54 Md. 332 | Md. | 1880
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was instituted by the appellant’s testatrix on the fifteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, upon the bond of John S. Henderson, her father and guardian, dated the twentieth day of September, eighteen hundred and sixty-five. Henderson, the principal, and John W. Egnor, one of the securities, are before the Court; the other security was returned non est.
The narr. sets out that John S. Henderson was, by the Orphans’ Court of Cecil County, appointed guardian to Maria L. Henderson (appellant’s testatrix) and gave bond and security for the faithful performance of his duties as such guardian, and that John W. Egnor and one Alexander Hill were sureties on his bond. It then sets out the bond in substance, and alleges that after such appointment and the execution of his bond as guardian, he received into his hands large sums of money belonging to his ward, Maria L. Henderson, and that on the thirteenth day of November, 1867, John S. Henderson passed an account in the Orphans’ Court of Cecil County, of his receipts and disbursements on behalf of his ward, whereby after deducting all allowances for debts and commissions, it appeared that there was due the ward from her guardian the sum of seventeen hundred and thirty-eight dollars and forty-eight cents; that this account was passed by the Court; but that although often demanded the amount
The first question then necessary for us to examine arises on the third prayer of the plaintiff which was rejected by the Court. That prayer invoked the principle that when a party has been kept in ignorance of his rights by the fraud of the defendant, the Statute of Limitations shall not be permitted to run until such time as with reasonable diligence the plaintiff might have discovered the fraud.
Reliance is placed on the Act of 1868, chapter 357. This •act was the subject of construction by this Court in Wear vs. Skinner, 46 Md., 257, and in that case it was decided that this Act “ was passed for the purpose of enabling parties to set up the fraud of the defendant in a Court of law as well as in a Court of equity,” for the purpose of removing the bar of the Statute.
There was no error in the Court in rejecting the prayer, for it excluded from the consideration of the jury one most material element necessary to the protection which the Statute intended to secure, namely, that by ordinary ■diligence the fraud could not have been discovered sooner.
The only remaining question is, whether the Circuit Court was right in granting the first prayer of the defendants ? That prayer presents the question, when the Statute of Limitation begun to run, and from what time it is to be computed in this case ? The defendants insist that the Statute begun to run from the moment the ward reached eighteen years of age, when, by law, she was emancipated from her guardian. On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that Limitations did not begin to run until the guardian had passed his account in the Orphans’ Court. It is urged that, by the law, it was his duty to pass such account, and consequently his bond was bound till that duty was performed.
By the Code the Statute begins to run from the breach of the condition of the bond. When did the breach in this case occur ? Sec. 192 of Art. 93 of the Code provides thus : “ On a ward’s arrival at age, or on the marriage of a female ward, the guardian shall exhibit a final account to the Orphans’ Court, and shall deliver up, agreeably to the Court’s order, to the said ward, or to the husband, as the case may require, all the property of such ward in his hands, including bonds and other securities, and, on failure, his bond may be put in suit, and he shall he liable to attachment, and fine not exceeding three hundred dollars; and a female shall be of age at eighteen for the purposes of this section.”
This section is identically the same as the provision of the Act of 1198 on the subject, and commenting thereon in Green vs. Johnson, 3 Gill & Johns., Judge Dorsey says,
The case of Byrd vs. Crisfield was a case of revocation of guardianship, and controlled by the sections already referred to on that subject. The case of Thruston vs. Blackiston was on a trustee’s bond, and wholly dissimilar to this. The case of Griffith vs. Parks was upon another question, and in no way involved the question of Limitation. It is well settled that, when the Statute once begins to run, no circumstance will stop its progress. Ruff’s Adm’r, d. b. n. vs. Bull, 7 H. & J., 14. If the theory of the appellant prevailed, the continued negligence of the guardian to pass his account, creates a new default by which he can get the full benefit of his suit, notwithstanding he has had a full right of action from the date that he came of age. The running of the Statute would thus be either stopped or its effects wholly avoided. The allegation in the narr. is not the allegation of a neglect to pass his account, but only a statement that at a particular time he did state an account by which a particular sum was found to be due which he has not paid over. That sum was due when the ward arrived at age, and the account could have been stated then, and ought to have been, and the ward could have sued and coerced the statement then, or have shown the amounts which passed into her guardian’s hands, and recovered without abatement, if the credits had not been claimed. But it is said that, by the Code, Limitations begin to run from the breach of the bond, and the breach for which this suit is brought is the
If the ward has slept on her rights, she must bear the consequences. The securities cannot suffer by it. Eo matter in what form the breach is alleged, the default will relate to the time when the duty of the guardian to finally account and pay over first attached, and the ward could sue in his own name. If such was uot the law, the Statute of Limitations would afford no protection to securities on guardian bonds. Just so long as the guardian saw fit to delay passing his final account, and the ward chose to indulge- and did not sue, the right of action would be preserved by the guardian going at any time and passing the final acconnt, notwithstanding the Statute of Limitations ; which, if suit had been brought without waiting for an account, would have run from the ward’s arrival at age. The passing of the account, no matter how long delayed, would have the effect to revive
It is plain, that as against sureties at least, that is not just and cannot be sound. We are of opinion, therefore, that in a suit on the bond of the guardian, the Statute begins to run from the day the ward arrives at age; and the Court below properly instructed the jury in granting the defendants’ first prayer. The proof when the ward reached legal age was all one way, and was conclusive of the case, under the instructions of the Court on the subject which we have approved; and the jury could not find otherwise than for the defendants. It is for this reason we are relieved from deciding on the other questions raised by the record. The judgment will he affirmed.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
filed the following dissenting opinion:
In this case I must enter a dissent.
The bond sued on bears date the 20th of September, 1865 ; the female ward attained the age of eighteen years on the 3rd of May, 1866; the guardian stated his only and final account in the Orphans’ Court on the 13th of PTovember, 1867, showing the amount due the ward to be $1738.48 ; and this action was brought on the 15th day of July, 1878;—-within less than eleven years from the time of the passage of the account in the Orphans’ Court. The breach of the condition of the bond assigned, as the cause of action, is the non-payment of the money ascertained to he due by the account stated on the 13th of November, 1867.
By granting the first prayer on the part of the defendants by the Court below, and by the opinion of the majority of this Court, the Statute is declared to run as
It has been expressly decided by this Court, and, if there be any stability in decisions, it must he taken as settled, that, in actions on bonds of the character of the one sued on here, the bar of the Statute commences to run only from the time when the breach of the condition of the bond occurs. This was expressly ruled in the cases of Thruston vs. Blackiston, 36 Md., 501, and Byrd & Crisfield vs. State, use of Stewart, 44 Md., 492. Until the breach of the condition did occur there was no cause of action; and there may have been as many distinct breaches of the condition as there were distinct duties required of the principal in the bond. State vs. Dorsey, 3 G. & J., 75, 94.
By sec, 192 of Art 93 of the Code, it is made the duty of guardians, upon the arrival at age of their wards, or on marriage of female wards, to exhibit a final account to the Orphans’ Court, and to deliver up, agreeably to the order of the Court, to their wards, all the property of every kind and description in their hands; and on failure their bonds may he put in suit. This of course, contemplates time after the arrival at age of the ward; at least there must be allowed a reasonable time thereafter for settling the account in the Orphans’ Court, before there is a breach of duty occasioned by the non-settlement of such account. Griffith vs. Parks, 32 Md., 1, 8.
But the settlement of the account in the Orphans’ Court is one thing and a particular duty, and the payment of the amount ascertained to be due the ward is another thing and a distinct duty ; and the failure or neglect to perform either of these duties could he assigned as a breach of the condition of the bond. State vs. Dorsey, supra. The ward was not hound to sue for the first breach that occurred,
This principle of pleading is very plainly stated by the learned Judge who delivered the opinion of the Court in the case of the State vs. Dorsey, before referred to ; and if additional authority he needed, it may he found in the case of Sanders vs. Coward, 15 M. & W., 48, 56. In this last case, Baron Pakke, in delivering the judgment of the Court, and speaking of the application of the defence of the Statute of Limitations to breaches of the condition of a bond, said: “Although, on the first breach of the condition of a bond, the obligee may sue the obligor, and have judgment under the Statute of 8 and 9 W. III, ch. 11, as a security of a higher nature for future breaches, he is not hound to pursue that course. He may waive the right of action on the bond, in respect of the first breach, or any number of breaches, and he contented with the specialty security only for future breaches, and sue after-wards on á subsequent forfeiture, and assign that for a breach. If it were not so, the inconvenience would he considerable, and the value of a security by bond diminished.”
It is not the penalty of the bond that forms the real cause of action, hut the breach of the condition, (Sanders
Miller, J., concurs in this opinion.