172 Ind. 619 | Ind. | 1909
Lead Opinion
Appellant’s relator instituted this action in the Warren Circuit Court on January 23, 1907, by a complaint in two paragraphs, and then filed an affidavit for a change of venue from that county, pending which, defendant filed a demurrer for want of facts to constitute a cause of action, to each paragraph of the complaint. The venue was changed to Fountain county, where such demurrer was sustained, and exception reserved by relator, and on his motion, third and fourth paragraphs of complaint were filed in that court. A demurrer for want of facts, addressed to each additional paragraph of complaint, was sustained and exception reserved; and, refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered that relator take nothing by his complaint, and for costs. Error is assigned as to each of these rulings.
Appellant here states that his whole case “is set forth in paragraphs three and four of the complaint,” so that we have not considered the first and second paragraphs.
The substance of the third paragraph of complaint is that appellant’s relator and appellee are separate owners of individual telephone exchanges in the town of West Lebanon, Indiana, established under public franchises granting the
The fourth paragraph is substantially the same in its allegations as the third, except that no reference is made to the alleged “working agreement,” or the agreement as to the Danville connection, or the notice of December 27, 1906, but is grounded upon the allegations that for more than two years each of them has been, and is now, carrying on the business for hire for the public generally, and holding himself out to the public as ready to- serve all without discrimination, and that each is conducting his business under a public franchise from the town of West Lebanon for the use of the streets, alleys, and public places, and on the highways between said town, and adjoining towns and cities; that for more than two years last past the switchboards of the telephone plants of relator and appellee have been connected, and are now connected, by which the patrons of each have interchangeable local, and long distance service, and that during all that time said connection existed with the consent of both parties; that the telephone facilities furnished by the telephone plants in the towns of Ambia, Williamsport and Boswell are substantially the same as those furnished by the parties hereto to their patrons.
Aside from this proposition, the statute itself is controlling. Section 272 Burns 1908, §271 R. S. 1881, provides that “no action shall abate by the death or disability of a party, or by the transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of action survive or continue. * * * In case of any other transfer of interest, the action shall be continued in the name of the original party; or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action. ’ ’ The motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied. See, also, Tate v. Hamlin (1895), 149 Ind. 94; Shedd v. Disney (1894), 139 Ind. 240.
Relator urges the sufficiency of the third and fourth paragraphs of the complaint on the grounds: (1) That telephone companies are subject to the rule governing common carriers, and are bound to furnish equal facilities to all per
The private right of property and of contract may not be thus interfered with. We are treating now only of the relations of these gwasi-public utilities, where there is no statutory regulation, and no contractual relation, express or implied.
In Shelbyville R. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (1885), 82 Ky. 541, it was held that one railroad company connecting with another, one-half mile from an established station of the latter, though there had been at one time an agreement between the two companies, which had been abrogated, by which the cars of each had been hauled over the road of the other, and the complaining company at the time the suit was brought was running its ears on the half-mile of track of the other company, by permission, did not authorize the connecting company to demand that the one company should permit the use of its engines and cars on the half-mile of track. To do this, says that court, would be destructive of appellee’s franchise, and it would be to allow, without even the pretense of legislative sanction, the one company to take the property of another, and appropriate it to its own use. ’ ’ The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was chartered in 1826 by the State of Maryland, without any reservation of the right of amendment or repeal. One section of the charter provided that no use of this company’s roads should be made by any other company without the consent of the then chartered company.
In 1874 the legislature of Maryland passed an act requiring all railroads within that state to permit the crossing or connecting roads to use not to exceed five miles of track of another line, and this was held to be an invasion of the char
In Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. United States (1876), 93 U. S. 442, 23 L. Ed. 965, under an act of congress, granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad, and providing that “said railroad shall be and remain a public highway for the use of the government of the United States, free from all toll, or other charges for the transportation of any property or troops of the United States,” it was held that such provision means transportation by the United States by its own means; but that when transportation was required to be made by the railroad company, it was entitled to compensation.
The constitution of Colorado, providing that “all individuals, associations and corporations shall have equal rights to have persons and property transported over any railroad in this state, and no undue or unreasonable discrimination shall be ma'de in charges or facilities for transportation of freight or passengers within the State, and no railroad company, nor any lessee, manager, or employe thereof, shall give any preference to individuals, associations, or corporations in furnishing ears or motive power” (Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co. [1884], 110 U. S. 667, 4 Sup. Ct. 185, 28 L. Ed. 291), imposes no greater obligation than the common law imposed; and one railroad connecting with another, cannot, by the fact of a physical connection, at any point it pleases, require the line with which it connects, in the absence of some constitution, charter, or statutory regulation, to establish stations for the interchange of freight and passengers at such connections.
Conceding that corporations and individuals operating telephones are subject to legislative regulation, the legislature has made no attempt at requiring connection between
There is, however, as we conceive, a marked difference between furnishing initial, independent service, through or by means of an independent exchange, and secondary service by an interchange of business, or by means of connecting two or more plants; so that for all practical purposes of the users they constitute but one system, for that in effect, as we have seen, in the absence of contract, would amount to practical confiscation of private property.
“Where private property is, by the consent of the owner, invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it subject to the rights of the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit.” Allnutt v. Inglis (1810), 12 East 527. The doctrine of this early case is the acknowledged law. It is stated somewhat differently in Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77, where it is said: “Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affects the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.” It is alleged in this complaint that relator has 200 subscribers to his local line, and appellee has 150, and that they both have toll connections with other towns.
These views seem to us to be of controlling force here. These parties have gone to large expense in constructing their plants, both in, and for many miles in the country around, West Lebanon, and to other towns and cities, presumably upon the ground that such extensions are profitable to each, and the more so by reason of their arrangements for interchange. It cannot reasonably be inferred that either of them contemplated that the other could at his will discontinue that arrangement. Each has doubtless extended his field of operations by reason of their arrangement for interchange, and the very nature of the business is a continuing one.
There is still another feature of the case which is of controlling importance.
The fourth paragraph of complaint eliminates all questions of contract, except a physical connection by agreement, and stands upon the common-law grounds for relief. What we have said as to the third paragraph applies to the fourth, except in respect to the contract feature of the former.
It will be seen from the allegations that the physical connection between the plants has not been severed; that relator
The allegations also show consent to the connection. Having elected to furnish direct physical connection between, and immediate communication with and for other exchanges and their patrons through his exchange in West Lebanon, appellee cannot exclude a like service to an exchange in the same town, for the reason that he is compelled to treat all of the same class alike, and there can, it seems to us, be no rational ground for excluding one exchange, when others are admitted. The act of admitting the connection alleged, is equivalent to a declaration that all will be admitted to the connection, on the terms and conditions imposed as to one or more. Appellee has admitted to his exchange the exchanges of Ambia, Boswell, Williamsport and Danville.
We have given the cause this much attention because of its public interest and character, but the judgment must be affirmed upon other grounds.
We can perceive no distinction in principle between a case where a set-off greater than the amount of toll is claimed to be due, and a controversy over the amount due from the operation of the exchange, especially when that controversy arises respecting an agreement which in any event affects only the Danville line, and is collateral to, and, disconnected from the main operating agreement. That contract might in any event be annulled on thirty days’ notice, but the main agreement is affected with no such condition, and we have held that the tolls must be paid. Irvin v. Rushville, etc., Tel. Co., supra.
The court below did not err, and the judgment is affirmed.
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing.
Suppose the situation should be reversed, and that appellee had received the amount tendered, he would then have been driven to a suit at law to recover what, if any, sum was due to him, and, if relator was in fact indebted to him, he would be put in the situation of furnishing service when relator was owing him for past service, and, if relator could do that, every patron of his plant could do the same, so that the question as here presented is simply one of honest difference as to a sum due, which, under the original opinion, we held must be adjudicated in some other method. To hold otherwise would, in effect, leave public service agencies to continue indefinite and forced service, and be compelled to maintain perhaps interminable and unlimited actions for their compensation, and this the policy of the law does not demand. The public has such an interest that efficient and prompt service, undiminished by depleted revenues, should be maintained.
The reasons for the rule requiring payment of the fixed charges to be made are well stated in the two cases last referred to. The very life and efficiency of relator’s own plant might be menaced by a contrary holding. Ve think the original opinion correct.
The petition for a rehearing is overruled.