66 Iowa 26 | Iowa | 1885
This cause has been elaborately argued in print, and orally at bai\ Every conceivable phase of the case has been fully discussed by the able counsel representing the respective parties. The arguments of counsel and the voluminous record have been examined and fully considered, and therefrom we reach the conclusion that the material question to be determined is whether the Ancient
The constitution is lengthy, and contains specific provisions for the government of the order, of which the supreme lodge, as its name indicates, is the supreme authority and head, to which appeals might be taken, and whose decision in relation to any matter legitmately before it is final and conclusive. The material provisions of this constitution will be sufficiently referred to hereafter. In general, it may be now said that under its provisions subordinate lodges might be formed in any state where no grand lodge was in existence, and that such subordinate lodges were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme lodge, and that, when the membership of such subordinate lodges reached a specified number, then a grand lodge might be formed which had j urisdiction over the subordinate lodges in such state, but the supreme lodge had jurisdiction of and the power to control the grand lodge in accordance with the constitution of the supreme lodge and rules of the order. The first meeting of the chosen representatives for the organization of the supreme lodge was held in February, 1873, and, wffien organized, it or its officers became a corporation under a statute of Kentucky, which authorized the incorporation of the “ grand lodge of the A. O. U. W. of Kentucky, and the supreme lodge.” Said statute, among other things, provided that “ a supreme lodge may be established by this grand lodge, in conjunction with other grand- lodges, and when so established the officers thereof and their successors in perpetuity shall become a body politic and corporate, under the name and style of the £ Supreme Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of the United States;’ and on accepting this charter shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities therein contained, with the power to establish other grand lodges
The articles of incorporation of said grand lodge provide that its powers are subject to “such laws, rules and regulations as are now and shall hereafter be prescribed by the sujireme lodge of the A. O. U. W. of the United States.”
In so far as they have any bearing in this case, the provisions of the constitution of the supreme lodge and the grand lodge are the same, and the preamble to the former declares that one of the objects of the organization is “to create a fund for the benefit of its members during sickness or other disability, and in case of death to pay a stipulated sum to such person or persons as may be designated by eaeh member.” This fund, payable on the death of a member, is known as the beneficiary fund, and is created by the payment- by the members of specified sums of money as dues, and on the death of a member assessments are made on the members for certain sums of money to pay the death loss of $2,000. When there is a grand lodge in any state, it is obligated to pay, and is charged with the duty of collecting and disbursing, such money. The grand lodge of Iowa had so obligated itself, and was charged with such duty at the time the differences between it and the supreme lodge occurred, as will be presently stated. At a meeting of the supreme lodge, held in Boston in 1880, an amendment to the provisions of the constitution in relation to the beneficiary fund was adopted, and afterwards, at a meeting of said lodge, held in Detroit, in 1882, the provisions so adopted were amended. By the amendments to the constitution so adopted, what is
No person can be admitted as a member of the order unless he is a free, white male, of the full age of 21 years, and under 50 years old. He must be of good moral character, competent to earn a livelihood for himself- and family, and a believer in the existence of a Supreme Being. In addition to which, he must pass a satisfactory medical examination. A certificate of membership is issued, whereby the order obligates itself to pay the sum of $2,000 on the death of a member, to whomever he may designate, provided all
The petition states “ that one of the principal objects and functions of said association is to secure to each member thereof the payment, on his death, of the sum of $2,000, subject to the fulfillment of the conditions imposed by the constitution and laws of the association.” Counsel for the plaintiffs concede that such pecuniary provision is the same as that secured by ordinary life insurance; but, while this is so, it is contended that the association has no resemblance to any known life insurance company, for the reasons that the relations between such insurance companies and their members are purely business relations, based upon contract, and therefore cannot be changed except by mutual consent. In such associations all that the assured has to do is to pay his dues and assessments; but in this, the right to pecuniary benefits, whether in case of sickness or death, is merely incident to and absolutely dependent upon continued membership in a fraternal society, subject to its laws, present or future, and defeasible by loss or suspension of such membership in any mode or for any cause provided by such laws; such as for immoral and unbecoming conduct, including a malicious or false charge against a “ brother.” On the other hand, the contention of the appellants is that, in order to determine the primary purpose of the association, reference must be had to the conditions of membership and the business conducted; and it is said that there is no dispute but what the applicant for membership must be insurable; that his application must be accompanied by a physician’s certificate to that effect; and that the qualification for membership is made ultimately to depend upon the question as to whether the applicant is insurable, and when he is admitted into full membership a policy of insurance is issued to him, and every member is thus insured; nor can he be a member without keeping his policy in force. If he fails to pay dues and assessments, his membership in the; association is forfeited.
Elaborate and -stringent provisions are made in relation to the beneficiary fund payable on the death of a member, and for collecting and enforcing the payment of such amounts as are assessed on each member; but we have been unable to discover any provision for enforcing any of the other declared objects of the association stated in the preamble to the constitution of' the supreme lodge, including “sick benefits.” If the provisions of a fraternal character be eliminated from the association, its primary and only purpose is that of a life insurance organization. State v. Bankers’ & Merchants’ Mut. Ben. Ass’n, 23 Kan., 499; Folmer’s
We are satisfied, from an examination of the record, that the primary object and purpose of the association of the Ancient Order of United Workmen is to provide a beneficiary fund to be paid upon the death of each member, and that the avowed fraternal character of the association is merely incidental thereto. In fact, we go further than this, and from the record find that one of two things is true; that is to say, either the fraternal objects of the association as avowed have been abandoned, or they never were intended to be enforced. We find no evidence of their enforcement, or that they were ever regarded as material by the members of the association; while, on the other hand, the provisions in relation to the beneficiary fund have been enforced, and the accumulation and payment of such fund has been regarded as the object and purpose of the association. Therefore it must be regarded as a life insurance organization, and within the provisions of the statute which provides that “ no foreign life insurance company, aid society, or association for the insurance of the lives of its members, and doing business on the assessment plan, shall be allowed to do business in this state, unless it lias a guaranteed capital of not less than one hundred thousand dollars in the state in which it is organized.” Code, § 1160.
The supreme lodge is a Kentucky organization, and its business and primary purpose is life insurance; and, under the foregoing statute, it is immaterial whether it is incorporated or not, for in either case it cannot do business in this state, for the reason that it has not the requisite guaranteed capital. If it is incorporated in Kentucky, as we think it is, and it has been so held, then, for other reasons, it cannot enforce' the so-called relief law in this state for the purpose of relieving overburdened jurisdictions. Instead of stating the reasons at length, we refer to the following adjudicated
Reversed.