State ex rel. Green v. Lawrence Bridge Co.State ex rel. Green v. Lawrence Bridge Co.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Horton
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Horton, C. J.:This is an action in the nature of quo warranto,, brought originally in this court by the state of Kansas, ex rel. James W. Green, county attorney of Douglas county, as plaintiff, charging C. W. Babcock and his associates with wrongfully assuming to exercise corporate rights *454as the “Lawrence Bridge Company,” and with claiming and using, without any lawful warrant, grant, or charter, the liberties, privileges and franchises of having and maintaining a bridge over and across the Kansas river at the city of Lawrence, and of asking, demanding and taking certain tolls and duties of and from all persons crossing, passing over, and using the said bridge. The petition also alleges that the bridge is a highway across the said river, at Lawrence, and the only means accessible to the public of crossing the river for many miles on either side of the bridge. The plaintiff asks that the defendants be enjoined perpetually from exercising corporate rights as the “Lawrence Bridge Company;” from demanding or receiving tolls; from obstructing or removing the said bridge or highway, and from all interference therewith. To the petition of plaintiff, the defendants pleaded that, by the act of the late governor and legislative assembly of the territory of Kansas, entitled “An act to incorporate the Lawrence Bridge Company,” approved February 9, 1858, the exclusive right and privilege of building and maintaining a bridge across the Kansas river at the city of Lawrence was granted, for the period of twenty-one years, to defendant C. W. Babcock and others, or their assigns, and such other persons as might be associated with them for that purpose, and that they and their associates, or a majority of them, were authorized to form a company to be known as the “Lawrence Bridge Company,” with capital stock to the amount of $375,000, in shares of $100 each, and power was given by that act to prescribe by-laws for the regulation of said company, receive and collect subscriptions to such capital stock, and establish and collect tolls for crossing said bridge; that under said act and certain amendatory acts thereto, the said C. W. Babcock and his associates duly organized the Lawrence bridge company, and before October 1st, 1863, constructed and completed the said bridge across the Kansas river, at Lawrence, at the cost and expense of $75,000, and have ever since maintained and been in the possession of it; that to continue and perpetuate the existence *455•of the Lawrence bridge company, with all the privileges and franchises conferred upon it by the provisions of the said .act of incorporation of 1858, and acts amendatory thereto, the corporation on February 8, 1879,‘by a vote of its board ■of directors, accepted all the provisions of the act of the legislature of the state entitled “An act concerning private corporations,” approved February 29, 1868, and all acts of the legislature of the state amendatory to that act, applicable to the exclusive right and privilege of building and maintaining .a toll-bridge across the Kansas river at Lawrence, and the collection of tolls, but said corporation did not abandon, by •such acceptance, any privilege or franchise conferred upon it by its acts of incorporation, consistent with the provisions of the general incorporation act of 1868, and that therefore by virtue of § 25 of said general incorporation act of February ‘29, 1868, (Gen. Stat. 196, 197,) and by the filing of the said certificate of acceptance, the bridge company, from February •8, 1879, has had the exclusive right to carry out its objects, as described in the special acts of its incorporation, without .any limitation as to time, and is still the owner of the bridge, with all its original franchises and privileges, including the franchise of being a corporation and the taking of tolls. •Some other matters are stated in the answer, but it is unnecessary to refer more fully to the defenses. The twenty-one years given by the special act of Feb. 9, 1858, incorporating the Lawrence bridge company, within jvhich it had the right to build and maintain a bridge across the Kansas river at Lawrence, and collect tolls on such bridge, expired before the commencement of this suit. Hence, the first and important question which is presented for our consideration is, whether this company was continued and perpetuated as an incorporation for all time, with all the privileges and fran•chises originally conferred under its special charter of February 9,1858, and the amendments thereto, by. the action of its board of directors accepting, on February 8, 1879, certain •provisions of the general act of 1868 concerning private corporations, and forthwith filing a copy of such acceptance with *456the secretary of state ? This inquiry leads to an examination-of § 25, ch. 23, Gen. Stat., and necessarily compels us to pass-upon the validity of so much of that section as attempts to-authorize corporations organized under special laws of the territory to continue to enjoy and exercise all their powers,, privileges and franchises originally conferred, for an indefinite-period beyond the limit of their chartered existence.
*460
There is no hardship in this result.. Toll-roads or turnpikes and plank roads, constructed under public authority for public use by incorporated companies, with provisions in the acts of incorporation for their management, are common highways; and the only difference between them and other common highways is, that instead of being made at the public expense in the first instance, they are authorized and laid out by public authority and made at the expense of individuals or corporations in the first instance, and the cost of construction and maintenance is reimbursed by tolls, levied by public authority for the purpose. (Angelí on Highways, §§ 8, 9 and 14.)
By analogy, considering the manner the bridge in controversy was built, its situation and use, it bears a close relation to toll and plank roads. In this case, the bridge company has received tolls for over fifteen years, and located as the bridge has been at a point of great travel and business interests generally, it is very probable that the tolls have been more than sufficient to repay the cost of its construction and maintenance. At least, we may assume that this was the hope of the corporators in accepting the provisions of the charter, and in constructing the bridge; and we cannot believe they have been the unfortunate victims of a harsh contract. If not, no injustice is sustained by them, that the bridge on the expiration of their franchise or license to take tolls, becomes free to the use of every citizen, as other public highways. If the claim of defendants is valid, that the bridge itself is the private property of the stockholders, to be hereafter managed by them or through their trustees, then the expiration of the charter of the corporation would be beneficial rather than in*462jurious to them, for it would emancipate the bridge from the control of the law, and convert the limited privileges of the stockholders into a broad, unbounded license. We do not mean that it could not be ultimately taken and condemned for a highway if it were needed, but unless so taken and condemned they could use it, as other people use their own, run it on their own account, charge what tolls they pleased, close it up or open it when they thought proper, and disregard every interest except their own. This claim of counsel overlooks the fact that the bridge was constructed under authority obtained from the public, and that the public have already paid for it by tolls levied by public authority. In this condition of affairs, the public have some rights in the continuance of the bridge or highway in its present position. Under §42, ch. 23, Gen. Stat., the officers or ‘managers of the late corporation have full authority to settle the business of the corporation, and divide the moneys and other property among the stockholders; but the bridge being an extension of the highway over the Kansas river and a part of the public highway, is not the property of the stockholders of the ‘late corporation, but is a public road which every citizen has the right to use. The period during which it was lawful for the corporation to take tolls has long since expired, and now neither the officers, managers nor stockholders .of said corporation have any further control over the bridge or highway. They cannot obstruct it, or collect tolls, or remove or otherwise interfere with it.
The injunction prayed for in the petition of plaintiff will be granted, and such injunction will be made perpetual. Costs are also adjudged against the defendants.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur with the Chief Justice in the first and second propositions stated in the syllabus of this case. I have no doubt concerning the uncónstitutionality of §25 of the corporation law of 1868. (Comp. Laws of 1879, p. 220.) For while said section, so far as it applies to this case, is in form a general law, yet it is in fact nothing but an *463omnibus special act, attempting to confer corporate powers. With reference to the third proposition of the syllabus, I have such grave doubts that I do not wish to express any opinion.
Brewer, J.:It seems to me that the grave question in this case is as to the unconstitutionality of said § 25. It certainly is in form a general law. It purports to apply not to a single corporation, but to all corporations of a particular class. A law concerning cities of the first class applies at present to only a single corporation, but as it applies to all corporations of that class it is unquestionably a general law. This section not only purports to apply to all corporations of a particular class, but does in fact apply to many corporations. It grants to all such corporations the same power — that of self-perpetuation; and while the wisdom of such legislation may be doubted, yet I am not clear that it is beyond the legislative power. But my associates are clear that the section, so- far as this case at least is concerned, is unconstitutional, and that therefore all charter privileges of the defendant have ceased.
It seems to me to follow from this that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment; for I agree with the Chief Justice, that the bridge is a permanent structure on the public highway, and under the authorities, when the franchise to take tolls ceases, the right of the public to use the bridge free from any burden of tolls attaches, without any right on the part of the builders to remove the structure and destroy the highway. The right to take tolls for a specified number of years was the consideration granted by the public to the defendants for the privilege of placing this improvement on the highway, and the former owners have now no more right to remove the bridge than the owners of a turnpike to tear it up after the franchise to take tolls has ceased.