State ex rel. Gunter v. ThompsonState ex rel. Gunter v. Thompson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Sayre
Appellees are exercising authority as a board of public safety for the city of Montgomery by virtue of an act entitled: “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to provide and create a commission form of municipal government and to establish same in all cities of Alabama which now have or which may hereafter have a population of as much as twenty-five thousand and less than fifty thousand people, according to the last federal census, or any such census which may hereafter be taken; to regulate the .selection and election of commissioners and their terms of office and recall from office, to fix their powers, duties and compensation, to punish improper conduct in connection with elections and petitions hereunder; to abolish police commissioners, aldermen and certain other city officials, and otherwise provide for the creation and maintenace of said commission form of government/ approved April 6, 1911.”
This amendatory act was passed over the Govern- or’s veto February 5, 1915. Acts 1915, p. 52. This proceeding, an information in the nature of quo warranto, attacks the constitutional validity of the last-act on various grounds.
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No legislative powers, unless the fixing of salaries for its officers and agents be such, are given to the board. Its function is to exercise control over the personnel and practical operations of the departments committed to its care.
The main argument on this branch of the case is that the provision for a board of public safety with the powers indicated is a radical departure from the fundamental theory and principle of the commission form of government which, counsel say, consists in the concentration of all municipal powers in a few persons who must be elected by the people and kept directly under their control by various provisions such as the recall, initiative, and referendum, and others calculated to taire city government out of politics and to prevent corruption in administration. Hence the conclusion is drawn that the change ingrafted upon the previous government by the creation- of an independent board of safety, *567elected by the Senate and not subject to recall by tlie people, is not clearly expressed in the title of the act, which announces the purpose to provide and create a commission form of municipal government.
The most general and comprehensive idea expressed in the title of this act, the expression of legislative purpose to which all else in the title may be, and to which all else in the body of the act must be referred, is “to provide and create a commission form of municipal government.” It is the settled construction of the constitutional rule that so long as the generality of the title is not made a cover for legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having necessary or proper connection between its parts, there is no cause of objection. — State v. Street, 117 Ala. 203, 23 South. 807. Counsel for relators would have the court make to the details of this statute a Procrustean application of a certain conception that has been evolved by their own learned reflection upon ideals of government. But we have been unable to find any authoritative hard and fast definition of the commission form of government that descends into all the details of the plan, nor do we believe any such definition exists in the popular mind. The general idea suggested by the phrase is that of a concentration of all the powers of municipal government in a few persons; of a government by a committee chosen from the community at large, rather than by a mayor and the old familiar board of aldermen, which experience teaches are too often chosen that their first consideration may be given to the interests of parties and the restricted constituencies by which they are elected. It may be conceded that the plan, as thus far developed, usually, though not universally, incorporates popular *568elections, the referendum, and the recall, as the plan of this act does in respect of the commission, though not as to the auxiliary hoard of safety; but it has by no means reached the stage of a scientific formula. It has undergone many modifications in its brief history; several varieties of it are noAV extant in other states; and it Avould lay too heavy a burden on the court if it Avere required to say just AAdiat fixed ideas, other than that to Avhich Ave have referred, the collocation of words commonly employed to describe these forms of municipal government carries in the popular mind, AAdiich, it must be presumed, Avas the mind of the Legislature in the enactment of this law. We feel safe in saying that the act sets up a commission form of government within the broad general meaning of its caption. Whether the plan here is faulty, as counsel insist, consideration of its practical wisdom is not for us, but for the Legis lature, the power of which, within the limits set by state and federal Constitutions, cannot be confined, either for causes or persons. — Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, 44 Am. Rep. 128. That it sets up, in addition to the main commission, another to which it commits the administration of certain important functions of municipal governments — unwisely it may be — does not- take the plan Avithout the general idea of a commission form of government.
“The distinction is this: That a law applying to a certain class of cities, fixed by previous legislation, into which other municipal corporations may enter, and from which they may pass into other classes, by increase of population, is not special, but general, since the grade of any particular city is not designated by the act, but depends upon its growth in population, as it may, by such growth, pass from one grade or class to another.” — State v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St. 90, 23 N. E. 931, 21 Am. St. Rep. 772.
Numerous examples of the application of this principle may be found at page 874 of 21 Am. St. Rep., and elsewhere, in judge Freeman’s note to State v. Ellet. The leading brief against the present act employs harsh language in attributing unworthy motives to its framers, and folly, ignorance, and inattention to the Legisla-, ture in its passage. But these suggestions, proceeding, so far as we are informed by the record before us, wholly and [done upon the single fact that the act in its pres*571ent conditions operates upon only one city, ignore the reason and authority of the cases we have cited, to which might he added others from eminently respectable! courts.
Counsel have argued the question whether the provision of the act that “no person shall be eligible to the office of president or member of the board of commissioners of any such city * * * ■ who shall, either by election or appointment, have held the office of president or member of the board of commissioners of any *574such city three consecutive years within the four years immediately preceding* the date of the election of the hoard of commissioners/’ is unconstitutional as applied to the present commissioners. This question is moot. It is not raised by the record. Nor can we anticipate that it will ever be raised. Nor- would we be justified in any confident assumption of a full acquaintance at this time with all the considerations that may be brought to the court’s attention by the parties then in interest should the question be raised in the future. We have therefore not considered it to- be the part of wisdom to indicate an opinion, which at best would be advisory only.
We have thus considered the questions raised by the record, and it results from what we have said that we are in accord with the views which have found able expression in the opinion of the learned special judge who heard the case in the court below, and that the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur.