36 W. Va. 223 | W. Va. | 1892
This was a proceeding in quo warranto instituted by J. E. Heatherly in the Circuit Court of Barbour county at the
At the July term, 1889, of said Circuit Court, an information was filed by said J. E. Heatherly as follows, to wit, “James E. Heatherly, under and by virtue of the statute in such cases made and provided, now, in the name of the state of West Virginia, here in open court comes, and prosecutes herein, and gives this honorable court to understand and be informed as follows, to wit: That whereas, at a general election on behalf of and by the people of the state, in and through the several counties, on the 6th day of November, A. H. 1888, he, the said James E. Heatherly, was duly elected sheriff of the said county of Barbour for and during the term of four years, to commence and be held on and from the 1st day of January, A. D. 1889, for the said term, to be from thence fully completed and ended; and that after such election, and the same having been properly certified to him according to law, he, the said James E. Heatherly, afterwards, to wit, on the 11th day of November, A. D. 1888, went in proper person before the court of the said county of Barbour, at the court-house thereof, then in session, and entered into the proper official bonds required by law, with surety sufficient therefor, and then and there duly approved by the said court; whereupon the said James E. Heatherly also took the oath of office before the sqid court, and then and there in all respects qualified according to law, and took upon and completed in himself a vested right and title to and in the said office of sheriff' of the said county of Barbour; and upon and after the said 1st day of January, A. D. 1889, he, the said James E. Heatherly, then and there entered upon the said office and by himself, and those properly deputed under him,
On the 13th day of November, 1890, the following order was entered in said proceeding : “This cause was submitted to the court on the last day of the last term, and, for reasons appearing to the court, the County Court was admitted a party defendant, the defendant Shank declining further to make defence, and the County Court, by C. E. Teter, prosecuting attorney, demurred to the plaintiffs petition and the information filed ; and the court having maturely considered the demurrer aforesaid, and the petition and exhibits and information filed, doth sustain said demurrer. It is therefore considered by the court that the plaintiff’s petition and information filed be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, with costs,” etc.
Erom this order the said Ileatherly obtained this writ of error.
The first error assigned is that it was error to admit the County Court as defendant to said proceeding. Upon this question as to the propriety of making said County Court a party defendant, it is true that our Code, e. 125, s. 58,
Suppose the County Court, instead of demurring, had seen proper to plead, what facts alleged in the petition or set forth in the information could it have traversed, and, if upon the facts proven the opinion of the court had been in favor of the relator, what, judgment could have been rendered against the County Court? The material allegation set forth in the petition and information was that the defendant, John W. Shank, had without lawful or sufficient authority intruded into and usurped the office of sheriff’of Barbour county from the said James E. Heatherly ; and while the determination of this question incidentally involved the action of the County Court in vacating said office and appointing said Shank sheriff of said county, the action of said County Court was merely an incident to be considered in determining the right,of the defendant John W. Shank to hold said office ; and the County Court had no more right to be brought in as a party to defend its action in the premises than auy inferior court has a right to be heard when the regularity and legality of its proceedings are brought in question in an appellate court. It was not in the power of the County Court to undo its action in vacating said office, and no judgment against the County Court could have rendered the relator the relief he sought. We can therefore see no good reason for the action of the Circuit Court in admitting the County Court as a defendant.
Upon this question we find that High, in his valuable work on Extraordinary Legal liemedies, second edition (section 606) says: “The right of a court to exercise its discretion in granting or withholding leave to file an information is not limited even by a statute authorizing the granting of the remedy at any time upon proper showing made.”
Under our statute, the language is: “If, in the opinion of such court, the matters stated in such information are sufficient in law to. authorize the same to be filed, an order shall be made filing the same, and awarding a summons against the defendant named therein to answer such information.”
It will be perceived that, under our statute, when a party interested applies to the court for leave to file an information in the nature af a writ of quo warranto, it is provided : “If, in the opinion of such court, the matters stated in such information are sufficient in law to authorize the same to be filed, an order shall be made filing the same, and awarding a summons against the defendant named therein to answer such information.” Bo that upon the application to file such information the court is called upon to decide the identical question which would be raised by demurrer to the information, to wit, whether the matters stated in such information are sufficient in law to authorize the same to be filed.
The record in this case shows that on the 13th day of July, 1889, said information was presented to the court, with his petition, by the plaintiff in error, which information was considered by the court, and ordered to be filed, and process was awarded against said John "W". Shank; and on the 13th day of November, 1890, it appears that the County Court had been admitted a party defendant, the defendant Shank declining further to make defence; and that the County Court demurred to ihe plaintiff’s petition,, and the information filed, which demurrer ivas'sustained, that is, the court then held that said information was not sufficient in law, and dismissed the same — which action
Again, if the County Court had been properly made a party defendant, its demurrer to the petition admitted the fact therein alleged, that when the plaintiff in error was notified of the requirement to give a new bond he was von compos mentis, and wholly unconscious of the fact, and that his mental condition was well known to said County Court at the time said service was attempted ; when this admitted fact is taken in connection with the statute (Code, c. 10, s. 20, p. 86) which provides that “if the officer so required to give a new bond, or give such additional bond, after being notified of the requirement, fail to comply therewith within the time required, his office shall be deemed vacant” etc. See People v. Superior Court Judge, 38 Mich. 310, where service of process was obtained by merely laying it on the body of a man too sick to understand, it was held invalid ; also Cates v. Woodson, 2 Dana, 452, where it was held that process served upon an insane man in person, but not upon his curator, was insufficient. See, also Murphy v. Loos, 104 Ill. 514.
We can not hesitate in our conclusion that said County Court had no authority either to declare said office vacant, or to appoint said Shank to fill the'vacancy. We are further of opinion that, when the said .John W. Shank declined to make any defence to said proceeding, the Circuit Coui’t erred in allowing the County Court to be made a party defendant thereto; but that the Circuit Court, when said defendant declined to make a defence, should have heard the case upon its merits; and, if the plaintiff sustained his allegations, the court should have rendered judgment of ouster against the defendant. The demurrer in this case having been filed by the County Court, which, as we hold, was improperly made a party defendant, the admissions occasioned thereby could not be binding upon the defendant, Shank. The case must therefore be reversed, and remanded, with costs.
IíeveRSed. Remanded.