Appellant asserts in his sole proposition of law that where parties have previously agreed to and the trial court has ordered nonbinding mediation of all postdivorce disputes prior to initiating court action, a writ of prohibition or mandamus will issue to preclude court action on a child support modification motion until mediation has first been attempted.
We review the summary dismissal of a complaint upon a finding of an adequate remedy at law by determining if the court of appeals abused its discretion. State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton (1994),
The court of appeals determined that appellant possesses an adequate remedy at law by appealing the overruling of appellant’s dismissal motion following the conclusion of the support modification proceedings. The presence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law generally precludes extraordinary relief in prohibition or mandamus. State ex rel. Hunter v. Certain Judges of the Akron Mun. Court (1994),
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law by appeal. Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1995),
It is uncontroverted that Judge Patterson possesses general subject-matter jurisdiction over the child-support modification proceeding. See, e.g., Civ.R. 75(1); R.C. 3109.05. Further, appellant does not claim that Judge Patterson patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, thereby rendering the availability of appeal immaterial.
Instead, appellant claims that appeal is inadequate because it is not complete, beneficial, and speedy. See State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994),
Appellant’s contention is meritless. In an appeal following a final order concerning the support issue, a reviewing court could determine that Judge Patterson erred in proceeding on the postdivorce motion without the parties’ first resorting to mediation. The reviewing court could vacate any support modification order if it finds that Judge Patterson erred in not granting appellant’s dismissal motion. This would afford appellant complete, beneficial, and speedy relief. See State ex rel. Gibson v. Ray (July 18, 1995), Lucas App. No. L-95-191, unreported,
Appellant cites State ex rel. Glass v. Reid (1991),
Finally, to the extent that appellant argued below that appeal would be time-consuming and expensive, this argument is insufficient to warrant a finding that the appellate remedy is inadequate and can be circumvented. See State ex rel. Casey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1991),
The court of appeals properly determined that it appeared beyond doubt from the complaint that appellant could prove no set of facts entitling him to extraordinary relief in prohibition or mandamus. Therefore, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in granting Judge Patterson’s motion and dismissing the case. See, e.g., Daggett, supra; State ex rel. Sobczak v. Skow (1990),
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
