State ex rel. Hamblin v. City of Brooklyn

Aug 18, 1993

No. 91-1773

Versions:67 Ohio St. 3d 152

616 N.E.2d 883

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

Wе hold that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in finding particular witness statements to be exemрt trial preparation materials under R.C. 149.43(A)(4) or in finding certain forensic documents to be exempt investigatory work product, R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).

Here, the court of appeals performed the mandated individualized scrutiny of the records. See State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786; State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 77, 566 N.E.2d 146. Previously, we chose to defer to the discretion ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍of the court of appeals that performed an in camera review. State ex rel. Williams v. Cleveland (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 544, 549, 597 N.E.2d 147, 151. “[R]eversal of the factual determinations of the appellate court relative to disclоsure made during its in camera review would be inappropriate absent an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Watkins (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 129, 136-137, 609 N.E.2d 551, 558.

Admittedly, “[w]e have recognized, on numerous occasions, the limited availability of the trial preparation exception.” State ex rel. Williams v. Cleveland, supra, 64 Ohio St.3d at 546, 597 N.E.2d at 149. Nonеtheless, “witness statements have been found ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍to be exempt trial preparation records.” State ex rel. Johnson v. Cleveland (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 331, 332, 603 N.E.2d 1011, 1012.

The court of appeals exercised its discretion properly here in finding that these witness statements qualified as trial рreparation records. That court found that those statements “transcend the mere chronicling of fact” and “are the exact words of a possible trial witness, signed by the witness and taken to furnish the prosecutor with the requisite direct testimony.” Further, their form ensured authenticity, and the statements could be used to impeach the witness or to refresh recollection. Uncontradicted evidence existed that these statements “were specifically prepared * * * for the sole purpose of providing the prosecutor with the information necessary to present the case to the grand jury and to a jury at the criminal trial.”

We reject Hamblin’s claim thаt the city “may have waived” its exemption to public release. We need not consider a claim of error not raised before the court trying the case. State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364.

Finally, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretiоn in finding that scientific and forensic tests and submissions for such tests qualified as exempt work product under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c). See State ex rel. Williams v. Cleveland, supra, 64 Ohio St.3d at 548, 597 N.E.2d at 150; State ex rel. Johnson v. Cleveland, supra, 65 Ohio St.3d at 333, 603 N.E.2d at 1013; State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Rauch (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 100, 12 OBR 87, 465 N.E.2d 458.

In sum, Hamblin has not demonstrated that the court of ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍appeals abused its discretion in finding, after an in camera inspection, that certain documents were exempt from release. That “reasoned, logical conclusion need not be disturbed on аppeal.” State ex rel. Johnson v. Cleveland, supra, at 332-333, 603 N.E.2d at 1013.

Judgment affirmed.

Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Wright and Resnick, JJ., concur. Douglas, J., concurs in judgment only. Pfeifer, J., dissents. F.E. Sweeney, J., not participating.

Dissenting Opinion

Pfeifer, J.,

dissenting. David Hamblin fatally wounded Lillian Merrick on October 13, 1983. By June 15, 1988, he had been tried and convicted оf the crime and had had his appeal as of right before this court. We upheld the conviction and death sentence, and later in 1988 the United States Supreme Court denied Hamblin’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A), any person convicted of a criminal offense who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of his rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio or United States Constitutions may file an action with the sentencing court stаting the grounds for relief and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence. In conjunction with such an action, defendants routinely seek to review the prosecutor’s file regarding their case.

It is apparent that litigating the denial of a public records request for the prosecutor’s entire file has now become ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍an effective strategy to delay the imposition of the death penalty in Ohio. This case is a classic example.

It has been over four years since David Hamblin’s counsel made their public records request to the city of Brooklyn. For four years the state of Ohio has fed, clothed and housed a man that the people of Ohio have legally found to be unworthy of life. For four years the victim’s family has had to live with the thought that thе person who took their loved one’s life remains able to live his own. And for four years the deterrent value оf Ohio’s death penalty statute has been steadily eroded.

The perpetrators of death penalty сrimes exact a huge toll on our society. First, there is the loss of the life of the- innocent victim and the concomitant emotional and psychological cost to the victim’s family, friends, and community. Then, there are the mоre measurable costs of confinement and legal costs for the defendant’s seemingly endless appеals. A further hidden cost is the death penalty defendant’s drain on the resources of our public defenders, resоurces which could be better put to use for the defense of indigent defendants at the trial level. Finally, there is а cost to the philosophical validity of the death penalty statute, which is hopelessly undermined when aрpeals and the habeas corpus process routinely cover the span of two decades.

Our courts must do what is within their power to control those costs. The best way to do that is to open ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍the proseсutor’s entire file at the conclusion of a death penalty defendant’s statutory appeals process.

Also, for post-conviction relief to be meaningful, a defendant needs access to the file that is the one most likely to contain information regarding questionable prosecution tactics. If the prosecutor’s file contains information that indicates the defendant’s death sentence was somehow wrongfully obtained, then clearly the defendant and the trial court should be provided that information for the post-conviction relief hearing.

In this case, the prosecutor should have opened his entire file immediately upon the defendant’s request. Since the prosecutor did not, the trial court should have ordered him to do so. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.