83 W. Va. 255 | W. Va. | 1919
The relators seek the aid of the writ of mandamus to compel respondents to deliver to them possession of all the records, record books, minutes, proceedings, moneys and all other property or properties or things of any kind whatsoever belonging to the Grand Lodge of Colored Masons of this state, which have come into and are in the hands of the respondents, who claim to be officers of the lodge and who hold the property by virtue of such claim.
The respondent, A. E. Goodwyn, was elected Grand Master of the Colored Masons of "West Virginia at the regular annual communication — the word communication being the Masonic equivalent of the word meeting — of the Grand Lodge held at Clarksburg in June, 1917, and the respondents, Trent and Hughes, respectively, Grand Treasurer .and Grand Secretary of the Grand Lodge, at wihch communication Huntington was selected as the place for the next ensuing annual communication of the Grand Lodge, the time therefor being
The right to the writ, depends upon the answers to three questions: (a) Whether Goodwyn as the Grand Master had authority to postpone indefinitely the holding of the communication at the time prescribed by the constitution of the order and at the place designated by the Grand Lodge in 1917; (b) whether the body assembled at Huntington was legal and constitutional as to empower it to dispatch the business ordinarily transacted by such a body when properly constituted; and if so, (c) whether the writ will lie to compel respondents to deliver to relators the property in their possession belonging to the grand body.
The Grand Lodge instituted and conducted by the colored Masons of this state is a chartered body, as the relators and respondents both concede, as they also do that the constitution of the organization requires a grand annual communication at a time definitely prescribed and at a place to be selected each year at the preceding annual communication, and that upon all questions arising upon this proceeding the principles laid down by Albert G. Mackey in his work on Masonic Jurisprudence, so far as applicable, shall govern and. control.
Upon the first question presented' for consideration, namely, the power of a Grand Master of Masons to postpone an annual communication of the Grand Lodge. Doubtless Goodwyn and those with whom he consulted and upon whose advice he acted reached the conclusion that as he was Grand Master, and as such the supreme head of the organization that elected him, and had the exclusive authority to preside over its deliberations, wherever and whenever convened, he also necessarily Avas clothed with ample authority to proclaim and thereby lawfully to effect the indefinite postponement of
Then what of the second proposition, namely, whether the body that assembled at Huntington at the time fixed by the constitution and the place selected therefor at the Clarksburg meeting was legally and properly constituted and authorized to transact the business proper to be transacted, had not Goodwyn attempted to postpone the regular annual communication ? The constitution, it is agreed, ■ does not prescribe what shall constitute a constitutional majority of such lodge when assembled in annual' or special grand session for the dispatch of business or for any other purpose, and so far as we are informed by counsel or can discover, there is no rule of law or statutory provision which prescribes or fixes a quorum for associations of this character, except the general provision governing corporations organized for the purpose of profit, and none whatever fixing such a quorum for fraternal organizations.
Notwithstanding G-oodwyn’s proclamation, the representatives of ten of the thirty-seven subordinate lodges acknowledging allegiance to the Grand Master of Colored Masons, several Past Masters, a Past Grand Master, Grand Senior Deacon, Grand Pursuivant, ‘one of the three Grand Trustees and a District Deputy Grand Master met at Huntington on June 11, 1918, and organized and held a grand communication for the dispatch of business, and thereafter continued in session for the usual length of time, and among other things elected the relator, H. B. Hundley, Grand Master of Masons within his jurisdiction, the relator, S. B. Moon, Grand Secretary, and the relator, I. M. Carper, Grand Treasurer, of the same Grand Lodge. Did the persons so convened constitute such quorum as empowered them or the
As apropos this question and. as important in this connection Chancellor Kent says: “There is a 'distinction taken
The question involved upon this point may not improperly be illustrated by the case of Rex v. Varloe, Cowper 248, where the policy of a borough was to be determined by the vote of its freemen, a corporation which necessarily consisted of an indefinite number and that number subject to change from time to time; and the conclusion reached was that the major part of the freemen present, whether large or small, were entitled to act. The same principle was applied in the Madison Avenue Church case, cited above, for the same reason, as it was also in the case of Craig v. Church, also cited. The decision in each case was based
The third and last proposition, whether the writ lies or not, seems to be quite clear. Goodwyn’s term of office ended; it is said, by the provisions of the constitution, by-laws, rules or regulations of the order with the expiration of the year for which he was elected, and by rotation Hundley was his regular and legitimate successor. But the cessation of his authority as Grand Master of Masons does not depend solely apon custom or legislation. He ceased to be such an officer upon the election of Hundley by a legally constitfited Grand Lodge, and thereafter possessed none of the powers or the prerogatives pertaining to the former position, and hence in duty was bound to recognize the authority of his successor. And so of Trent and Carper. And there appears to be no substantial reason or excuse for his refusing obedience to the principal command of the alternative writ. Mandamus lies to compel the admission to office of a party having a clear prima facie right thereto, and as a necessary incident to compel the delivery of the appurtenances of the office. Kline v. McKelvey, 57 W. Va. 29. That such relief will be given to compel the surrender of the office to a claimant where the right seems clear,- appears to be the settled policy
Writ awarded.