History
  • No items yet
midpage
State Ex Rel. Hamilton v. Snodgrass
325 N.W.2d 740
Iowa
1982
Check Treatment

*1 Terry Ann of Iowa STATE

HAMILTON, Appellee, SNODGRASS, Appellant. Eugene

Michael

No. 66493. of Iowa.

Oct. 17, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Nov.

gram (ADC). By mandate of a federal commence the state must statute father when- proceedings against putative and it is applies ever a mother for ADC father has abandoned determined the 654(4) (1976 mother and child. U.S.C. § III). payments im- Supp. Any support & assigned by posed proceeding in the long as she receives mother to the state so Thus the state support. 252A.13. ADC support pay- any receive present would at and can be required of the defendant ments these said to have initiated se and filed an appeared pro Defendant peti- allegations denying answer of Attor- tion. He obtained the assistance pur- for the limited ney Robert F. Heimer public expense obtaining counsel pose of He asserted the represent him further. the federal arises under to counsel request for constitutions. and state alleged defendant of counsel appointment meaning of Iowa was within re- was unable to Code section 336A.4 threatening ability without tain counsel for his fami- economic necessities provide ly- motion for the defendant’s denying the trial court made of counsel

appointment indigency. finding regarding defendant’s no proceeding this is a civil simply It found Heimer, Davenport, appel- for Robert F. 336A.4, defining indigency, and that section lant. only.” pur- For actions “applies to criminal Gen., Miller, John R. Atty. Thomas J. holding court reviewing the trial poses of Gen., Martin, Wylie Fil- Atty. Asst. and G. that defend- assume, deciding, we lers, III, County Atty., appellee. Clinton indigent. ant is is and I. Because recoup funds for the brought must be purposes of a “state action” for State HARRIS, Justice. Const.amend. process the due clause. U.S. indigent paternity Does an Const, V; I, Snodgrass must Iowa art. to counsel at have a constitutional process. be afforded due The trial held he public expense? court contention process Defendant’s due agree. not and we does in Mor principles from enunciated arises were initiated These Brewer, 92 S.Ct. rissey v. 408 U.S. support depend- the uniform State under (1972). If an indi ch. 262A ents law. Iowa Code action with State vidual is threatened alleged defendant was the father of life, relator liberty or him of deprive which will daughter required her and should be process. entitled to due property, he is during support minority upon the child and to depends is due What function and government reimburse the state for received nature dependent individual interest involved. under the aid to children Crimme, (Iowa pointed indigent, where the unsuccessful, 1979). personal he is lose his freedom.” Id. at 101 S.Ct. meaningful op Due calls for “a Eldridge L.Ed.2d at 649. The three factors Boddie v. Connecti portunity to be heard.” stake, (1) (2) private are: interests at cut, 780, 785, 28 interest, (3) governmental the risk Auxier v. Wood *3 procedures that will used lead to an Hosp. Sch., ward - value, probable erroneous decision and the (Iowa 1978). 142-43 any, safeguards. of additional wrong was in re The trial court jecting Snodgrass’s application on the basis was a proceeding Lassiter to terminate a of parental a distinction between civil and criminal relationship. The court deter- proceedings which are Some weight mined that the net the Eldridge of require appointment called civil of counsel every factors would not in termination labeling so it is not a the action question of ceeding presumption overcome the that no criminal right or civil. The to counsel has right physical to counsel exists one’s unless more person’s to do with a stake in the liberty is threatened. Due determi- practical and the effect of the nations were left a ap- case case Dept. outcome. Lassiter v. of Social Serv proach. Id. at S.Ct. ices, 18, 24, 101 2153, 2158, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at 652. (1981). L.Ed.2d 648-49 Snodgrass’s II. interest helpful Lassiter is here for what it ex but, proceedings think, are substantial we plains rejects. controlling and is for what it less than parent those of a in a termination out, been, process, points Due “has never proceeding. Although he claims otherwise be, and perhaps precisely can never liberty is not immediately involved. He defined.” 452 U.S. S.Ct. argues that one finding ramification of a of 68 L.Ed.2d at 648. Fundamental fairness is possible would be incarceration in part requirement require of the and the a later contempt proceeding for failure to ment varies according to the interests at support payments. make Iowa Code preemi stake. Id. The court stated: “The (1981). 252A.3(1) It is true that the find generalization nent emerges that from this ing of paternity in these would precedents indigent’s court’s right on an binding any be subsequent contempt pro appointed right counsel is thát such a has ceeding involving question. If Snod- been recognized only to exist where the grass willfully sup fails to make ordered litigant may liberty lose his if he physical port payments subject he is to civil con litigation.” (Emphasis loses the Id. add tempt and incarceration result. ed.) presumes Fundamental fairness 252A.6(13). contempt In such a hearing, an indigent’s right appointed counsel course, Snodgrass of is entitled to counsel. when, loses, “only arises if he he recognized right We have to counsel in a deprived physical liberty. of his It hearing might directly result incar against presumption that all other Osmundson, ceration. McNabb v. elements in the due decision must (Iowa 1982). be measured.” Id. at S.Ct.

68 L.Ed.2d at 649. Snodgrass Nevertheless it is when willfully ignore would a court order that he

In considering indigent’s claim of counsel, finding would with a become threatened appointed the court factors, contempt potential liberty. and a loss of Eldridge balances the three ele Snodgrass’s ments interest here does not differ originally defined in Mathews v. El dridge, 319, 335, 893, 903, significantly indigent from that of an de- U.S. S.Ct. proceed- myriad It then fendant in a of other civil “set[s] weight ings. their net the willful failure or against example, the scales For presumption ap- alimony there is a child refusal to make the examination and contempt proceed- cross-examination of could lead to a payments injunction develop- Thanks to scientific violation of an often witnesses. ing. The contempt. A re- finding accuracy in a ments the of blood tests has dra- results quirement appointed We have noted that matically improved. inevitably lead to re- thought ap- would accuracy of the tests is quirement proach certainty. mathematical See State might in other actions which Vinsand, defendants Buechler contempt pro- day one form the basis of (Iowa 1982). accuracy Indeed paternity finding A seems consti- ceeding. the tests is such that an indistinguishable from a vast ar- tutionally to blood tests at has a due ray court orders the violation of which Streater, 452 public expense. Little v. subject contempt. one to might 2202, 2209, The interests State are

III. in paternity same actions and roughly the *4 lawyer To father a putative accord a proceedings. The cost to the termination expense advantage be of some public McNabb, be vast. would 315 N.W.2d State escape the test but it has attempting to imposition The of such a financial at 17. past less to do than it did in times left legislative best for is determina burden improving reliability paternity of a de- McNabb, separate opinion at tion. See paterni- termination. The risk of error in a 17-18. in an ty action is not affected unusual de- not wish legislature might might or gree by presence or absence of counsel. states have provide to the services. Several parentage the uniform act and adopted for an opportunity any event In indigent paternity vided counsel for defend- is result in the absence of counsel erroneous 19(a) provides that act ants. Section of greater paternity cases categorically not appoint that “the court shall counsel for involving the termination than eases to obtain party financially who is unable federal due rights. Snodgrass’s parental 584-19 counsel.” See Hawaii Rev.Stat. § fails appointed process claim 257-69(1) (West (1976); Minn.Stat.Annot. § holding in Lassiter. under the 40-6-119 Supp.1982); Mont.Code Ann. § (1981); (1981); N.D.Cent.Code 14-17-18 a number of states out that pointed It is these Wyo.Stat. 14-2-116 While counsel in to have found due 19(a) adopted states have section Kim Reynolds v. paternity action. See parentage significant uniform act it is 799, (Alaska 1977) (un mons, 803 569 P.2d adopting three other states in the act have constitution); Cheboy Artibee v. state der 19(a) of their part excluded section as a 54, 59, Mich. 243 Judge, 397 gan Circuit state law. 7000-7018 See Cal.Civ.Code §§ 248, (under (1976) state consti 250 1981); (West 19-6—101 to Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 22, 34, Cortez, tution); 24 Cal.3d v. Salas 19-6-129 Ann. Wash.Rev.Code 537, 226, 234, 529, P.2d 593 154 26.26.905; 74.20.350 26-26.010 to §§ 209, denied, 900, 62 444 cert. light divergent legislative opinion In of this (1979) (under both federal L.Ed.2d 136 appointed judicially not be should Bashaw, v. 279 constitutions); Hepfel state required. 342, (under (Minn.1979) supervi 348 fairness); ensure sory power of court IV. weigh We next whether Townes, 53 Carrington Cty. ex rel. absence of counsel in a action Wake 769 S.E.2d might result in erroneous determinations. words, remanded, presence (1981), In other of coun would modified and N.C. 333, -, (1982) (un paternity proceeding sel make determina S.E.2d constitutions); and state question pa tions more reliable? The in a der both federal 209, 216, S., 404 A.2d N.J.Super. ternity really suit is one of In M. v. biology. basis); (1979) (unspecified Made disputed former times claims of 273, 276, R., 95 Misc.2d necessarily were from line G. v. David mainly determined (1978) (under state legislation both federal as placed by equal N.Y.S.2d is constitutions); and state State protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend- Daugherty, 145- Graves S.E.2d ment City federal constitution. (W.Va.1980) (under constitution). state Selden, Waterloo v. 251 N.W.2d However, there are two why reasons (Iowa 1977). First, authority is compelling. less than closely interests the State are most of these in- decisions founded on aligned with the relators who commence terpretation of the local state constitution. chapter 252A But the inter- Second, the decisions that found a federal ests putative of the State and the fathers process right due to counsel predate the are dissimilar. It is axiomatic that “[a]ll Lassiter decision the U.S. persons need be treated alike to meet Court, seriously and are it. undermined equal protection. constitutional standards of There contrary authority. state enough It if all members of the same Cty. Townes, ex rel. Carrington v. equally.” Auger, class are treated Hack v. [slip 333, -, 306 N.C. S.E.2d (Iowa 1975) (emphasis (N.C. opinion 1982)] (no July absolute original). “Equal protection assurances do due counsel in require dissimilar situations to be treat- cases; decision is vested in state Selden, similarly.” ed 251 N.W.2d at 509. court, subject appeal); trial Sheppard providing counsel to the relators the Mack, App.2d Ohio 427 N.E.2d aiding plaintiffs class of whose (1980) (no equal due closely interests resemble its own. Such protection right appointed counsel); exercise promote State’s its *5 ex Family State rel. Adult and Serv. Div. v. through litigation own interests does not Stoutt, 303, 313, Or.App. 1132, 57 644 P.2d carry with obligation it.an to (1982) (no 1137-38 process due right ap litigation efforts of opposing those pointed counsel under federal or state con equal protection State’s interests. stitutions); Walker, State v. 87 Wash.2d challenge is not well taken. 443, 445, (1976) (no 553 P.2d 1095 due AFFIRMED. process equal protection or right appoint counsel). ed except All Justices concur UHLEN- No different result is by mandated our HOPP, J., REYNOLDSON, C.J., and state Davis, constitution. In v. State 304 LARSON, JJ., McCORMICK and who dis- (Iowa 1981), we said: sent. The Supreme Court of Iowa is the final UHLENHOPP,

arbiter of the meaning (dissenting). of the Iowa Justice Con- stitution, but when the federal and state In appeal Snodgrass contends constitutions contain provisions, similar process the due equal protection and the they usually are deemed to be identical in clauses of the United and Iowa Con- States scope, import, purpose. and [Authori- guarantee stitutions defendant Special respect and deference is ties.] right appointed counsel in state-initiat- accorded Supreme United States Court ed paternity proceedings chapter interpretations of language similar 252A of the Iowa I Code. do not reach the federal constitution. [Authority.] equal protection although issue I think it reject We Snodgrass’s process due chal- presents problem a serious in view of the lenge to the trial court’s appoint refusal to provision attorney public of an expense him counsel. on the other side of the case. Snodgrass presents V. I an alterna am not concerned about the defendant ' tive claim under the equal protection clause who is in fact the father child but of both the federal and state constitutions. rather with the defendant who did not fa- Our own equal protection (art. 6) clause magic ther the child. The courts have no places substantially the same limitations on way ascertaining the actual fatherhood Grimme, v. on the State They depend child. must of the (Iowa 1979). case in N.W.2d presentation and evidence court, necessity therein and lies the As the States United attorneys versed on both sides assistance noted, been, recently process due “has never state has legal procedure. in law and be, perhaps precisely and can never Iowa for prosecutors throughout stationed Department defined.” Lassiter v. of Social cases, but the be un- these 18, 24, of Durham Services U.S. assume represented. Obviously we cannot 2153, 2158, S.Ct. every paterni- defendant charged Rather, require- embodies the ty guilty. fairness,” ment of “fundamental a flexible “calls for Indigency. Snodgrass’s concept procedural

I. claim which such upon protections particular de- predicated as situation Brewer, Morrissey that he is The record mands.” indigency. establishes U.S. 2593, 2600, indigent. 33 L.Ed.2d in fact Since the court I will arguendo indigent, process guarantee he the due Applying assumes point. ascertaining on that is thus an not dwell exercise necessary par- cedures which under the Com- II. Due to counsel. — to satisfy require- ticular circumstances merits, the clause of ing process to the due ment of fundamental fairness. the fourteenth amendment the United states, stated, process Constitution “.. . nor shall has also States The Court “[D]ue life, minimum, deprive any any person requires, liber- that absent a coun at a property, sig ty, tervailing overriding without due state interest of ” nificance, corresponding law. .. . The clause forced to settle their persons language duty through judi Iowa contains similar Constitution claims of basically import, meaningful scope, given and is same in cial must be. I, purpose. Iowa Con opportunity Const. Art. heard.’’ Boddie v. Johnson, (Iowa necticut, re U.S. Huff, 113, 118 1977); Chicago (1971) (emphasis added). Title Insurance Co. (Iowa 1977); Davenport Streater, 1, 5-6, See also Little *6 2202, 2205, 627, Co. v. Water Iowa Commerce 101 68 L.Ed.2d 632 State S.Ct. Comm’n, 583, 1971). Manzo, 545, (Iowa (1981); Armstrong 190 N.W.2d v. 593 380 U.S. 552, 1187, 1191, 62, necessity I therefore find no to consider the 14 66 85 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. separately. (1965); two constitutional clauses v. Central Hanover & See Mullane Bank Bair, 306, 313, 652, Manufacturing Co., v. 254 Moorman Co. Trust 339 U.S. 70 S.Ct. aff’d, 737, (Iowa 656; 865, 1977), 745 437 872 question N.W.2d U.S. 94 L.Ed. The 267, 2340, (1978) present 98 S.Ct. 57 L.Ed.2d 197 case is whether counsel is (“[A] separate process discussion of the an required for [due in the federal constitu- clauses and state action to ensure state-initiated necessary general meaningful oppor under the that the defendant has a tions] guaran- that similar principle tunity constitutional to be heard. usually

tees deemed to be identical The trial court relied on the distinction scope, import purpose.”). and proceedings between civil and criminal and agrees The that the state’s on rule general the that counsel in a civil in proceedings chapter involvement proceeding constitutionally mandated. distinction, satisfy 252A is sufficient the “state ac That as the majority recognizes requirement here, process longer tion” of the due clause. is no tenable as civil to all must be an indi process light Due afforded when proceedings, in decisions which have by vidual is threatened state action which civil right despite found a to counsel deprive protected liberty particular will him of a nature action. Lassi of the Ingraham Wright, ter, 31-32, 2162, interest. 430 property v. at 101 68 452 S.Ct. at U.S. 651, 672, 97 1401, 1413, (due S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. 51 L.Ed.2d at 652 counsel 746 335, 893, Eldridge, 319, 424 96 S.Ct. proceed U.S. in civil circumstances

under some rights); 18, In re parental 903, 33 Those factors ings to terminate 47 L.Ed.2d 1428, 1451, 41, 18 1, 87 Gault, S.Ct. 387 U.S. specific dictates of are determinative (due process right to 527, (1976) 554 (1) proceeding: process given due for a adjudication proceedings counsel in civil stake, (2) govern- at private interests Wilcox, juvenile delinquency); Cleavor interests, that (3) the risk mental Cir.1974) (case-by- 940, (9th 499 F.2d will lead to an erroneous procedures used right to due case determination of value, any, probable decision and neglect dependency counsel in child safeguards. procedural additional Osmundson, McNabb proceedings); “We balance Court then stated: must [the (due process right (Iowa 1982) other, and against each elements three] proceedings); contempt in civil to counsel weight net scales then set their Dubuque v. District Court Chambers there against presumption 261 Iowa where the right from appeals (1967) (right unsuccessful, may lose his indigent, if he is relation terminating parental at personal freedom.” 452 U.S. 22, 34, Cortez, 24 Cal.3d ship); Salas Applica- at 649. S.Ct. 226, 234, P.2d cert. Cal.Rptr. that test in Lassiter resulted in the tion of denied, 100 S.Ct. 444 U.S. weight the net of the El- conclusion (due right (1979) L.Ed.2d 136 every dridge factors could not be found in pa counsel in civil establish parent-child to terminate the re- appears rule to be ternity). emerging presumption of lationship, to overcome the is not to be to counsel issue of civil deprivation no to counsel when labeling the action as crimi determined civil, by inquiring into involved. The Court there- liberty nal or but rather was not of the interests in magnitude nature and of whether fore held that the determination volved, adjudication, the ramifications of process required counsel in such due distinguish the ac and the features which on a ceedings should be left to courts ordinary tion from civil case-by-case basis. U.S. Cal.3d 2162, 68 L.Ed.2d at 652. at 230. P.2d analysis the Lassiter to the Applying recent- The United States here, that an action to facts I note first balancing analyzing test for ly developed a chapter 252A is paternity under establish claims. The process right-to-counsel due 252A.1 proceeding, civil Iowa Code § underlying inter- test takes into account the Travis, Bishop v. Lassiter, particular proceeding. ests in the 1981), (Iowa and incarcera- 2154, 68 L.Ed.2d 640. paternity finding on a imposed tion is not proceed- In Lassiter the with a Court dealt *7 in the action is alone. If the defendant relation- ing parent-child to terminate the merits, the trial court unsuccessful on the began with a ship. analysis The Court’s establishing paternity an enters order cases and past right-to-counsel review of its support. Iowa amount of setting proper a cases of the with the from those extraction adjudication 252A.3(1). Thus the Code § litigant has presumption “that an a defendant with a itself does not confront when, only a physi- of his deprived that he will be threat loses, physical of his may deprived he he be the case. Under the liberty cal if he loses continued, “It is liberty.” The Court analysis must therefore Lassiter test that all the other against presumption that due presumption with the start decision must elements in the due proceed- require counsel in these does not 26-27, 101 S.Ct. be measured.” U.S. presumption ings. against But 649. The Court next 68 L.Ed.2d at placed in the Eldridge factors must be three employing the balancing set forth a test first identified in Matthews v. balance. three factors issue, prior he did not have counsel in the to consider is the

A. first factor is im- private interest of a defendant paternity on the issue on which proceeding paternity. plicated in an action to establish proceeding is founded. subsequent can divided into three That interest be unpersuasive that a de- argument per- interest in his parts: the defendant’s con- fendant need have no concern about in and in his liberty, property, sonal tempt only he can be found in because relationships. familial contempt wilfully pay support. if he fails to Snodgrass although contends that he place, In the whether the defendant first faces no immediate risk of incarceration if wilfully pay pay or could not failed litigation he is unsuccessful in this —he in itself. frequently judgment call fa- imprisoned merely finding on a he Second, requirement the wilfullness for con- sig- has a thered the child—he nevertheless tempt cannot be much consolation to ar- liberty nificant interest at stake. He defendant who knows he is not the father finding of gues that one ramification of adequately pater- but defend the could paternity present in the suit would be counsel; in later con- possibility of incarceration want he still has a nity suit for of sup- to make tempt proceedings for failure contempt pro- contest on his hands in the port payments which he would be obli- for ceeding. gated. 252A.3(1). He See Iowa Code § provide support exposes also Failure to argues paternity finding that a would prosecution for non- to criminal judicata subsequent contempt pro- be res in felony. D Iowa support, a class Code that issues ceedings. He therefore reasons Although a un- 726.5. defendant would proceeding may in present determined questionably be entitled to counsel in that directly control subsequent prosecution, Wainwright, Gideon personal which his is in fact endan- freedom (1963), once gered. again stage the assistance of counsel at that Snodgrass is right that defendant who might questionable be of value in view of wilfully fails to make court-ordered previous adjudication paternity. See payments exposes contempt himself to civil Townes, County Carrington rel. ex may in which incarceration re S.E.2d 252A.6(13). Although sult. Iowa Code § an indigent (1981), remanded, defendant has a to counsel modified and 306 N.C. in a contempt proceeding if incarceration is (1982) (adjudication 293 S.E.2d 95 McNabb, imposed, 315 N.W.2d at proceeding civil paternity state-initiated presence of an attorney stage judicata subsequent res criminal of issue interpose be too late to what nonpayment support). action for See often be the defendant’s defense —that (“Support, pur- also Iowa 726.5 Code § adjudication he is not the An father. section, poses any support of this means chapter in a ”). which has been fixed court order.... judicata subsequent 252A is res civil con civil finding Thus a in a action tempt proceedings. Reynolds v. Kim See significant impact in a subse- may have mons, (Alaska 1977); 569 P.2d Arti proceeding in which the de- quent criminal bee Cheboygan Judge, 397 Mich. Circuit physical liberty is threatened. fendant’s 54, 58-59, A Cal.3d finding present proceed (“While 593 P.2d at 231 *8 ing may thus bearing have a direct on the prosecuted is entitled to criminal- counsel outcome of a subsequent pro enforcement ly nonsupport, significant the ele- for most ceeding liberty in which physical the paternity—may have ment of the stake; Snodgrass places is at it the on offense — proceed- already been determined in a civil “third base” proceeding. in that While the ing unrepre- in was which defendant defendant has counsel in the subse quent proceeding counsel.”). to contest the wilfullness sented that the decision in be as such many civil recognize bring The possible which could in human affairs. judgments true as

result contempt pro- Supreme recently em- future United Court incarceration in States about per- re- specific nature of the injunctions, phasized as fundamental ceedings, such suits, noted, fre- support lationship dissolu- when “This Court child formance fears seemingly importance of fa- quently tion cases. The has stressed the bonds, proceed- legitimized by requiring paternity counsel in milial whether or not require- to a ings inevitably marriage, “would lead and accorded them constitutional indigent de- of such protection. ment of counsel for Just as termination fairness, might procedural which one so too fendants other actions bonds demands Streater, contempt proceed- imposition.” the basis day form of a does their Little action, however, is not ing.” paternity A 452 U.S. omitted). paternity pro- (1981) (citations civil In ordinary

an action. power pitted the state is is in accord: ceedings the full The California concerning the an against person this court [paternity] The before cases biological a rela- existence of fundamental monetary judgments. more involve than financial, le- tionship which entails serious bought statutory au- They were Salas, 24 gal, obligations. and moral See to declare of the thority the existence at Cal.Rptr. P.2d Cal.3d biological relationship, that of most basic at 233. parent and child. A determination grave has for all paternity implications in future potential incarceration father, child, alleged concerned —the en- contempt proceedings would not alone the mother and This court has the state. Snodgrass paternity title in this maintaining par- a termed the interest in and the res proceeding. potential But that one, relationship compelling ent-child “a judicata adjudication effect of paternity among civil ranked the most basic of important to consider under factors ” rights. . . . an incorrect Freedom from Eldridge tests. imposition relationship of that on either a in- Snodgrass property argues parent compelling a child equally is an present terests are involved in the action. interest. adjudication An renders de- paternity Cal.3d fendant liable for “a fair and reasonable” (citations omitted). P.2d at 230 minor- support during amount of the child’s addition to creation of a fundamental 252A.3(1). ity. support Iowa Code Child relationship, paternity has the finding payments period extended of the over the potential family of disrupting established can, minority place child’s question, and, relationships of the because defendant a sizable financial a defendant. burden on stigma of the social with the associated obligation through gar- is enforceable finding, reputation. of damaging his nishment the defendant’s proceedings, and Bashaw, Hepfel v. wages protected by are not the maximum (Minn.1979); yearly garnishment applicable to limitation 281 S.E.2d ordinary civil Iowa Code judgments. 642.21(1), significant 627.12. most civil liberty, proper- Unlike I conclude that §§ judgments, obligation ty, and familial are involved interests dischargeable in 11 U.S.C. bankruptcy. 523(a)(5) (1979). requires Eldridge B. The second factor

Important interests are inex- inquiry familial into the risk action that a action, tricably involved in as involving unrepresented purpose impose of the is to result in an erroneous determination parent-child relationship on the defendant extent to involvement of into the which the me, vital improve reliability and the child. To this is the most aspect paternity litigation, and demands have under- determination. Courts which *9 paterni taken have blood inquiry this found that tific test clearly evidence would be ty quite complex actions are in nature and procedural safeguard a valuable in such the risk are sub of erroneous results cases. Connecticut acknowledged has as stantial where the defendants are in much 46-b-168 of its by statutes 802-03; Reynolds, counsel. 569 P.2d at Sa providing ordering for the of blood tests las, 30-31, 154 Cal.Rptr. 24 Cal .3d at at negative and the of admissibility find- 232; Artibee, 593 P.2d at at Mich. ings. Unlike other may evidence that be 249; Hepfel, 243 N.W.2d at 279 N.W.2d at susceptible to varying interpretation or 345; County, 53 N.C.App. at disparagement, results, test blood Many indigents S.E.2d at 771-72. such proper by obtained under conditions qual- and, more do significantly, uneducated experts, ified are difficult to refute. comprehend procedure. judicial On one Thus, access grouping to blood tests for side of sits counsel table the state’s attor indigent defendants appellant such as law, ney, proce experienced skilled in help to would insure the correctness of actions, dures of in command paternity decisions in Connecticut. of the resources and facilities of the state. 14, 101 at S.Ct. at Obviously, unrepresented the indigent de (citations at 637 omitted). Recently blood fendant on side the other of the table is no testing has been further refined to show require match. While alone would not the plausibility implausibility paterni of counsel for the defendant —-we numer have ty. Vinsand, Buechler v. ous civil proceedings by governmental units (Iowa 1982). involving unrepresented defendants —this test, however, The use of the blood again is a to factor be considered dependent on the assistance of largely coun- Eldridge. by sel. As noted the Carolina North Court An important aspect of the paternity Appeals, of defendant’s “[A]n ceeding blood-group is the test. of Results right to a free grouping blood test be those tests are admissible as evidence a meaningless rendered without counsel to biologically incapable defendant being of advise him of his to demand such a parent the of the child. The importance of test, explain significance, to the test’s to such tests in recently actions was properly ensure test adminis- emphasized Streater, in Little v. where the tered, ensure that results are United States Court held that un- properly admitted into evidence.” Wake der the circumstances the case indi- S.E.2d at gent a defendant had due to a 24 Cal.3d See blood expense. regard test at state With 232; Hepfel, 593 P.2d those tests the stated: at 345. witnesses, Given the usual absence of disagree aspects majori- I with two coloring testimony self-interest statement, putative ty’s “To accord father the litigants, and the evi- State’s onerous public lawyer expense be of some dentiary rule mother who continues [a advantage attempting escape the test constant her accusation of past but it has less to do than did in times prima establishes a facie case which improving reliability of a paternity

defendant cannot overcome solely First, do not determination.” visualize own testimony] and refusal pay tests, aiding defense counsel as defendant grouping blood the risk is incon- attempting escape a test. If a contem- siderable that an recognized is a one and is to plated Connecticut will test be paternity proceeding administered, erroneously adjudged properly reported, and intro- the father Further, duced, child in question. I see defense counsel as not because its recognized capacity definitively actually initiating ex- but cooperating test. clude high percentage Schneckloth, of falsely Marriage accused In re the putative fathers, (Iowa 1982) (blood scien- availability grouping N.W.2d 535 *10 father, N.C.App. at at County, S.E.2d could not be defendant

showed Salas, 33, 154 unsuccessfully keep from 24 Cal.3d at quoting attempted mother evidence). Second, with the 593 P.2d at 234. Cal.Rptr. at out of test tests, in attorneys blood-group advent may has interests which The state itself greater have a rather presence the It by be advanced of counsel. Id. lesser than in former times. than role mother, the interest with the shares an (problems 537-38 of foundation evidence child, obtaining in putative and the father tests). Initially, in the introduction of these paternity. an accurate determination of the about someone must inform defendant Little, 452 U.S. tests, ar- blood then that someone must that has noted at 637. One court range for and have them adminis- them legitimate in in “the has no interest state results, tered, then obtain the and he must imposing correctly ascribing parentage and evidentiary foundation lay then he must someone obligations the of fatherhood on in evidence. In real and introduce them other father.” than the child’s actual With- life that is defense counsel. someone 154 Cal. Cal.3d at 593 P.2d at pos- help indigent out the defendant cannot Rptr. at 536. succeed, rely sibly help he cannot on and An accurate determination of attorney. the benign by concern state’s may the the also increase likelihood attorney are The and the defendant state’s provide will the actually named father confederates; they are combatants. Certainly support payments. court-ordered help Defense also overcome counsel enthusiastically will not as defendant paternity adju- potential the for erroneous he payments represented make was not from nature of dications which arises the to present and thus unable his defense was usually the action. sexual activities Since effectively. Wake place outside private, take in witnesses S.E.2d ordinarily Frequently only the unavailable. altogether, factors I would Taking the themselves, testimony is and by parties the Eldridge hold under the usual rule in naturally tends to be self- evidence civil cases is overcome and that an serving. Illegitimacy: See H. Krause Law paternity proceedings in has a defendant Policy Social both constitutional counsel under risk a paternity proceed- The of error in the and Iowa Constitutions. United States ing parties is not when insubstantial the agree I the view the with California representation. parties have If one of the Supreme Court: compelled participate complexi- [paternity] judgment A rendered [with- counsel, ties of such a without is not out the assistance counsel] the risk of error increases. unfair, Recognizing the it is unreliable. and the Eldridge factor of these complexity C. final necessitates state, a review of state’s interest in actions to of their outcome to the importance child, paternity. argument Legislature establish An can be and the mother made that on both the mother and child presence has afforded controversy may prosecuting liti- of counsel in their sides stimulate assistance However, gation. put by intervening heavily proposition aside the that the claim. side what has tradi- litigation always stimulation of be on of one behalf not, however, litigation private dispute, bad. the state tionally Increased been necessary providing result of a defendant the outcome of the case. has skewed “ significant consequences with ‘Faced counsel in suits. chances that inno- imposed on an strong evidence of fatherhood will paternity, scientific being dramatically many represented obviously defendants increase cent man [after counsel, if, engaging he is unable to afford discovery] ar- because They rive at a settlement with the district attor- offers no defense. ” for the ney expense of a trial.’ further if counsel increase still 17; I, I, 6; Art. plaintiff specialist prosecuting is a such N.Y. Const. Art. § W.Va. Const., Ill, Art. 10. The Unless rights pa- claims. *11 jurisdictions cites to which have refused to ternity protected, defendants are courts find a process requirement due of counsel man, but finding right simply risk not the for indigent pro defendants in paternity poorest man the father to be of a ceedings. cited, One of the cases so how child. If to be determined in paternity is ever, did not hold counsel is to be adversary proceeding at the behest of while guar denied but held that a blanket state, surely the interests of all con- given, of counsel cannot be antee the El- the defendant cerned demand that dridge weighed factors must be on a case- fairly. to fully able defend and He can- basis, by-case remanded a de and for such indigency prevents so not do when his Carring County termination. Wake obtaining him from counsel. ton v. Townes, 333, 306 -, N.C. 293 31, 535, 24 Cal.3d 154 593 95, (1982). S.E.2d 98 (citations omitted). P.2d 232 and footnote addition, 19(a) In section of the Uniform jurisdictions confronting the Other issue Parentage provides Act that “the court reached Reynolds, have similar results. 569 shall for a appoint party who is (due process P.2d at 803 clause of Alaska financially unable to obtain 9A counsel.” counsel); requires Kennedy Constitution v. 579, (1979). U.L.A. That including act Wood, Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 1374 the right provision to counsel been has Artibee, (1982); Mich. at 243 adopted by states. several Hawaii Rev. (due at 250 clause of process Michi (1976); Stat. 584—19 Minn.Stat.Annot. § gan right counsel); Constitution to gives 257-69(1) (West Supp. 1982); Mont.Code § Ann. 40-6-119 N.D. Code (right § 279 N.W.2d at to Cent. Hepfel, (1981); Wyo.Stat. 14-17-18 14-2-116 § § pursuant supervisory power established to (1977). of court to ensure fair administration of justice); County, N.C.App. Finally, majority’s with the disagree (federal and 281 S.E.2d at 773 state due situation distinguishing the of termination S., process give right counsel); M. parent-child relationship. to 169 of the court This N.J.Super. 209, 216, right appeal dealt with the to counsel on (1979) A.2d of In termination situation the case to (right unspecified basis); counsel on Chambers, re Interest of 261 Iowa R., Madeline G. David Misc.2d (1967). statute involved (1978) (federal N.Y.S.2d gave right there parent an attor- counsel); and state due trial, ney this court extended Coll, - Pa.Super. -, Corra 451 A.2d appeal. on While court relied (1982); State ex rel. Graves v. Daugh so, doing statute in also based the (W.Va.1980) erty, 266 S.E.2d Gault, holding on In re (due process state constitution clause of counsel). generally An gives Gault on a guar- was founded constitutional not., 4 A.L.R. 4th 363 antee of I do not think cre- counsel. the results indicates parent-child relationship any ation of the jurisdictions other are seriously these un- less vital for all concerned than termination rely courts on dermined the extent those relationship. rather constitutional state than federal Snodgrass and he desires relying But on grounds. the states their counsel. my opinion process own constitutions have due clauses ceedings go forward under the Unit- cannot identical our state due clause. ed or the Iowa States Constitution Consti- I, (“[n]o per- Compare Iowa Const. Art. § represented. tution unless he is I would life, deprived liberty, son shall be reverse the judgment. law”), property, due Const., I, 7; language Art. C.J., same Alaska REYNOLDSON, and McCORMICK 13; JJ., Const., I, Const.1963, join LARSON, Art. Mich. in this dissent. Calif.

Case Details

Case Name: State Ex Rel. Hamilton v. Snodgrass
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Oct 27, 1982
Citation: 325 N.W.2d 740
Docket Number: 66493
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.