In this original action, the relator, Nancy Hight, petitions this Court to issue a writ prohibiting respondent Marion Superior Court from further proceedings upon the petitions for contempt and modification of visitation filed by her ex-husband, Mark Hight. Nancy alleges that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Mark is not the biological father of the child. We deny the writ and, pursuant to Original Action Rule 5(C), issue this opinion.
On February 10, 1984, Nancy filed for dissolution of the рarties’ two-year marriage. On November 15, 1984, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution which providеd in part:
4. That the parties agree that [Mark Hight] was not the biological father of the child but also agree thаt [Mark Hight] acknowledged the child by:
(1) marrying [Nancy Hight] with full knowledge that she was pregnant
(2) allowing his name to be placed on the birth certificate of said child as the father
(3) openly stating to people “This is my son.”
(4) supporting the child for two (2) years prior to the filing of this dissolution.
The decree established Mark’s obligation to provide child support and provided visitation rights for Mark and thе child. Neither party appealed this order. Beginning pen-dente lite, Nancy had sought enforcement *269 of support orders through contempt and garnishment prоceedings.
On March 3, 1989, Mark filed petitions for modification of visitation and for order to appear and show cause, alleging that Nancy had wrongly denied him visitation with the child. Nancy responded on April 24, 1989, with a motion to dismiss alleging that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. On July 12, 1989, the trial court denied Nancy’s motion and set Mark’s petitions for hearing. Nancy now seeks to prohibit the trial court from exercising jurisdiction in any matters relating to the minor child.
Nancy asserts that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the child was not a child of both parties to the marriage as required by statute for the entry of a visitation or child support order. The decree, she claims, is thus a void judgment regarding its child support and visitation orders. For support, she сites
R.D.S. v. S.L.S.
(1980), Ind.App.,
In
R.D.S.,
the Court of Appeals held that a child must be a child of both parties to the marriage to come within the definition of “child” in Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-2(c) and to furnish the basis for child support.
R.D.S.,
Relying on
R.D.S.,
this Court, in
State ex rel. McCarroll,
madе permanent an alternative writ previously issued prohibiting the dissolution court from exercising jurisdiction over the custody of a child because the husband was not a parent of the child born prior to the marriage.
State ex rel. McCarroll,
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power to hear and detеrmine a general class or kind of case.
Board of Trustees of Town (Now City) of New Haven v. City of Fort Wayne
(1978),
[I]f a tribunal possesses the power to determine cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs, it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to consider the particular case, absent specific and timely objections to the jurisdiction of such particular case.... A judgment of a court without jurisdiction of the particular case within the [general] class is not a void judgment. Such jurisdiction can be waived and must be attacked by proper and timely motion.
City of Fort Wayne,
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be resolvеd by determining whether the claim involved falls within the general scope of authority conferred on a court by thе Indiana Constitution or by statute.
Behme,
*270 Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-3(a) and (b) empower a trial court to hear causes of action fоr dissolution and for child support. Within this grant of subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine child support (§ 31-1-11.5-12), child сustody (§ 31-1-11.-5-20), and visitation (§ 31-1-11.5-24). By filing the dissolution action, Nancy engaged the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear dissolution cases, which includes the authority to decide issues of child custody, support, and visitation. In entering a decree which provided for child support and visitation, the trial court’s action may have been contrary to thе evidence, but such error does not reflect the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The dissolution decree is not a void judgment. Nancy was required to timely challenge any erroneous exercise of authority by the trial court, and her failure to do so waives the issue.
This determination is not inconsistent with State ex rel. McCarroll because the complaining party there timely challenged the trial court’s improper exercise of judicial authority over a child not born to the partiеs of the marriage.
Relator Nancy Hight’s petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition is denied. This cause is remanded tо the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Ind.Code § 31-l-11.5-2(c) states:
The term "child” means a child or children of both parties to the marriage and includes children born out of wedlock to the parties as well as children born or adopted during the marriage of the parties.