50 Kan. 508 | Kan. | 1893
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On March 6, 1886, Gov. John A. Martin issued a proclamation declaring a consolidation of the cities of Wyandotte, Kansas City and Armourdale as one city of the first class, under the namg of Kansas City. This action was taken by him a3 goverspf ’n pursuance of the authority of “An act to provide few^he consolidation of cities,” and
“That the separating line between old Kansas City and old Wyandotte was the middle of the Kansas river, from the point where the Kansas river empties into the Missouri, which line ran up the Kansas river to a point where it intersects the boundary of the city of Armourdale; that the city of Armourdale, previous to the consolidation, was adjacent to the city of Wyandotte on the south, the platted territory of the city of Wyandotte on the south boundary being within 750 feet of the platted territory of the city of Armourdale on the north boundary thereof, the intervening space being occupied by the tracks and right-of-way of the.Union Pacific*515 Railway Company; that since the consolidation of said city as aforesaid, numerous additions have from time to time been added, by ordinances duly enacted and approved; that the territory comprising said additions amounts to about one-third of the present territory included within the boundary lines of said city.”
It is further alleged, that since the consolidation the whole territory comprising the same was divided into wards, and that, in each of the wards, councilmen and members of the board of education had been elected, and all of the qualified electors had participated in said election; that the city of Armourdale had been constituted the sixth ward; that the city had expended in public improvements in that ward alone the sum of $354,490.74, for which special-improvement bonds had been issued by the consolidated city, and that there had been expended, for school sites and buildings in the sixth ward, the sum of $27,000. It appears to be claimed that the opposition to the consolidation comes mostly from residents of the sixth ward. It is further alleged, that since the consolidation the city has been recognized as a city of the first class by the United States government, by the courts of Wyandotte county, the supreme court of thq state, by the state legislature, and by the governor and state officers of Kansas, and that from the time of the consolidation the several cities composing the same had voluntarily surrendered their respective local governments, and had acquiesced in the consolidation. It is finally averred, that the dissolution of the consolidation would cause irreparable injury to the people of the city, and also to the persons who own and hold the bonds and contracts of the city, and also to various persons and corporations who have received franchises for water, light and railways within the city-; that it would work confusion in the police regulation and control of the territory included in the city, and would give rise to much litigation both as to the contracts and debts outstanding, as well as in the matter of taxation, both past and future; and the defendants insist that, by reason of the premises, the state is es-
The result of the controversy depends upon the validity of the statutes under which the consolidation was effected. Several grounds of invalidity are asserted, but the principal ground is that the acts confer corporate power, and, being of a special or local nature, they are repugnant to § 1 of article 12 of the state constitution, which forbids the legislature to pass any special act conferring corporate powers. That corporate power is conferred by the legislature, no one can deny; but is it special and local in its application, within the meaning of the constitution ? The statutes attacked are chapters 63 and 64 of the laws of 1886, and it is contended that the first section of chapter 63 discloses the local and special character of the legislation. It reads as follows:
“Section 1. Whenever two or more cities, neither of which is a .city of the first class, lying adjacent to each other, and not more than three-fourths of one mile apart, have attained, or shall hereafter attain, an aggregate population of 15,000 or upwards, such cities shall be consolidated and become one city, and. be governed and regulated by the laws relating to cities of the first class, except as to matters provided for in this act.”
All of the provisions of the acts relate to the consolidation, and prescribe the various steps to be taken in completing it, except, possibly, one in relation to the grading of streets, the validity of which has been questioned. (Simpson v. Kansas City, 46 Kas. 438.) The statute is general in form and prospective in its application, and upon its face it would appear to operate on all communities which came within its provisions for all time to come. The mere fact that it is general in form, however, will not save the statute, if its operation and effect are necessarily local and special. (City of Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kas. 431.) In the case last cited, the following rule with reference to what constitutes general legislation, and which would be upheld, was stated: “If the act has room
“ It is not necessary that a law should operate upon all cities of the state to be constitutional. If it is general and uniform throughout the state, operating upon all of a certain class, or upon all who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided in the act, it is not obnoxious to the limitations against special legislation.”
The principle of classification in legislation for cities has been approved in this court and is conceded by counsel for plaintiff. Heretofore, it has been based on population only, but it has been generally recognized that other classifications might be made without offending the constitution. (City of Topeka v. Gillett, supra.) It was said in The State v. Hunter, supra, that —
“It belongs to the legislature to make the classification, and while it cannot so classify them as to make the law special in its application and results, yet many classes may properly be made. It need not be restricted to the population of the municipality, but it would seem that it might be based on the conduct or condition of the people resident therein.”
The cities of Kansas have been arranged in three classes. When it is found that a city has 15,000 inhabitants, it becomes a city of the first class; those that have less than 15,-000 and more than 2,000 are placed in the second class; and' all incorporated municipalities not having more than 2,000 fall within the third class. As cities increase in population, they advance from one class to another by a simple procedure, when they adopt a different form of city government, and are made subject to a different code of municipal laws. The statute in question provides another method for organizing cities of the first class, and for advancing adjacent cities of the lower classes to the first class. No previous law was adequate for this purpose. Is the classification fair, and the
It is further contended, that the law is special because at the time of its passage it was only applicable to three cities, which have taken advantage of its provisions to consolidate into the defendant city. It is true that no other cities than those named have taken advantage of the provisions of this act, and it is probably true that no other cities similarly situated have at present the requisite population which would enable them to consolidate. The act, however, in form appears to be designed for the whole state, and to embrace all cities that come within the specified class. The fact that only one group of cities could have consolidated under the statute at the time it was enacted does not condemn it. If the classification is proper, and the. legislation is such as admits of the entry of all cities of like condition into that class, it is not invalid, although there may be at the time only one group of cities that comes within the class. If the provisions are such that other cities may enter the class, and in the nature of things probably will enter the class and come within the provisions of the statute, it may be regarded as a general law. (City of Topeka v. Gillett, supra; Bumsted v. Govern, 47 N. J. L. 372; Fellows v. Walker, 39 Fed. Rep. 651; The State v. Hudson, 44 Ohio St. 137.)
It is well known that in mining and manufacturing districts towns spring up which are near together, and where the conditions are favorable for growth and prosperity they soon develop into cities of- the lower classes. Our attention has been called to groups of cities in other portions of the state which give promise that some of them at least will soon
It is claimed also that the law is limited by the exceptions mentioned in the first section; but it appears that every provision relates to and is intended to effect consolidation except the fourteenth section, which relates to the grading of streets. As intimated in Simpson v. Kansas City, supra, this section is not fairly embraced within the title of the act, and is unconstitutional. When the consolidation has been completed, the laws relating to cities of the first class must control; and, as § 14 is an apparent attempt to provide a rule for the grading of streets after the consolidation has been effected, it does not come within the title of the act, and cannot be sustained. This section, however, is distinct and severable from the remainder of the act, and its invalidity will not render the whole statute void. (Turner v. Comm’rs of Woodson Co., 27 Kas. 314; C. B. U. P. Rld. Co. v. A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co., 28 id. 453; Berry v. Railroad Co., 20 Am. Rep. 69; Smith v. Mayor, etc., 45 N. W. Rep. [Mich.] 964; Cooley, Const. Lim. 177; 3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 677.)
It is asserted that the act violates § 16 of article 2 of the constitution, which provides that “ No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title.” The title of the act is: “An act to provide for the consolidation of cities.” We think, under the numerous decisions of this court, that the title, although general, fairly indicates the scope of the act, and that when § 14 is eliminated from it, no objection can be fairly urged against the title. (The State v. Barrett, 27 Kas. 213; Comm’rs of Cherokee Co. v. The State, 36 id. 337; The State v. Comm’rs of Haskell Co., 40 id. 65; Mo. Pac. Rly. Co. v. Merrill, 40 id. 404; The State, ex rel., v. Sanders, 42 id. 228.)