State ex rel. Gibson v. SloanState ex rel. Gibson v. Sloan
{¶1} Reginald Gibson petitions this court to issue its writ of habeas corpus to Brigham Sloan, Warden of the Lake Erie Correctional Institution. Mr. Gibson contends Warden Sloan is confining him in contravention of law. We dismiss the petition.
{¶2} In August 2013, Mr. Gibson was convicted of felonious assault and abduction in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, and sentenced to a total term of eight years imprisonment. State v. Gibson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00175, 2014-Ohio-1169, ¶1, 12, 14 (”Gibson I“). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined a discretionary appeal. State v. Gibson, 140 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2014-Ohio-3785. In February 2014, Mr. Gibson petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief, which that court denied on the basis that all claims were barred by res judicata, since they could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Gibson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00039, 2015-Ohio-2055, ¶6 (”Gibson II“). Mr. Gibson further applied to the Fifth District to reopen his appeal, pursuant to
{¶3} December 2, 2014, Mr. Gibson filed the instant petition. March 26, 2015, he moved for judgment on the pleadings, since Warden Sloan had not answered.
{¶4} In Keith v. Kelley, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2009-T-0056, 2009-Ohio-6711, ¶17, this court stated: “In regard to the elements of a habeas corpus claim, this court has stated on numerous occasions that such a writ will lie only when the prisoner can establish: (1) an unlawful restraint of his liberty; and (2) the absence of any alternative remedy at law. State ex rel. Waites v. Gansheimer, 11th Dist. No. 2006-A-0003, 2006-Ohio-1702, at ¶4.” In State v. Sands, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-096, 2013-Ohio-2822, ¶19, this court observed: “The court further notes the Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that ‘(r)es judicata bars (appellant) from using habeas corpus to obtain a
{¶5} We have thoroughly reviewed the claims raised by Mr. Gibson in his petition for habeas corpus. They are substantially the same as those raised in his second petition for post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Gibson II at ¶10-42. They all could have been raised on direct appeal, or by way of application pursuant to
{¶6} The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J., THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J., concur.