139 Conn. 102 | Conn. | 1952
The first issue presented by this reservation concerns the constitutionality of a special act of the General Assembly authorizing credits for veterans taking promotional examinations in the classified 'service of the city of Bridgeport. Should the act be declared constitutional, a further issue is whether the credits were properly applied by the municipal civil service commission.
For the purpose of discussing the constitutional question, the following statement of facts stipulated by the parties will suffice: In 1935 the General Assembly provided a civil service system for the city of Bridgeport. 22 Spec. Laws 261, No. 407. Since then, all positions in the police department, now totaling 337, have been in the classified service under the administration of the defendant commission. In 1943 the General Assembly passed a special act requiring the commission to add five points to the earned rating received by an honorably discharged war veteran taking an examination for original employment with the city, and ten points if he had a service-connected disability. 24 Spec. Laws 212, No. 300. In 1945 the General Assembly adopted an amendment calling for the addition of similar points on promotional examinations as well. 24 Spec. Laws 789, No. 406.
The plaintiffs and five of the defendants are either patrolmen or detectives in the Bridgeport police department. While none of these defendants is an honorably discharged war veteran, all of the plaintiffs qualify as such under the provisions of the act of 1943 as amended in 1945. The other defendants
On March 1, 1951, the commission held a promotional examination in which the plaintiffs and the defendants participated. A list of names was then compiled, showing the relative standing of the several candidates as determined by their examinative ratings. Any vacancy hereafter occurring in the position of police sergeant is to be filled by the appointment of him whose name, at the time, tops the list. Because of the addition of the points required by the amendment of 1945, the standing of each plaintiff was materially improved. By this means he obtained, to the detriment of the defendants, a position on the list higher than he would otherwise have merited. The defendants maintain that this amendment, compelling, as it does, preferential treatment of veterans on promotional examinations, is improper class legislation and hence unconstitutional.
The defendants rely in part upon the provision of § 1 of article first of the constitution of Connecticut which states that “no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.” They also assert that the amendment of 1945 violates that provision in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States which prohibits every state from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. The latter claim adds nothing to the former. The guarantee incorporated in the federal constitution has a meaning equivalent to that found in our own. State ex rel. Brush v. Sixth Taxing District, 104 Conn. 192, 195, 132 A. 561. We confine ourselves, therefore, to the
Legislation authorizing preferential treatment of honorably discharged war veterans seeking either original employment or promotional advancement in the civil service has not previously been examined by this court. Determination of the validity of such legislation presents a problem with a double aspect. The first requires disposition of the question whether the legislation serves a public purpose, that is to say, whether it promotes, inter alia, the general welfare of the community. Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 350, 82 A. 1030; Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District v. County of Lincoln, 144 Neb. 584, 589, 14 N.W.2d 202; City Affairs Committee v. Jersey City, 134 N.J.L. 180, 182, 46 A.2d 425; 37 Am. Jur. 734, § 120. No enactment creating a preference can withstand constitutional attack if the sole objective of the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual. Its validity is contingent, at least in part, upon its furthering a public purpose; if enacted with that end in view, legislation can be sustained even though it may incidentally confer a direct benefit upon an individual or a class. Horrigan v. Mayor of Pittsfield, 298 Mass. 492, 497, 11 N.E.2d 585; 3 Willoughby, Constitution of the United States (2d Ed.) § 1150.
We have recently upheld the validity of two acts authorizing special treatment of veterans in fields other than that of public employment. The first dealt with the distribution of $50,000,000 as a so-called bonus; the other, with limited tax exemptions. Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 52 A.2d 702; Walsh v. Jenks, 135 Conn. 210, 62 A.2d 773. The public purpose, we noted, in the preamble of the act in the
The amendment of 1945, unlike the so-called bonus act, did not set forth in preamble a statement of the legislative purpose. That omission, however, is of no moment. If there is any reasonable ground upon which the validity of the act can be sustained, we must presume that the legislature intended to further that ground rather than that it acted upon some improper motive. Walsh v. Jenks, supra, 222. In adopting the amendment, the General Assembly could reasonably have believed that the extension of preferential treatment to veterans taking civil service examinations, either for original employment or for promotion, would encourage patriotism. Since we are bound to consider that this was one of the ends intended to be served, the purpose was genuinely public in nature.
The second aspect of the problem presents the question whether the amendment is improper class legislation. The provision of § 1 of article first of the Connecticut constitution that “no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community” does not necessarily prevent the General Assembly from dealing differently with different classes of persons. It may constitutionally do so (1) if there is a natural and
In the Lyman case, supra, 521, the essence of the enactment in question was to effectuate grants to veterans. A similar situation prevailed in Walsh v. Jenks. In the ease at bar, however, we are faced with a different kind of legislation. While it incidentally provides preferences for veterans, its essence is to prescribe rules for the selection of municipal employees. This legislation is more nearly akin to that involved in Franco v. New Haven, 133 Conn. 544, 52 A.2d 866, wherein we upheld the validity of an issue of bonds to finance a veterans’ housing project. We said at page 548: “The situation before us differs in certain material respects from that we were considering in the Lyman case .... [T]he provisions of the act indicate that it was designed to relieve the untoward conditions resulting from an acute housing shortage as it particularly affected veterans of the late war.” After pointing out the evil social effects of a housing shortage, we went on to say (p. 549): “The question then is: Can the General Assembly properly regard the situation of veterans coming 'within the definition in the act as substantially different from that of other members of the community as regards the unfortunate
The test in the Franco case may thus be phrased to meet the problem in the ease at bar: Can the General Assembly properly regard the situation of honorably discharged war veterans as substantially different from that of other members of the community as regards the selection of employees of the city of Bridgeport? This can reasonably be answered in the affirmative. It is a most desirable thing for the welfare of a city to obtain for its classified service the highest types of available candidates. The General Assembly could with reason have believed that honorably discharged war veterans would bring to the service of the city of Bridgeport qualities of patriotism, loyalty and increased sense of responsibility — traits, developed by military discipline and service, which tend to make of the veterans superior public servants. “No one should deny that these advantages are conducive to the better performance of public duties, where discipline, loyalty, and public spirit are essential.” Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 573, 3 A.2d 701. We point out, however, that an enactment of this nature which gives arbitrary preference to veterans, regardless of their capabilities, is void. It is essential to the validity of such an act that it require the veteran to possess the minimal qualifications necessary to the proper discharge of the duties of the position he seeks. People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 593, 105 N.E. 1; State ex rel. Taggart v. Addison, 76 Kan. 699, 707, 92 P. 581; Mayor of Lynn v. Com
The defendants do not quarrel with these decisions. In argument and brief they concede the constitutionality of a veterans’ preference act when its scope is limited to original employment. They attempt, however, to differentiate between that situation and one where, as here, the preference is authorized in promotional examinations. They place their reliance, in the main, on Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O’Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382, and the dictum in Parrack v. Ford, 68 Ariz. 205, 209, 203 P.2d 872. Their claim amounts to this: • A preference accorded veterans seeking original employment in the civil service can be constitutionally upheld as proper class legislation only on a quid pro quo theory; in such instances the preference is legally warranted because the veteran is apt to bring to the public service more desirable attributes than those ordinarily found in the nonveteran; this contribution is exhausted as the basis of a valid preference once it has been used to obtain employment for the veteran; credits on promotional examinations, therefore, place a value on something which does not then exist and there is no longer a quo which he can give for the quid which he is permitted to receive; and consequently, the amendment of 1945 contravenes the constitutional guarantee that “no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.”
This line of reasoning, however, is not persuasive.
The defendants further maintain that the effect of the amendment of 1945 runs counter to the objective of civil service, which abhors preferences, and that it will eliminate incentive in nonveteran officers to the detriment of the morale in the department. It is not for the judiciary to assess the wisdom of this or of any other act. Trustees of Bishop’s Fund v. Rider, 13 Conn. 87, 103. Whether public policy required preferential treatment of war veterans in promotional examinations in the Bridgeport police department was a question for the General Assembly, and for it alone, to answer. Landry v. Personnel Appeal Board, 138 Conn. 445, 451, 86 A.2d 70. Our duty is limited to determining whether the formulated policy, as expressed in the amendment of 1945, contravenes any constitutional provision. State v. Gilletto, 98 Conn. 702, 714, 120 A. 567. In reaching our decision on that matter, we must make every proper presumption and intendment in favor of the legislation and it must be sustained unless its invalidity appears beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Bassett, 100 Conn. 430, 433, 123 A. 842; Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 349, 82 A. 1030. Since we
The second issue presented by the reservation is whether the points were properly applied. These further facts have been stipulated by the parties: The promotional examination held on March 1,1951, covered four subjects. These had been selected by the commission. The first dealt with the duties of a police sergeant. This was the only one for which the commission required a written test. The other subjects were (a) the candidate’s training, experience and general qualifications, (b) his performance during the preceding year, and (c) his length of service in the department. Ratings on all four subjects were made by the defendant personnel director, Linley, the first being based on the written test and the other three mainly on departmental records containing data upon past activities of the candidates. The points to which the plaintiffs were entitled under the amendment of 1945 were added only to the rating received on their written tests. To each subject the commission had assigned a relative weight. Thus, the written test was given a weight of four while the examinations on the other subjects received weights of three, two and one, respectively. The ratings on the unwritten examinations were then multiplied by their assigned weights. The rating on the written test, after being augmented by the preference points, was multiplied by four. The sums were added together and the total was divided by ten. The final ratings of the plaintiffs were then established. It is
The act of 1943 as amended in 1945 is quoted in a footnote.
It is the defendants’ claim that the points were properly added only to the rating on the written test because, they say, an earned rating means “the rating actually earned by candidates’ effort in demonstrating skill and capacity as evoked by definite tests addressed to those ends,” and because, they urge, the written test was the only part of the entire examination which sought those ends. The words of a legislative enactment, however, are to be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 254, 102 A. 573. Although the defendants labor in an attempt to demonstrate that the context of the aet indicates otherwise, we are satisfied that the legislature employed the words “earned rating” in the sense in which they are ordinarily used. A rating means a grade and “earned” means merited or deserved as by labor or service. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed.); see Hartford Electric Light Co. v. McLaughlin, 131 Conn. 1, 5, 37 A.2d 361.
It may very well be that a subject of examination could be selected by the commission which would result in a rating not earned by the candidates. That, however, is not true of the four subjects upon which the plaintiffs were examined. The ratings on their service records, on their training, experience and qualifications, and even on their seniority, were, by their activities in the department or by the length of time they had served, as clearly earned as were those based upon the knowledge which their written test showed them to possess.
Were we to adopt the meaning suggested by the
We answer the questions reserved
No costs will be taxed in this court to any party.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The amendment of 1945 (24 Spec. Laws 789, No. 406) affected $ 1 of the special act of 1943 (24 Spec. Laws 212, No. 300). The only change made by the amendment was to add the last sentence appearing in 5 1 below. The material part of the act of 1943, as amended, reads as follows:
“section 1. Any person, who is a resident of the city of Bridgeport and has served in the armed forces of the United States in time of war and has received therefrom an honorable discharge, and who is not eligible for disability compensation or pension through the Veteran’s Administration, shall have five points added to his earned rating on any examination held for the purpose of establishing an original employment list for said city. Any such person shall be entitled to such additional five points on any promotional examination, provided he shall receive at least a minimum passing grade on such examination.
“sec. 2. Any such person with a service-connected disability which is substantiated by record or other sufficient documentary evidence, on any such examination shall have ten points added to his earned rating. . . .
“sec. 3. Any such person, having a service-connected disability, shall be exempt from . . . any physical examination . . . provided such disability shall not make it physically impossible for him or her to perform the required duties and functions of the employment for which he or she seeks classification on any employment list. . . .
“sec. 4. The names of veterans described herein shall be placed upon the lists of oligibles for appointment ... in the order of such augmented ratings.”
“(27) In adding five or ten points to the earned rating of veterans, as required by Speeial Act Number 300 of the Special Acts of 1943, as amended, is the “earned rating,” to which said points are to be added, the rating attained by candidates on the competitive written examination only as interpreted and applied by the Personnel Director and the Civil Service Commission in the preparation of the promotional employment list for Police Sergeants hereinbefore described?
“(28) In adding five or ten points to the earned rating of veterans as required by Special Act Number 300 of the Special Acts of 1943 as amended, is the ‘earned rating,’ to which said points are to be added, the final or total rating attained by candidates on all subjects of examination as contended by the relators?
“(29) In applying veterans’ preference credits to the earned rating of the relator-veterans in the examination for promotion to the class of position of Police Sergeant in the Bridgeport Police Department, as provided for in Special Act No. 300 of the Speeial Acts of 1943, as amended, did the Civil Service Commission and the Personnel Director act legally in applying said credits only to the grade obtained by the relator-veterans in the written examination or test and not to the other subjects of examination?
“(30) Is that portion of the Speeial Act No. 406 of the Special Aets of 1945 amending Special Act No. 300 of the Speeial Acts of 1943 by adding provision for veterans’ preference credits of