THE STATE EX REL. HORVATH, APPELLANT, v. STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT BOARD, APPELLEE.
No. 97-1197
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided August 19, 1998.
83 Ohio St.3d 67 | 1998-Ohio-424
Submitted May 13, 1998. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APE08-983.
- Mandatory teacher contributions to the State Teachers Retirement System result from economic legislation designed to benefit retired and disabled public school teachers and their survivors and beneficiaries and, when placed in the fund, lose their character as private property. Accordingly, the nature and extent of a contributor‘s protected property rights in the State Teachers Retirement System are determined solely by the statutes that govern the system.
- Public school teachers do not possess contract rights in any State Teachers Retirement System benefit unless and until the benefit vests by operation of
R.C. 3307.711 .
{¶ 1} Appellant, Theodore Horvath, initiated this action for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief to recover interest on mandatory contributions to the State Teachers Retirement System (“STRS“) made by his wife, Sydney Horvath, while publicly employed as an art teacher between 1951 and 1964. Although Mrs. Horvath never resumed her career as a public school teacher, she
{¶ 2} Throughout these proceedings, Horvath has urged invalidation of
Theodore J. Horvath, pro se; Chattman, Gaines & Stern Co., L.P.A., Thomas C. Wagner and Sara J. Moore, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Michael W. Gleespen and Kelly Igoe, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
{¶ 3} For the reasons stated below, we reject Horvath‘s challenges to
I. R.C. 3307.651(3)
{¶ 4} From the inception of this action, Horvath‘s arguments have lumped together
{¶ 5}
II. TAKINGS
{¶ 6} Horvath argues that
{¶ 7} A review of the Supreme Court‘s takings jurisprudence, however, demonstrates that the very factors Horvath wishes this court to ignore are those with the most relevance to his case. Loretto is quite dissimilar to this case. Loretto involved a permanent physical occupation of real property; state legislation permitted cable television carriers to permanently affix access lines and other facilities to apartment buildings and severely limited the landlords’ recompense for the intrusion. Id., 458 U.S. at 422-425, 102 S.Ct. at 3168-3170, 73 L.Ed.2d at 873-875. Because governmental action involving permanent physical occupation of real property is of such a character as to itself carry the traditional takings inquiry, the Loretto court held that there was no reason to further analyze the public benefit of the governmental action or its impact on the property owner. Id. at 434-438, 102 S.Ct. at 3175-3177, 73 L.Ed.2d at 881-884. As we discuss below, the most important distinctions between Loretto and this case are that (1) the governmental action in this case is not a physical occupation of private property for its own use, and (2) ultimately, Mrs. Horvath possessed no property right to interest on her STRS contributions.
{¶ 8} At the outset, we think it necessary to announce the common purpose behind the United States and Ohio Takings Clauses. Those constitutional guarantees are ” ‘designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ ” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. at 123, 98 S.Ct. at 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d at 648, quoting Armstrong v. United States (1960), 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554, 1561. In conjunction with this design,
{¶ 9} On this issue, we draw comparison to Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (1986), 475 U.S. 211, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166. In Connolly, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that legislation forcing an employer to fund its share of obligations incurred during voluntary association with a multiemployer pension plan did not constitute a taking. In addressing the nature of the government action, the court noted that “the Government does not physically invade or permanently appropriate any of the employer‘s assets for its own use. Instead, the Act safeguards the participants in multiemployer pension plans by requiring a withdrawing employer to fund its share of the plan obligations incurred during its association with the plan. This interference with the property rights of an employer arises from a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good and, under our cases, does not constitute a taking requiring Government compensation.” Id. at 225, 106 S.Ct. at 1026, 89 L.Ed.2d at 179.
{¶ 10} Similarly, in this case, Mrs. Horvath‘s contributions to the STRS were used to benefit STRS participants—a subset of the public that included her. As we discuss later, STRS itself adjusts the benefits and burdens of providing public school teachers with retirement, death, and disability benefits among public school teachers and their employers. While the state may derive an indirect benefit from this use in that the STRS benefits publicly employed school teachers, that indirect benefit does not equate with physical invasion or permanent appropriation of the assets of fund participants for its own use. Accordingly, the analysis
{¶ 11} Having rejected Horvath‘s attempt to analogize this case to Loretto, we now turn to the traditional takings inquiry set forth by the court in Penn Cent. Although the Penn Cent. court noted that the traditional takings inquiry requires an ad hoc analysis depending largely on the circumstances of a particular case, it listed the following factors as having particular significance: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action. Id., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d at 648. We previously analyzed the character of governmental action in this matter as being similar to the economic legislation considered in Connolly and dissimilar to the physical invasion considered in Loretto, and now confirm that our analysis of that issue weighs against the finding of a taking. Accordingly, we proceed to analyze the economic impact of the regulation on Mrs. Horvath and her investment-backed expectations in her STRS contributions.
{¶ 12} In analyzing the severity of the economic impact of
{¶ 13} In Mrs. Horvath‘s case, failure to reach retirement age caused her potential STRS benefits to remain unrealized. Nevertheless, Mrs. Horvath‘s forfeiture of the interest earned on her contributions is not disproportionate to the benefits available to her under the plan, whether actually realized or not. Thus, the second takings factor of the Penn Cent. test is not in Horvath‘s favor. Compare Connolly.
{¶ 14} Finally, in considering the Horvaths’ reasonable investment-backed expectations, we note that, from
{¶ 15} Moreover, courts construing the investment-backed expectation factor of the Penn Cent. triad have concluded that its purpose is “to limit recovery to owners ‘who could demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Allen v. Cuomo (C.A.2, 1996), 100 F.3d 253, 262, quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States (Fed.Cir.1994), 28 F.3d 1171, 1177. This conclusion seems grounded in the long-standing principle that “[n]o person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.” New York Cent. RR. Co. v. White (1917), 243 U.S. 188, 198, 37 S.Ct. 247, 250, 61 L.Ed. 667, 672. As noted by one legal commentator, and cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods. (1994), 511 U.S. 244, 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1499, 128 L.Ed.2d 229, 255, fn. 24, “[i]f every time a man relied on existing law in arranging his affairs, he were made secure against any change in legal rules, the whole body of our law would be ossified forever.” Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964) 60. See, also, Branch v. United States (Fed.Cir.1995), 69 F.3d 1571, 1578. Because the record contains no indication that the Horvaths possessed a reasonable investment-backed expectation to interest on STRS contributions made after August 1959, this factor also weighs against finding a taking.
{¶ 16} Having failed the Penn Cent. takings analysis, Horvath‘s claim is not saved by his analogy to Webb‘s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith (1980), 449 U.S. 155, 101 S.Ct. 446, 66 L.Ed.2d 358. Unlike our previous takings discussion, which treated Mrs. Horvath‘s mandatory contributions and the interest accrued
{¶ 17} The teacher‘s savings fund of the STRS is much different from the interpleader fund considered in Webb‘s. The interpleader fund at issue in Webb‘s was private property held for the ultimate benefit of Webb‘s creditors. To that fund, the court applied the “usual and general rule * * * that any interest on an interpleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of the principal.” Webb‘s, 449 U.S. at 162, 101 S.Ct. at 451, 66 L.Ed.2d at 365. The Webb‘s court rejected the suggestion that sums placed in the interpleader fund became “public money” upon deposit until they left the account, instead stressing that sums placed in the interpleader fund remained private property, despite the fact that creditors lacked an immediate right to its proceeds. See, also, Phillips, 524 U.S. at 183-184 (noting that all the parties to that appeal agreed that the principal held in IOLTA trust accounts is the client‘s “private property“). Additionally, the Webb‘s court was careful to note that the statute at issue was not one adjusting ” ‘the
{¶ 18} In contrast to the interpleader fund in Webb‘s, mandatory teacher contributions to the STRS result from economic legislation designed to benefit retired and disabled public school teachers and their survivors and beneficiaries2 and, when placed in the fund, lose their character as private property. See
{¶ 19} Granted, funds held in the teachers’ savings fund superficially resemble personal annuities in that
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
{¶ 21} Horvath proposes that the unequal treatment by
{¶ 22} As stated in State ex rel. Nyitray v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 173, 175, 2 OBR 715, 717, 443 N.E.2d 962, 964, “[e]qual protection of the laws requires the existence of reasonable grounds for making a distinction between those within and those outside a designated class. The ‘reasonableness’ of a statutory classification is dependent upon the purpose of the Act.” (Citations omitted.) The makeup of the classes identified by Horvath is itself telling. Eligibility for retirement is based on an aggregate of two factors: age and service time. Accordingly, classification of members into groups of retirees and nonretirees furthers the apparent purpose of STRS of protecting elderly and long-serving public school teachers with adequate retirement benefits.
{¶ 23} Because the statutes set apart retirees as a class that STRS is chiefly designed to benefit, it logically follows that nonretirees will not be entitled to the same treatment. When the legislature moved STRS from a defined-contribution
{¶ 24} “[L]egislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends. But the Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have ‘some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.’ ” Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966), 384 U.S. 305, 309, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1499-1500, 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580, quoting Baxstrom v. Herold (1966), 383 U.S. 107, 111, 86 S.Ct. 760, 763, 15 L.Ed.2d 620, 624. Classifications having a reasonable basis do “not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-502, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377. Because a rational basis underlies disparate treatment of public school teachers who meet retirement eligibility and those who do not, there is no equal protection violation.
IV. CONTRACT CLAIMS
A. Contract Clauses
{¶ 26} Essentially, Horvath argues that, at the time Mrs. Horvath started working, the STRS created a contractual obligation to pay interest on her STRS contributions that could not later constitutionally be altered by statute. In analyzing whether a statute violates the Contract Clause, “[g]enerally, we first ask whether the change in state law has ‘operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’ ” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein (1992), 503 U.S. 181, 186, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 1109, 117 L.Ed.2d 328, 337, quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (1978), 438 U.S. 234, 244, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 2722, 57 L.Ed.2d 727, 736. “This inquiry has three components: whether there is a contractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and whether the impairment is substantial.” Romein, 503 U.S. at 186, 112 S.Ct. at 1109, 117 L.Ed.2d at 336.
{¶ 27} In determining whether a contractual relationship exists in the first instance, we are mindful that a state legislative enactment may be deemed a contract for purposes of the Contract Clause only if there is a clear indication that the legislature has intended to bind itself in a contractual manner. Natl. RR. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1985), 470 U.S. 451, 465-466, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1451, 84 L.Ed.2d 432, 445-446. Accordingly, we begin with a presumption that, absent a clearly stated intent to do so, statutes do not create contractual rights that bind future legislatures. Id. Courts have coined the phrase “unmistakability doctrine” for this legal principle. See, e.g., McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd. (C.A.1, 1996), 88 F.3d 12, 19, citing United States v. Winstar Corp. (1996), 518 U.S. 839, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964. The requirement inherent in the unmistakability doctrine that ” ‘the government‘s obligation unmistakably appear thus serve[s] the dual purposes of limiting contractual
{¶ 28} Our early cases categorized pensions granted to public servants as mere gratuities, which were not to be equated with contractual rights. Accordingly, pension boards were free to modify pension awards, provided that modifications were done reasonably and not arbitrarily. Mell v. State ex rel. Fritz (1935), 130 Ohio St. 306, 309, 4 O.O. 320, 321-322, 199 N.E. 72, 73. In State ex rel. Cunat v. Trustees of Cleveland Police Relief & Pension Fund (1948), 149 Ohio St. 477, 481-482, 37 O.O. 143, 145, 79 N.E.2d 316, 318, however, the court acknowledged that enactment of the “vested right” statutes placed pensions granted to public servants covered by a firemen‘s pension fund or a police relief fund in the category of unilateral contracts that, upon conditions fulfilled, ripen into a contractual right to a pension.
{¶ 29} In 1955, the legislature added vesting language to the STRS similar to that contained in the vested rights statutes considered in Cunat by enacting
{¶ 31} We recognize that other states have found the deferred compensation aspect of a public pension to implicitly require vesting of the right to a pension at fixed and definite benefit levels upon acceptance of employment. See, e.g., Betts v. Bd. of Administration of Pub. Employees’ Retirement Sys. (1978), 21 Cal.3d 859, 863, 148 Cal.Rptr. 158, 161, 582 P.2d 614, 617; Sylvestre v. Minnesota (1973), 298 Minn. 142, 155-156, 214 N.W.2d 658, 666-667; Yeazell v. Copins (1965), 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541. Applying the unmistakability doctrine, however, we are unable to conclude that our legislature intended to confer contractual rights upon STRS participants aside from those that have vested by operation of statute. Compare Spiller v. Maine (Me.1993), 627 A.2d 513, 515-517 (statutes establishing pension benefits for state employees did not create contractual rights, and, thus, legislative modifications of prospective retirement benefits for state employees did not violate state and federal Contract Clauses); Pineman v. Oechslin (1985), 195 Conn. 405, 414, 488 A.2d 803, 808 (retirement Act did not create vested contractual rights in favor of state employees before they became eligible for pensions, since there was no clear expression by legislature that the Act was intended to create such rights). Accordingly, consistent with our earlier opinions on the subject, we conclude that public school teachers do not possess contract rights in any STRS benefit unless and until the benefit vests by operation of R.C. 3307.711. See Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trustees (Del.1983), 464 A.2d 894, 896. We therefore hold that R.C. 3307.651(2) does not violate our state or federal Contract Clauses.
B. Conscionability
{¶ 32} Horvath seeks to avoid application of
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 33} Because Horvath fails to demonstrate that
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
Notes
“Each employer, before employing any teacher to whom sections
“Any such appointment or reappointment of any teacher in the public day schools of the state, or service upon indefinite tenure, shall be conditioned upon the teacher‘s acceptance of such sections, as part of the contract.”
That section, however, incorporates only the duties and obligations that
