State Ex Rel. Graddick v. RampeyState Ex Rel. Graddick v. Rampey
Rampey, the present mayor of Glencoe, was indicted by an Etowah County grand jury on charges of second degree theft and use of his official position for рersonal financial gain in violation of
Following the conviction, the Glencoe City Council requested Mayor Rampey to resign. He refused, whereupon the State filed the petition for quo warranto pursuant to
No person convicted of embezzlement of the public money, perjury, or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to the legislature, or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this state.
In pertinent parts,
(a) The following pеrsons shall be ineligible to and disqualified from holding office under the authority of this state:
(1) Those who are not qualified electors, except as otherwise expressly provided;
. . . .
(3) Those who shall have been convicted of treason, embezzlement of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery or any other crime punishable by imprisonment in the state or federal penitentiary and those who are idiots or insane; [Emphasis added.]
Rampey‘s motion to dismiss the petition was granted and the trial court issued an order, the pertinent parts of which read:
This cause coming on to be heard on the oral and written arguments of both parties on motion to dismiss heretofore filed by the Defendant, the Court has carefully considered the briefs and arguments of both parties and after due deliberation holds that in accordance with the definitions, as contained in the law dictionaries and the law that the violation of the State Ethics Law is not per se an infamous crime. The Court further finds that the State Ethics Law is a hybrid creature providing a maximum fine and sentence, but not a minimum. The Alabama Criminal Code states a felony as “an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one [year] is authorized by this Title.” The Ethics law is not contained in the Criminal Code, but is a separate Section and Title of the Alabama Code. Therefore, this definition is not controlling in this
case and the Court must look elsewhere for an answer. Ordinarily and historically, a felony is one of which a sentence has been imposed of more than 1 year. The jury brought in a verdict of guilty and the Court imposеd a fine of $5,000.00, but no jail or prison term was imposed, therefore, the Court holds the conviction of the Defendant as a misdemeanor.
The Court, therefore, grants the Defendant‘s motion to dismiss thesе proceedings.
It is apparent that final judgment was grounded on the conclusion that a violation of
No mention is made in the judgment of the State‘s alternative theory of disqualification under
One convicted of a crime “punishable by imprisonment in the state or federal penitentiary” is “ineligible to and disqualified from holding office” under subsection (a)(3) of
Rampey argues there are only three possible mеchanisms by which an officeholder can be removed: (1) impeachment under
He does not refute that quo warranto is a proper remedy for preventing one who fails to meet the qualifications of § 60 to assume office; but rather he contends, the qualifications of one to hold an office, duly elected and qualified аt the time he assumed that office, may only be tested by that section of the Constitution.
However, initially it was made clear in Finklea v. Farish, 160 Ala. 230, 49 So. 366 (1909), that the legislature has full authority to impose qualifications for public office in addition to those required by thе Constitution.
Thereafter, in State ex rel. Coe v. Harrison, 217 Ala. 80, 114 So. 905 (1927), this court held that a Dothan city councilman who was eligible to that office when elected but who failed to pay a poll tax while in office thereby vacated the officе because of Code 1923, § 1761, which required every city councilman to be a qualified elector of the city in which he “shall have been elected.” In so holding, the court stated:
Appellee‘s view is that the section governs eligibility to office, but not the qualification of the councilman to continue to hold office, once he is elected and inducted into office according to law. We have been unable to accept that view.
Although § 1761 was not the same provision which we presently consider, it was construed in conjunction with Code 1923, § 2575, the precursor of
Such was the mandate of this court in State ex rel. Chambers v. Bates, 233 Ala. 251, 171 So. 370 (1936), where, in affirming the ouster of a Mоbile city commissioner in a quo warranto proceeding, the court declared:
But the Legislature cannot prescribe as a cause for removal any conduct or omission while in оffice, except such as is authorized by section 173 for impeachment, but may provide for removal by quo warranto, for something which renders him incapable of holding the office or ineligible to it. If the candidate or officeholder violates the Corrupt Practice Act in a way which makes him ineligible or disqualified, by its terms, he thus becomes a usurper or intruder, or unlawful
holder of the office, and may be removed by quo warranto. [Citation omitted and emphasis added.]
Similarly, interpreting the progenitor provision of
. . . We do not question the power of the Legislature to declare a public officer convicted by due process of law and sentenced tо imprisonment ineligible to further hold the office, and to declare the office vacant unless and until the judgment of conviction is reversed and the sentence to imprisonment vacated. [Emphasis added.]
Although none of these decisions were primary interpretations of
Furthermore, we think the natural import of the language of
The remaining issue is whether Rampey‘s conviction for violation of
As mentioned, although Rampey was only fined, in the amount of $5000, any person found guilty of violating the Code of Ethics for Public Officials, Employees, and others, is subject to a possible punishment of a $10,000 fine and 10 years imprisonment under the provisions of
Having determined, from our examination of
Also, we need not address the State‘s contention that Rampey was disqualified from office under subsection (a)(1) of
The judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Taking judicial notice of the fact that Rampey‘s conviction, which serves as the basis of this action, is presently on appeal before the Court of Criminal Appeals, we suggest the trial court take that fact into consideration in determining when to go forward with further proceedings in this case.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SH