101 Neb. 263 | Neb. | 1917
Lead Opinion
In this action the relators, appellants, pray a peremp- • tory writ of mandamus against respondents, to compel the admittance of certain applicants to free high school'privileges in the high schools of the Omaha school district, by
Under the provisions of our Constitution relating to equality in taxation, any law imposing an unfair or unequal burden of taxation upon one school district for the benefit of another would be unconstitutional. This was held in High School District v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 117. Afterwards, in Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, we held that the court would not assume without proof that a fee fixed by law was not compensatory.
The law under consideration provides that such school district as may be “unable to furnish accommodations to nonresident pupils, without constructing or renting additional buildings, hiring extra teachers, or other reasonable cause, may refuse admission to any or all such nonresident pupils.” Rev. St. 1913, sec. 6813, subd. 6. It was evidently the view of the legislature that, since such expenses- would be incurred in any event, if no additional expense was imposed upon the receiving district for teacher’s wages or for buildings and their upkeep, the sum of $1 a week would cover all additional cost. The school district is abundantly fortified against imposition by reason of the statutory right that is given to it to deny admittance when its school accommodations and facilities are insufficient to give proper care and attention to its own resident pupils as well as to those seeking admittance from another school district.
' The respondent school district admits that it has at present facilities for additional pupils, and the evidence shows that the statutory fee of $1 is fully compensatory for the additional expense which would be incurred by reason of the proposed attendance of nonresident pupils.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony with the views expressed in this opinion.
Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Under democratic institutions, it ought never to happen that one community should he required to bear the burdens of another. Especially is that true where the burden involves taxation, and under a Constitution like ours where its framers undertook to provide every possible safeguard which they thought necessary to secure equality. This question is discussed at length in High School District v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, where Judge Nor val came to the conclusion that any attempt at fixing an arbitrary sum which one school district must pay another for educational privileges must fail, because, in the nature of the case, the sum arbitrarily fixed would be either too great or too little, putting an unfair burden on one district or the other, to be raised by taxation. I cannot help but think that this is true. I agree that the opinion is in accordance with the rule laid down in Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, and that the fee is compensatory in the sense urged. The trouble is, its reasoning proves too much. If it is lawful to eliminate overhead expenses, as is done in this case, then the amount which the outlying district might be required to pay might become merely nominal; $5 a year might cover it. Then a situation could arise wherein the community supporting the school would pay by taxation $100 a year per pupil for its own resident pupils and be forced to give to nonresident pupils the same privileges for $5 a year, which, while it would meet the additional expense for the nonresident pupil, would be far less than the actual cost, and less than what I think can be fairly considered as compensatory.
Educational privileges are no doubt important to the future welfare of the state, but not more so than the preservation of those principles of equality embodied in the Constitution, or the necessity of abiding by them until the Constitution is changed. .
