State ex rel. Hartman v. TetraultState ex rel. Hartman v. Tetrault
Christopher P. Finney, 2623 Erie Avenue, P.O. Box 8802, Cincinnati, Ohio 45208, for relator-appellant, Barbara Hartman
Lawrence E. Barbiere, 5300 Socialville-Foster Road, Suite 200, Mason, Ohio 45040, for respondent-appellee, Christopher Tetrault
Robert Surdyk, Kevin A. Lantz, One Prestige Place, Suite 700, Miamisburg, Ohio 45342, for respondent-appellee, Pierce Township, Clermont County, Ohio
O P I N I O N
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶ 1} Relator-appellant, Barbara Hartman, appeals the decisions of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of respondents-
{¶ 2} In October 2007, Pierce Township and Tetrault entered into an Employment Agreement where Tetrault would serve as Assistant Administrator for Development Facilitation and be paid a base annual salary of $77,000 premised upon a 1,110 hour per year schedule, or 277.5 hours per calendar quarter. In addition, if Tetrault worked more than 277.5 hours per quarter, he would be paid $75 per hour for the overage, not to exceed $7,500. In order to track his hours, the Employment Agreement provided that Tetrault would maintain a daily log of his activities and time.
{¶ 3} Beginning in June of 2009, after being informed that his daily log of activities and time was too detailed, Tetrault began submitting quarterly one-page summary reports listing the monthly total of hours he worked for Pierce Township (“Summary Reports“). Tetrault would track the total number of hours he worked per day on scrap paper kept in his vehicle. One piece of scrap paper could contain anywhere from one to three days of hours worked. Tetrault would then use the scrap paper to input the hours he worked into a third-party hosted computer website known as Basecamp. Tetrault would then generate the Summary Reports from Basecamp. According to appellant, only Tetrault had full access to the Basecamp website and has never allowed another individual to have full access to the section of Basecamp that contains Tetrault‘s daily records.
{¶ 4} Tetrault accessed Basecamp through a laptop computer provided to him by Pierce Township (the “Township Laptop“). Tetrault used the Township Laptop to access Basecamp, generate emails, store files, and conduct non-Pierce Township business. Upon Tetrault‘s termination as a Pierce Township employee, Tetrault restored the Township Laptop to its “factory setting,” effectively erasing the hard drive, and returned the laptop to Pierce Township.
{¶ 5} On April 21, 2010, appellant filed a public records request with Pierce Township
All records documenting all time expended by Chris Tetrault for or on behalf of Pierce Township from July 1, 2009 to the present, including, any description of the work or tasks performed for all such time.
{¶ 6} On July 16, 2010, appellant commenced an action against Tetrault and Pierce Township on behalf of the State of Ohio (“First Litigation“). State ex rel. John Doe v. Tetrault, et al., Clermont C.P. No. 2010-CVH-1462 (July 16, 2010). In an amended complaint, appellant raised two causes of action: (1) whether all public records responsive to appellant‘s request were provided pursuant to
{¶ 7} While the First Litigation was still pending before the trial court, on June 20, 2011, appellant filed the present lawsuit (“Second Litigation“) asserting two causes of action against Tetrault: (1) spoliation of evidence, and (2) the statutory violation of
{¶ 8} On September 29, 2011, Tetrault moved for summary judgment in the Second Litigation, arguing that the claims asserted were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Pierce Township followed with a similar motion for summary judgment on December 9, 2011, as to appellant‘s cause of action pursuant to
{¶ 9} From the trial court‘s decisions on summary judgment, Relator appeals, raising two assignments of error. For ease of discussion, we shall address both assignments of error together.
{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES ON THE SPOLIATION CLAIM BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
{¶ 12} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 13} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES ON THE DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS CLAIM BROUGHT PURSUANT TO R.C. 149.351 BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
{¶ 14} In her first and second assignments of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Tetrault and Pierce Township because: (1) Tetrault failed to offer more than conclusory assertions that he was entitled to summary judgment; (2) the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the causes of action in the Second Litigation; and (3) appellant was not required to amend her complaint in the First Litigation to include the causes of action brought in the Second Litigation.
{¶ 15} This court reviews a trial court‘s decision on summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. State ex rel. Doe v. Register, 12th Dist. No. CA2008-08-081, 2009-Ohio-2448, ¶ 20. Summary judgment is proper when: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3)
Res Judicata
{¶ 16} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining that the spoliation cause of action and the
{¶ 17} As an affirmative defense, “[r]es judicata operates ‘to preclude the relitigation of a point of law or fact that was at issue in a former action between the same parties and was passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction.‘” Faierman v. Conrad, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2003-10-271, CA2003-10-272, 2004-Ohio-6319, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 80 Ohio St.3d 649, 651 (1998). “Where there is a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits, res judicata bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the previous action.” Id., citing Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 279, 1995-Ohio-331, syllabus. Thus, “‘an existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.‘” (Emphasis sic). Brown v. Dayton, 89 Ohio St.3d 245, 248 (2000); Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62 (1990); Rogers v. Whitehall, 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69 (1986). In essence, the doctrine of res
{¶ 18} The Ohio Supreme Court has identified four elements necessary to bar a claim under the doctrine of res judicata: (1) there is a final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the second action involves the same parties or their privies as the first; (3) the second action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) the second action arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. City of Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 123, 2006-Ohio-954, ¶ 84, citing Hapgood v. Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (C.A.6, 1997).
{¶ 19} In this case, there is no dispute that the First Litigation was resolved on the merits by the issuance of two final, valid decisions from the trial court granting summary judgment to Tetrault and Pierce Township. There is also no issue that the First Litigation and the Second Litigation involve the exact same parties save the absence of David Elmer, Pierce Township Administrator, from the Second Litigation. Thus, the issues before this court are whether the causes of action in the Second Litigation were or could have been litigated in the first action and whether such causes of action arise out of the transactions or occurrences which were the subject matter of the First Litigation.
1. Spoliation of Evidence Cause of Action
{¶ 20} We shall first address appellant‘s argument that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar appellant‘s spoliation of evidence claim.
{¶ 21} In the First Litigation, appellant claimed that the scrap paper Tetrault used to track his daily hours of work, as well as a document recovered from the Township Laptop hard drive, were records subject to disclosure. Because Tetrault had deleted or destroyed these items, appellant claimed that she, as a representative of the state of Ohio, was
{¶ 22} In the Second Litigation, appellant asserts a claim under the intentional tort of spoliation of evidence. In order to prove a claim of spoliation of evidence, appellant must establish the following elements: (1) pending or probable litigation involving appellant; (2) knowledge on the part of Tetrault that litigation exists or is probable; (3) willful destruction of evidence by Tetrault designed to disrupt appellant‘s case; (4) disruption of appellant‘s case; and (5) damages proximately caused by Tetrault‘s acts. See Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 29 (1993).
{¶ 23} In her complaint in the Second Litigation, appellant asserted that, with knowledge that the First Litigation was probable, Tetrault willfully discarded the scrap paper, erased the Township Laptop‘s hard drive, and withheld documents on the Basecamp website with the purpose of disrupting the First Litigation. Further, appellant alleged that Tetrault‘s actions did disrupt appellant‘s ability to litigate the First Litigation and caused appellant to suffer damages during the course of the First Litigation including the need to engage computer forensic services to restore the Township Laptop‘s hard drive. Thus, the Second Litigation stems from the filing of a public records request which revealed that Tetrault had allegedly destroyed documents which were, or could have led to, discoverable material in the First Litigation.
{¶ 24} Appellant argues that the Second Litigation did not arise from the public records request but, instead, arose from the First Litigation. Specifically, appellant contends that the First Litigation was commenced because Tetrault and Pierce Township did not comply with the Public Records Act. However, appellant contends that the spoliation cause of action did not arise from the alleged violation of the Public Records Act but, from the First Litigation,
{¶ 25} The causes of action in the Second Litigation arose from the same “common nucleus of operative facts” that were the subject matter of the First Litigation. See Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 382. In essence, both litigations allege the destruction of the scrap paper, deletion of the documents on the Township Laptop, and address the documents contained on the Basecamp website. Regardless of whether appellant‘s spoliation claim stemmed from the public records request or the First Litigation, the spoliation claim arises from the transactions or occurrences which were the subject matter of the First Litigation.
{¶ 26} Finally, we can find no reason why the spoliation claim could not have been litigated in the First Litigation. Appellant became aware of the spoliation claim during the pendency of the First Litigation and filed her complaint for the Second Litigation before the First Litigation had been resolved. Appellant never moved to amend the First Litigation‘s complaint to include the spoliation claim, nor moved to consolidate the two cases once the Second Litigation was filed. As provided in
{¶ 27} Therefore, as the spoliation of evidence claim could have been litigated in the First Litigation and rose out of the transactions or occurrences which gave rise to the First Litigation, we find that the doctrine of res judicata applies to bar the spoliation claim in the Second Litigation.
2. R.C. 149.351 Cause of Action
{¶ 28} We next turn to appellant‘s cause of action in the Second Litigation pursuant to
{¶ 29}
{¶ 30} As stated above, appellant‘s First Litigation brought causes of action pursuant to
{¶ 31} In the Second Litigation, appellant asserted that Tetrault and Pierce Township violated
{¶ 32} Appellant contends that the
{¶ 33} Finally, we note that there is no reason why the Second Litigation‘s
{¶ 34} Furthermore, although appellant contends that Tetrault presented merely conclusory statements that he was entitled to summary judgment, the affidavits and exhibits attached to Tetrault‘s brief were sufficient to determine that no genuine issues of material fact exist due to the application of the affirmative defense of res judicata.2 Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Tetrault and Pierce
Joinder of Spoliation Claim
{¶ 35} In Howard Johnson, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a spoliation of evidence claim “may be brought at the same time as the primary action.” Smith v. Howard Johnson, 67 Ohio St.3d at 29. This appeal asks whether the Ohio Supreme Court‘s holding means that the spoliation claim may be brought at the same time as the primary action, but within the primary action, or may be brought at the same time as the primary action in a separate lawsuit.
{¶ 36} In our decision today, we have found that the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case to bar appellant‘s claims in the Second Litigation that could have been brought in the First Litigation due to their arising from the same common nucleus of operative facts. This holding in no way states that a spoliation of evidence claim brought during the pendency of the primary action must be brought within the primary action. Indeed, this court acknowledges circumstances where it may be necessary to bring a spoliation of evidence claim during the pendency of the primary action but in a separate lawsuit.3 However, we have resolved the issues before this court based upon the doctrine of res judicata and, therefore, whether a party is required to bring a spoliation of evidence claim within a primary action, or merely at the same time as the primary action, is an issue for another day.
{¶ 37} Accordingly, appellant‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 38} Judgment affirmed.