant Clarkston positively identified J.W. as the person who had sped away on the bicycle.
J.W. was charged with one count of illegal possession of stolen things in violation of La.R.S. 14:69. After a hearing, he was adjudicated delinquent of illegal possession of stolen things. J.W. was subsequently ordered to be committed to the
J.W. timely filed this appeal.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
In order to adjudicate a child delinquent, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child cоmmitted the delinquent act alleged in the petition. La. Ch.Code. art. 883. The standard for the State’s burden of proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is “no less strenuous than the standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding against an adult.” State in the Interest of A.G.,
In light of the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and in evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, аn appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
Louisiana Constitution Article V, § 10(B) mandates that an appellate court review both lаw and facts when reviewing juvenile adjudications. Therefore, as in the review of civil cases, a factual finding made by a trial court in a juvenile adjudication may not be disturbed by an appellate court unless the record evidence as a whole does not furnish a basis for it, or it is clearly wrong. State in the Interest of Batiste,
1 ¿Illegal possession of stоlen things is defined in Louisiana Revised Statute 14:69(A) as follows:
A. Illegal possession of stolen things is the intentional possessing, procuring, receiving, or concealing of anything of value which has been the subject of any robbery or theft, under circumstances which indicatе that the offender knew or had good reason to believe that the thing was the subject of one of these offenses.
Thus, in order to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent of possession of stolen property, “the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 1) the property was stolen, and 2) the property was of value, and 3) that the defendant knew or should have known that the property was stolen, and 4) that the defendant intentionally possessed, procured, received or conceаled the property.” State in Interest of B.J.,
Whether the backpack was stolen
J.W. does not contend the backpack did not have value or that he did not intentionally possess, procure, receive or conceal the backpack. Instead, he argues that there was no evidence adduced at trial that the backpack was stolen and that he knew or should have known it was stolen. J.W. contends the State did not meet its burden of proof at trial as to those elements. We disagree and find there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate J.W. delinquent of the illegal possession of stolen property.
J.W. argues that because no one testified during trial about the ownership of the backpack or about whethеr it was the subject of a theft or a robbery, then no ^reasonable trier of fact could have adjudicated him delinquent. The State relies on circumstantial evidence, including the physical evidence that linked J.W. to the truck in which the backpack had been located.
Sergeant James Clarkston testified under direct examination that he observed J.W. and a female bicyclist traveling against traffic on a one-way street. He decided to “check them out” after he noticed that the male (later identified as J.W.) kept looking at him. Sergeant Clarkston also stated he noticed a backpack on J.W. After noticing that Sergeant Clarkston was approaching him, J.W. continued riding away from Sergeant Clark-ston and removed the back pack from his shoulders and thrеw it to the ground. Sergeant Clarkston testified that he pretended he did not see J.W. dispose of the backpack and, that although he called both cyclists, only the female stopped and went to him. J.W. rode away. Sergeant Clark-ston radioed J.W.’s description to other officers. J.W. was subsequently apprehended and returned to Sergeant Clark-ston’s location for identification. Sergeant Clarkston positively identified J.W. as the person he had observed discard the backpack. Sergeant Clarkston, who was the supervisor at the scene, directed Officer Lawrence Weathersby, Jr. to conduct the investigation of the matter.
Sergeant Clarkston further testified that he and Officer Weathersby relocated to the truck from where the backpack had been taken. Sergeant Clarkston witnessed the collection of the fingerprints from the truck’s rear window.
Under cross-examination, Sergeant Clarkston admitted that he did not know how J.W. had come into possession of the backpack and that it could have been J.W.’s bag.
Officer Lawrence Weathersby, Jr. testified that he received a radio call from Sergeant Clarkston about two suspects who had fled from him. Upon making |7contact with J.W., Officer Weathersby observed J.W. traveling at a high rate of speed and riding against traffic. Officer Weathersby testified that when he stopped J.W., J.W. was informed that he was being detained pending an investigation of a car burglary. Officer Weathersby and his partner were tasked with investigating the matter.
During his investigation, Officer Weath-ersby and his partner met with the adult femalе suspect who executed a rights of arrestee form and told the officers “what she and J.W. had been doing in the area.” Officer Weathersby recovered the discard
Officer Weathersby testified that after Sergeant Clarkston’s positive identification of J.W., he (Weathersby) relocated to the truck from where the backpack had been takеn. Officer Tasha Hunter took latent fingerprints from the exterior portion of the sliding glass on the back of the truck.
The State called Officer George Jackson, a fingerprint examiner for the New Orleans Police Department, as an expert in the taking of and the comparison of fingerprints, to which the Defendant did not object. Officer Jackson testified the latent fingerprints retrieved from the truck window positively matched J.W.’s prints which are stored in an automated fingerprint identification system. Based upon the rеsults of fingerprint comparisons, Officer Jackson was able to identify J.W.’s name, birthdate, sex and race.
We find there was sufficient evidence which could have led a reasonable trier of fact to exclude every hypothesis of innocence and find that J.W. was delinquent of illegal possession of the stolen backpack.
|¡¿Whether J.W. knew or should have known the backpack was stolen
J.W. contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or should have known the baсkpack was stolen. We find his argument is without merit.
The third element of the crime of illegal possession of stolen property is that the juvenile knew or should have known that the property was stolen. The Louisiana Supreme Court has observed that the mere рossession of stolen property does not create the presumption that the person possessing the property received it with knowledge that it was stolen. State v. Chester, 97-1001 (La.12/19/97),
In addition, when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred аccording to reason and common experience. State v. Shapiro,
In this case, Sergeant Clarkston testified that aftеr J.W. saw him, he (J.W.) rode away from him, and as he rode, J.W. disposed of the backpack. Considering the undisputed fact that J.W. discarded the backpack as he continued to ride away |nfrom Sergeant Clarkston, it is reasonable to find that J.W. knew the backpack was stolen.
After the disposal of the backpack, Sergeant Clarkston attempted to talk to J.W., but J.W. fled. At the time Officer Weath-ersby observed him, J.W. was traveling at a high rate of speed. It was not until J.W. was approached by Officer Weathersby that J.W. stopped аnd was apprehended.
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that J.W. knew or should have known the backpack had been stolen. Accordingly, we reject J.W.’s argument that his possession of the backpack was insufficient evidence to prove that he knew the backpack was the subject of a robbery or theft.
DECREE
After review of the evidence in this еase, we conclude the State proved its case of illegal possession of stolen things beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the delinquent adjudication of J.W. for illegal possession of the stolen backpack is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
Notes
. To maintain the confidentiality of the proceedings required by Louisiana Children’s Code Articles 407 and 412, we use initials for the juvenile defendant in this case.