Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} The primary question before us today is whether an action in mandamus by appellee General Motors Corporation (“GMC”) was the proper vehicle by which to seek relief from the order of appellant Industrial Commission that under R.C. 4123.56, GMC could not claim an offset for taxes withheld on appellant Chester Stephan’s behalf. For the reasons that follow, we hold that mandamus was the proper course of action for this case.
Relevant Background
{¶ 2} On October 5, 1998, Stephan, a GMC employee, suffered a herniated disc in the performance of his duties. Following the injury, Stephan filed a workers’ compensation claim. While Stephan’s claim was pending, GMC paid him $7,091.30 through its wage-replacement insurance program. In making those payments, GMC withheld a portion of each payment and sent the withholdings to federal and state taxing authorities.
{¶ 3} In February 1999, after concluding its investigation of the incident, GMC informed the commission that it would recognize Stephan’s injury as work-related. Stephan was thus entitled to $9,119.71 in temporary total disability (“TTD”) payments for the time he missed. GMC paid Stephan the difference between the TTD benefits and the amount it had already paid him through the wage-replacemеnt program.
{¶4} Stephan, however, believed that he was owed additional compensation because GMC’s payment did not include the taxes GMC previously withheld. A district hearing officer agreed with Stephan that he was entitled to a nеt amount of $9,119.71. GMC appealed, and a staff hearing officer determined that GMC had paid the correct amount and vacated the order. In turn, Stephan appealed to
{¶ 5} GMC then filed a complaint in mandamus in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, seeking an order directing the commission to credit GMC for the tax withholdings in calculating the amount Stephan was owed. After some procedural oddities in the trial court, and a remand from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm.,
{¶ 6} On GMC’s appeal, the court of appeals initially resolved the threshold question of whеther GMC had properly brought the case in mandamus. The appellate court concluded that because GMC did not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, “mandamus was the proper remedy to test the vаlidity of the commission order in the trial court.” State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-373,
{¶ 7} The commission and Stephan filed notices of appeal with this court, and wе granted discretionary jurisdiction.
Analysis
{¶ 8} The first question is whether GMC’s complaint for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue through which to seek relief.
{¶ 9} In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, GMC must establish a clear legal right to the requested rеlief, a clear legal duty on the part of the commission to provide the relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. MetroHealth Med. Ctr. v. Sutula,
{¶ 10} Convеrsely, when a party files an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 2721.02, the party seeks merely a declaration of its “rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Standing alone, a declaratory judgment cannot compel a government official to perform a specific legal duty. State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., AFSCME, Local 11, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations Bd.,
{¶ 11} Because a complaint that seeks to prevent, rather than compel, an action is not proper for mandamus, we must ascertain the substance of GMC’s complaint and its aims. State ex rel. Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic Data Processing Bd. (1989),
{¶ 12} On the other hand, the commission urges us to find that GMC should have filed a declaratory-judgment action coupled with a request for a prohibitory injunction. This position reflects a misunderstanding of the distinction between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. A prohibitory injunction preserves the status quo by enjoining a defendant from performing the challenged acts in the future. State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency,
{¶ 13} R.C. 4123.56(A) provides for “[ojffset of the compensation * * * only upon the prior order of the bureau or industrial commission or agreement of the claimant.” Because the commission already has determined that the amount of Stephan’s workers’ compensation benefits would not be offset by the tax with-holdings made by GMC, a declaratory judgment in and of itself is insufficient to provide adequate relief to GMC. Likewise, a prohibitory injunction would be useless, as the harm suffered by GMC is a past injury, rather than future conduct that GMC seeks to enjoin.
{¶ 14} Therefore, the only way a declaratory-judgment action could provide GMC a remedy is if GMC also sought a mandatory injunction that compelled the commission to vacate the order and enter a new order pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 crediting GMC with the tax withholdings. Cf. State ex rel. Fenske,
{¶ 15} In addition to holding that GMC’s action seeking a writ of mandamus was proper, we agree with the court of appeals that GMC was entitled to the requested writ. The offset statute contains no ambiguity — “compensation paid under this section * * * shall be paid only to the extent by which the payment or payments exceeds the amount of the nonoccupational insurance or program paid or payablе.” R.C. 4123.56(A).
{¶ 16} Although GMC withheld taxes on Stephan’s behalf, the withholdings do not affect the amount GMC paid under its wage-replacement program. The statute simply does not limit the employer’s setoff to the net amount the claimant actually recеives. Under the plain terms of the statute, therefore, GMC is entitled to a setoff for the entire amount GMC paid, including the tax withhold-ings.
Conclusion
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the proper avenue of relief for GMC to challenge the cоmmission’s order was a complaint for a writ of mandamus. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the writ is proper.
{¶ 18} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Both GMC and the commission agree that the commission’s order at issue in this case was not appealable to the trial court under R.C. 4123.512, so our analysis focuses solely on whether an action in mandamus or a declarаtory-judgment action constitutes the appropriate avenue for relief.
. Although a writ of mandamus cannot control the entity’s discretion, a writ can compel the entity to exercise its discretion when it has a clear legal duty to do so. See State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995),
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 19} Chester Stephan suffered a work-related injury and was entitled to temporary total disability payments of $9,119.71 in 1998 and 1999. Before the determination that the injury was work-related, General Motors paid $7,091.30 to Stephan through its wage-replacement insurance program, from which it withheld $1,189.32 for taxes. After the determination that the injury was work-related, General Motors paid Stephan $2,028.41, the difference between the $9,119.71 owed for temporary total disability payments and the $7,091.30 “paid” to Stephan through the wage-replacement insurance program.
{¶ 20} A more reasonable employer might have realized that $1,189 is a much higher percentage of $9,119.71 (Stephan’s disability income resulting from his 1998 injury) than it is of $161,000,000,000 (General Motors’ approximate 1998 revenues). A more reasonable employer might have paid Stephan the amount to which he was entitled and then sought a refund of the taxes paid on Stephan’s behalf. (Such a transactiоn would likely require little more than a couple of phone calls.) Instead, General Motors decided to play hardball with one of its injured employees.
{¶ 21} Today, this court validates General Motors’ decision. Instead, we should dеny the writ and uphold the reasonable decision of the commission, which concluded that Stephan should receive the entire $9,119.71 to which he was entitled. The majority opinion speaks much of General Motors’ lack of an adеquate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The majority opinion has it completely backwards — General Motors wasn’t injured in any way. General Motors didn’t herniate a disc; Stephan did. General Motors isn’t out money to which it is entitled; Stephan is. General Motors should ask one of its tax professionals to request an accounting adjustment from the tax agencies with which it has regular routine contact. General Motors should not require its injured workers to take a crash course on tax procedure.
{¶ 22} I do not believe a writ of mandamus is appropriate in this case for one simple reason: General Motors does not lack an adequate remedy, because it can ask for a rеfund or an accounting adjustment. If the government agencies to which General Motors paid Stephan’s withholding taxes do not grant a refund,